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Abstract 
Forecasts of financial distress have been less frequently studied for privately held firms than 
for publicly traded firms. To contribute to the scarce literature on financial distress prediction 
for private firms, this study develops logistic regression and neural network models to forecast 
financial distress for privately held firms in the European Union using a set of risk factors as 
explanatory variables. Using a very large private dataset of over 6 million firm-year 
observations extracted from the ORBIS database, the study consists of three applications of 
predictive models to financial distress problems: the first focuses on using a set of risk factors 
as early symptoms or indicators of financial distress, the second on estimating financial distress 
prediction models over short and long time horizons and the third on comparing logistic 
regression and neural networks as two distinct classifiers in a very large private dataset.  
This study conducts a descriptive analysis of private firms’ data from 2002 to 2011 in order to 
address the first research problem. The descriptive analysis includes the variation of annual 
failure rates across industries and regions, the association of failure rates with macroeconomic 
variables, and a comparison of firm-specific variables for failed and active firms over a five-
year period leading up to failure. In addition to the effects of industry, region and business 
cycles on failure risk, this study finds that the symptoms of financial distress include a 
relatively constant value of natural logarithm of total assets and a stable increase in 
creditors/total liabilities over a 4-year period prior to failure, and a steady or rapid decline in 
liquidity and asset structural soundness and a stable or rapid increase in leverage over a 5-year 
period prior to failure.  
To address the second and third research problems, this study estimates logistic regression and 
neural network models to predict financial distress for privately held firms over one to five year 
time horizons, incorporating both firm-specific and macroeconomic variables. The study 
provides evidence of the incremental value of macroeconomic variables over firm-specific 
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variables for both logistic regression and neural networks predict financial distress up to as 
early as five years prior to failure with acceptable discrimination. The predictive models 
estimated also allow us to compare the predictive accuracy of logistic regression and neural 
networks in a very large private dataset: over one to two year time horizons, logistic regression 
and neural networks achieve similar predictive accuracy; over three to five year time horizons, 
neural networks outperform logistic regression but not substantially. To check whether the 
finding holds that logistic regression compares well with neural networks, this study conducts 
two additional tests. The first test, which estimates single-period models with the addition of 
new explanatory variables, finds that neural networks do not substantially outperform logistic 
regression until a very large number of explanatory variables are used. The second test 
estimates multiple-period models conditional on the current levels of the continuous variables, 
and their lagged levels and changes separately. The second test yields evidence of the 
overfitting of neural networks: neural networks outperform logistic regression in terms of in-
sample distress prediction, but they compare unfavourably with logistic regression in terms of 
out-of-sample distress prediction. Overall, logistic regression remains a predictive alternative 
to neural networks given its predictive accuracy, high generalisability and highly interpretable 
and easy-to-share output.  
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
Continued interest in financial distress prediction can be attributed to its utility to a wide range 
of stakeholders and its frequency in recent years. Predicting corporate financial distress is a 
very useful matter (Greene 2008, p. 14; Ohlson 1980, p. 111). Its utility lies in the great many 
purposes it serves: the assessment of financial institutions’ stability by regulators (Shumway 
2001, p. 103), credit risk pricing (Duffie & Singleton 2003), lending officers’ decision making 
and the assessment of clients’ going concern status by auditors (Coats & Fant 1993, p. 143). 
The effects of corporate failure during the recent global financial crisis have also contributed 
to continued interest in predicting corporate financial distress (Jones & Hensher 2008, p.1). 
The global financial crisis from 2007 to 2008 was perhaps the worst financial crisis since the 
Great Depression. It started from the subprime mortgage loan defaults in the United States of 
America (USA), the effects of which quickly spread to other countries throughout the world 
via financial markets. During the financial crisis, many public and private corporations 
collapsed or had to be bailed out. Corporate failure during the financial crisis presents an 
intellectual challenge to both researchers and practitioners, and an opportunity to develop 
corporate failure prediction models specifically tailored to the current economic environment.  
1.1 Research motivation 
An extensive literature on predicting financial distress has emerged in the five decades since 
Beaver (1966); however, the main focus has been on public firms due to the availability of data 
(Aziz & Dar 2006, p. 23; Jones & Walker 2007, p. 397; Pompe & Bilderbeek 2005, p. 849).2 
Privately held firms have been studied less frequently primarily because of limited access to 
data. It is particularly important to predict financial distress for private firms for two reasons. 
Firstly, there are many more private firms than public firms. In Australia, 99.9% of firms are 
                                                            
2 There are various business forms, including sole proprietorships, partnerships and companies. Unless otherwise specified, 
firms in this study refer to companies only. Public firms or publicly traded firms refer to companies which are listed on a stock 
exchange whereas private firms or privately held firms refer to companies which are not listed on a stock exchange.  
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small and large proprietary firms which are not listed on the stock exchange (Hanrahan, 
Ramsay & Stapledon 2009, p. 6). In the European Union (EU), 99% of firms are small and 
medium sized enterprises which employ fewer than 250 employees and have either an annual 
turnover of no more than €50 million or an annual balance sheet total not exceeding €43 
million.3 A small enterprise has 50 employees or fewer whereas a micro enterprise has 10 
employees or fewer (the European Commission 2015b).  Most of these small and medium sized 
enterprises are private firms. With headlines frequently dominated by mergers, takeovers and 
bankruptcies of public firms, the media give us an impression that an economy is largely driven 
by public firms, multinational enterprises in particular. However, private firms are the back-
bone of many economies. In the EU, for instance, most jobs are provided by small and medium 
sized enterprises rather than public firms (the European Commission 2015c). Secondly, private 
firms are prone to a higher rate of failure than public firms (Altman 1968; Beaver 1966; 
Falkenstein, Boral & Carty 2000). Thus, it is very important to assess the financial health of 
privately held firms given their economic contributions, higher failure rate and related social 
costs of failure.  
Conversely, the financial health of private firms cannot be assessed by market equity, agency 
ratings, or financial distress prediction models for public firms. Unlike publicly traded firms, 
privately held firms do not have liquid markets for their ownership transfer. Credit rating 
agencies typically only rate the creditworthiness of issuers of debt obligations (e.g., public 
firms, governments and sovereign nations) and debt instruments (e.g., corporate bonds and 
collateralized securities). It is also questionable to generalise predictive models for public firms 
to the prediction of financial distress for private firms due to their considerable differences 
(Bhimani, Gulamhussen & Lopes 2010, p. 518). When reviewing Moody’s proprietary 
predictive model for private firms, Falkenstein, Boral and Carty (2000), demonstrated the 
                                                            
3 An annual balance sheet total is the value of a firm’s main assets. 
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different relations of the same financial ratios to the default of public and private firms. The 
ratio of cash to total assets exhibited a modest relation to the default of public firms, but it was 
found to be the most important single variable in the private dataset. Easy access to capital 
markets makes it unnecessary for public firms to carry a lot of cash and cash equivalents on 
their balance sheets. Yet it is imperative that private firms with limited access to capital markets 
have ample cash and cash equivalents. Falkenstein, Boral and Carty (2000) also demonstrated 
how other ratios related differently to the default of public and private firms. The EBIT/interest 
ratio was among the most important explanatory variables in the public firm dataset and yet 
became a much less valuable variable in the private firm dataset. To predict financial distress 
for public firms, the ratio of total debts to total assets was as good as the ratio of total liabilities 
to total assets; however, in the private firm dataset the ratio of total debts to total assets was 
found to be a much more valuable explanatory variable.4 Not surprisingly, there have been calls 
for attempts to develop failure prediction models for firms other than listed firms (e.g., 
Falkenstein, Boral & Carty 2000, p. 47; Jones 1987, p. 155).  
 1.2 Research questions and contributions 
This study provides a venue for financial distress prediction models for private firms. It aims 
to develop logistic regression and neural network models to predict financial distress for 
privately held firms in the EU using a set of risk factors. The aim of the study is threefold: 
descriptive, predictive and comparative by addressing three research questions: Can one use a 
set of risk factors as early warnings of financial distress for privately held firms? How far ahead 
can financial distress prediction models forecast the financial distress of privately held firms 
with acceptable discrimination? Does logistic regression remain a predictive alternative to 
neural networks in the construction of financial distress prediction models? The area under the 
curve (AUC) of the Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) can be used to measure the 
                                                            
4 Liabilities are more inclusive and include debt, accounts payables and other liabilities.  
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discriminatory power of a model. The generally accepted rule is that a model provides 
outstanding discrimination for AUC values between 0.9 and 1, excellent discrimination for 
AUC values between 0.8 and 0.9, acceptable discrimination for AUC values between 0.7 and 
0.8, and no discrimination for AUC values of 0.5 and below (Hosmer and Lemeshow 2000, p. 
162).  
Unlike prior studies which have tended to focus on estimating financial distress prediction 
models only, this study uses accounting and non-accounting variables as early warnings of 
financial distress for privately held firms in addition to financial distress prediction modelling. 
Early warnings of financial distress do not simply become explanatory variables in predictive 
models for corporate financial distress; they also help stakeholders monitor a firm’s financial 
health continuously and provide them with sufficient lead time to take remedial action. Prior 
studies on the failure of private firms have tended to focus on estimating single-period financial 
distress prediction models. The output of a typical single-period model is a posterior probability 
that a firm will fail over a certain time horizon. These posterior probabilities may not be in time 
to prevent a failure event that is likely to occur in one year or less than one year. The description 
of failed firms and active firms helps stakeholders prevent or detect the financial distress of a 
firm in a timely manner. Take accounting ratios in debt covenants for example. It has been well 
documented in the literature that debt covenants are often put in place to solve agency problems 
between the management of a borrower and creditors (e.g., DeFond & Jiambalvo 1994; 
Ramanna & Watts 2012; Watts & Zimmerman 1986). Debt covenants may require that the 
borrower maintain certain minimum financial ratios relating to liquidity and solvency. These 
ratios help creditors monitor the borrower in a timely manner and prevent it from making 
decisions that may lead to its financial distress to the detriment of creditors. Can one use a set 
of risk factors as early warnings of financial distress for privately held firms? The descriptive 
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statistics in this study will identify a set of risk factors and examine the development of these 
risk factors over time as early warnings of financial distress. 
Following the description of a set of risk factors, the next question arises of how far ahead one 
can predict the financial distress of privately held firms with acceptable discrimination. In the 
EU, a firm’s financial distress can take a number of forms, which include failure to pay a debt 
before a deadline, inability to pay a debt, being in administration or receivership or under a 
scheme of arrangement, liquidation, or applying to the courts for bankruptcy or liquidation. To 
predict these forms of financial distress in the EU, this study considers a number of risk factors 
which serve as predictors as well as early warnings of financial distress. What the study first 
considers are accounting ratios that are constructed from annual financial statement data. The 
management of a firm makes decisions about the firm’s operating, investing and financing 
activities. The resultant effects of their decisions on the survival or failure of the firm can be 
identified through financial statements. Like prior studies, this study selects ratios covering 
liquidity (i.e., working capital/total assets, loans/total assets), solvency (i.e., total 
liabilities/total assets), profitability (i.e., EBIT/total assets) and structural soundness (i.e., 
cash/total assets, creditors/total liabilities, fixed assets/total assets) as independent variables. 
While prior studies have demonstrated the usefulness of accounting ratios to corporate financial 
distress prediction, there are several arguments regarding the usefulness of accounting data and 
ratios calculated from these data. The most obvious concern is the difficulty in measurement. 
The difficulty relates to measurement scales (e.g., Bierman 1969), competing measurement 
bases (e.g., Chambers 1966; Edward & Bell 1961; Sweeney 1930), competing concepts of 
income (e.g., Hicks 1939; Mitchell 1995; Revsine 1970), incorrigibility of allocations (e.g., 
Devine 1985; Thomas 1969), transfer pricing (‘Moving pieces’ 2007), counterintuitive market 
adjustments (e.g., Brubaker 2008; Katz & Reason 2008) and future market based instruments 
(e.g., Benston 2006). To these must then be added the concern of the managerial manipulation 
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of accounting data. The separation of ownership and management creates an incentive for 
managerial opportunism in order to distort or deceive (e.g., DeFond & Jiambalvo 1994; 
Ramanna & Watts 2012; Watts & Zimmerman 1986). There are a number of additional 
problems associated with the use of accounting ratios as explanatory variables of financial 
distress. Not only are financial statements backward-looking and therefore less informative 
about the future of a firm, but they are also prepared under the going concern assumption that 
a firm will not fail in the foreseeable future. Under the conservatism principle, there is a 
tendency to understate the values of assets and thus to overstate a firm’s accounting-based 
leverage measures (Hillegeist et al. 2004). Researchers and practitioners typically select a wide 
range of highly correlated financial ratios. Multicollinearity of financial ratios continues to 
exist although it can be reduced to some extent by a strict selection of less correlated variables 
(Charitou, Neophytou & Charalambous 2004, p. 484; Edmister 1972; Jones 1987, p. 140; 
Pindado & Rodrigues 2004). 
Accounting information is even less verifiable in private firms than in public firms. Accounting 
regulation seldom enhances the reporting quality of private firms to the same extent as it does 
in public firms; thus, the financial information of private firms may be even less reliable than 
that of public firms. In the EU, most publicly traded firms adopt International Financial 
Reporting Standards (IFRS), at least in their consolidated financial statements. For 
unconsolidated financial statements by both private and public firms, however, most European 
countries either require or allow national rules (Nobes 2008). Despite the same national rules 
for public and private firms’ unconsolidated accounting, Burgstahler, Hail and Leuz (2006) 
found that private firms exhibited more aggressive earnings management than public firms in 
the EU because capital markets and institutional factors in public markets provide incentives 
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for public firms to report more informative earnings.5 As prior studies have primarily relied on 
accounting ratios as predictors, the poorer accounting quality of private firms may have been 
responsible for the low accuracy and short time horizons of predictive models for private firms. 
Prior studies have effectively predicted financial distress up to five years prior to the occurrence 
of a financial distress event for public firms but typically up to one year prior to financial 
distress for privately held firms (e.g., Bhimani, Gulamhussen & Lopes 2010; Grunert, Norden 
& Weber 2005; Pindado & Rodrigues 2004).  
Beaver, McNichols and Rhie (2005) found that there was a decline in the predictive power of 
accounting ratios over time, but non-accounting information compensated for this loss in 
corporate financial distress prediction.6 To enhance the predictive accuracy and extend the 
forecasting horizon of models in the prediction of financial distress for private firms, this study 
includes macroeconomic variables in addition to accounting ratios and other control variables. 
With the addition of macroeconomic variables, how far ahead can one accurately predict the 
financial distress of privately held firms? The probability of financial distress is exogenous as 
well as endogenous. The managers of a firm make decisions about the firm’s operating, 
investing and financing activities. The impact of their decisions on the probability of financial 
distress can be partially identified through accounting data. The probability of financial distress 
is also exogenous in the sense that factors in the external environment in which the firm 
operates also have an impact on the firm. In a constantly changing environment a firm faces 
uncertainties arising from macroeconomic conditions and economic policy settings. During the 
2007-2008 financial crisis, for instance, consumers reduced their discretionary spending, which 
had an impact on a firm’s survival. Macroeconomic variables have been used as explanatory 
                                                            
5 As previous studies have often used the conservatism dimension of accounting quality, Burgstahler, Hail and Leuz (2006) 
focused on the degree of earnings management as another dimension of accounting quality. 
6 The non-accounting information in Beaver, McNichols and Rhie (2005) refers to market-based variables including market 
capitalisation, security return and standard deviation.  
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variables in the extensive literature on the prediction of credit risk and corporate failure for 
public firms. The macroeconomic indicators of real GDP, real GDP growth, interest rates, 
inflation, public debt to GDP, unemployment rates and official bankruptcy rates were used as 
predictors of changes in public firms’ credit ratings in Jones, Johnstone and Wilson (2015). 
Duffie, Saita and Wang (2007) used the firm’s trailing one-year stock return, the three-month 
Treasury bill rate, and the trailing one-year return on the S&P 500 index to examine the 
dependence of US public industrial firms’ defaults and other exits on macroeconomic variables. 
Macroeconomic indicators have been utilised to a much lesser extent to predict financial 
distress for privately held firms. It is not clear whether macroeconomic variables can enhance 
the predictive accuracy and extend the forecasting horizon of predictive models for privately 
held firms. Nor is it clear whether the same macroeconomic indicators will exhibit different 
relations to the financial distress of public and private firms. In this study, I will estimate 
probabilities of financial distress for private firms by incorporating both firm-specific variables 
(i.e., accounting ratios, firm size and age) and macroeconomic variables (i.e., international 
reserves per head, unemployment rates and trade balance as a percentage of GDP). It should 
also be noted that of the three macroeconomic variables, international reserves per head and 
trade balance (% of GDP) have not been used as predictors of financial distress in the prior 
literature. Other explanatory variables used in the study include the categorical variables of 
industry and region as they have been widely used in the existing literature (e.g., Bhimani, 
Gulamhussen & Lopes 2010). The use of these predictors is intended to compensate for the 
problems associated with accounting-based measures as explanatory variables.  
Using the above risk factors as predictors of financial distress, I construct financial distress 
prediction models for privately held firms using the traditional statistical technique of logistic 
regression and the machine learning technique of neural networks. The aim is to discover how 
an inflexible but highly interpretable logistic regression model compares with a highly flexible 
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but highly uninterpretable neural network model, and whether logistic regression remains a 
predictive alternative to neural networks. Jones, Johnstone and Wilson (2015) reviewed as 
many as 20 binary classifiers and empirically tested their ability to predict changes in credit 
ratings. At one extreme are simple linear classifiers including linear multiple discriminant 
analysis, logistic regression and probit regression, which generate highly interpretable outputs 
but have limited capability to model nonlinear relationships and interactions. At another 
extreme are fully general and nonlinear models such as neural networks, support vector 
machines, generalised boosting models and random forests, which model nonlinear 
relationships and interactions but generate “black-box” outputs. Between the two extremes lie 
mixed model approaches, such as multivariate adaptive regression splines and generalized 
additive models. To predict financial distress for private firms, this study utilises logistic 
regression and neural networks, which represent the two extremes of the spectrum of binary 
classifiers and have their own unique advantages and disadvantages.  
In the financial distress prediction literature, a number of studies have attempted to compare 
the predictive capacity of logistic regression and neural networks. A general observation from 
these prior studies is that the results have been mixed and conflicting: some studies found that 
neural networks outperformed logistic regression, whereas other studies found that logistic 
regression compared rather well with neural networks. Is a neural network approach 
substantially better than a logistic regression model in terms of their predictive capacity? Tam 
and Kiang (1992) reported conflicting results. They compared traditional statistical techniques 
with machine learning techniques in the prediction of corporate financial distress. After 
estimating models on an estimation sample, they validated these models on a holdout sample. 
In the “t-1” period, a three-layer network achieved the lowest misclassification error rates, 
followed by discriminant analysis, a two-layer network, logit, decision tree and 1 nearest 
neighbour and 3 nearest neighbour. In the “t-2” period, however, logit was the best classifier. 
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They conducted another experiment in which they pooled the two samples and applied a 
jackknife approach by Lachenbruch (1967). In both the “t-1” period and the “t-2” period, the 
three-layer neural network achieved the lowest total misclassification error rate. Altman, Marco 
and Varetto (1994) found that neural networks did not outperform logistic regression. Using a 
dataset of 1,000 healthy, vulnerable and unsound industrial firms in Italy during the period of 
1982 to 1992, they compared linear multiple discriminant analysis, logistic regression and 
neural networks. They did not reproduce empirical results for logistic regression on the grounds 
that logistic regression and linear multiple discriminant analysis achieved very similar results. 
Overall, they found that traditional statistical methods such as multiple discriminant analysis 
and logistic regression compared rather well with neural networks. A more recent comparison 
study is Iturriaga and Sanz (2015), which found that neural networks substantially 
outperformed logistic regression. They developed bankruptcy prediction models for U.S. 
banks. The authors developed up to 3 years prior to bankruptcy prediction models using neural 
networks. When they compared neural networks with two traditional statistical techniques and 
two recent models, they found that neural networks and support vector machine outperformed 
other models including discriminant analysis, logistic regression and random forest. Other 
studies which have compared logistic regression with neural networks include Tseng and Hu 
(2010) and Fedorova, Gilenko and Dovzhenko (2013).7 Not only did these studies report mixed 
and conflicting results, but they also primarily constructed distress prediction models for firms 
other than privately held firms over one to three year time horizons using small datasets: an 
estimation sample of 162 firms and a holdout sample of 158 in Tam and Kiang (1992), an 
estimation sample of 772 firms and a holdout sample of 104 firms in Iturriaga and Sanz (2015), 
an estimation sample of 808 firms and a holdout sample 300 firms in Altman, Marco and 
                                                            
7 Tseng and Hu (2010) compared logistic regression, quadratic interval logistic regression, back-propagation multi-layer 
perceptron and radial basis function network. Fedorova, Gilenko and Dovzhenko (2013) compared multiple discriminant 
analysis, logistic regression, neural networks, classification and regression tress and applied different combinations of these 
learning algorithms.  
25 
 
Varetto (1994), an estimation sample of 61 firms and a holdout sample of 16 firms in Tseng 
and Hu (2010), and finally an estimation sample of 790 firms and a holdout sample of 98 firms 
in Fedorova, Gilenko and Dovzhenko (2013). Using a very large private dataset, this study 
provides a very different setting to compare logistic regression and neural networks over one 
to five year time horizons. In doing so, the study has the potential to contribute to the literature 
which has yielded mixed and conflicting results about the predictive capacity of a neural 
network and logistic regression.  
This study contributes to the literature in several important ways. To begin with, it generates 
valid inferences about the financial distress of private firms. The corporate failure prediction 
literature has been dominated by predictive models for public firms’ failure due to the broad 
availability of reliable and comprehensive data. Yet it is questionable to generalise these 
models to forecasts of financial distress in privately held firms. This study develops corporate 
failure prediction models specifically tailored to the current economic environment in which 
privately held firms in the EU operate. Secondly, using a very large private dataset from the 
EU during the sample period of 2002 to 2011 is a significant contribution to the existing 
literature because a large sample helps generate more reliable findings (Pompe & Bilderbeek 
2005, p. 849). The dataset used in this study consists of as many as 6,011,966 firm-year 
observations in which 358,785 and 5,653,181 firm-year observations relate to failed and active 
firms respectively. The dataset is randomly split into 70% cases and 30% cases: 70% cases are 
used to train predictive models, and 30% cases are used to evaluate the generalisability of the 
derived predictive models. The dataset in the study avoids problems associated with prior 
studies such as a small sized dataset, a matched sample which overstates the proportion of 
failed firms, and the failure to validate an estimated model on a sufficiently large holdout 
sample. Thirdly, in addition to financial ratios and other independent variables, this study 
employs macroeconomic independent variables to predict financial distress for private firms. 
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An implicit assumption made by the majority of prior studies regarding the failure of private 
firms is the endogenous probability of financial distress. The exclusive use of accounting ratios 
as predictors may be responsible for the low predictive accuracy and short time horizons in 
prior studies on the financial distress of private firms. The study assumes that the probability 
of financial distress is both endogenous and exogenous because both managerial decisions and 
the external environment have an impact on the probability of a firm’s financial distress. Not 
only does the use of macroeconomic variables enhance the predictive accuracy and extend the 
forecasting horizon of a predictive model for private firms, but it also provides insights into the 
little known association between the financial distress of private firms and macroeconomic 
indicators. While Falkenstein, Boral and Carty (2000) demonstrated the different relations of 
the same financial ratios to the default of public and private firms, it will be interesting to find 
out whether macroeconomic indicators exhibit different relations to the financial distress of 
public and private firms. Not only can one use financial ratios and non-financial variables as 
predictors of financial distress, but one can also use them in the early diagnosis of a private 
firm’s financial distress. Fourthly, the comparison of logistic regression and neural networks 
contributes to existing comparative studies which seem to have reached no consensus that 
neural networks outperform logistic regression. Also, the majority of comparative studies 
contrasted the two techniques using a small sized sample of firms other than privately held 
firms. Which approach outperforms, logistic regression or a neural network, remains 
unanswered in predictive models for privately held firms. Further studies and tests need to be 
conducted using the two techniques (Altman, Marco & Varetto 1994). By using a very large 
private dataset, this study provides a very different setting to compare logistic regression and 
neural networks over one to five year time horizons. Finally, this study addresses the limitations 
of static models by using multiple-period observations which allow the study to assess the 
effectiveness of decomposing the end-of-year “݌” level of every continuous covariate into their 
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end-of-year “݌ െ 1” level and annual change “∆ݔ௣” (∆ݔ௣ ൌ ݔ௣ െ ݔ௣ିଵ) in predictive models 
for financial distress.  
1.3 Research scope 
The majority of predictive models for the financial distress of private firms have used data 
collected either directly or indirectly from bank client records (e.g., Bhimani, Gulamhussen & 
Lopes 2010; Falkenstein, Boral & Carty 2000; Grunert, Norden & Weber 2005; Pindado & 
Rodrigues 2004). Data from a bank client record are often biased for at least two reasons. A 
bank client record seldom contains unsuccessful prospective clients. When assessing loan 
applications, a bank loan officer will predict financial distress for their prospective clients 
based on a variety of information sources and reject some loan applications. This has been well 
documented in studies in which bank loan officers were found to have achieved a fairly high 
failed and non-failed firm prediction accuracy rate (e.g., Abdel-khalik & El-Sheshai 1980; 
Casey 1980; Chewning & Harrell 1990; Houghton 1984; Hwang & Lin 1999; Libby 1975; 
Zimmer 1980). Yet it is these unsuccessful prospective clients which are more likely to fail in 
the end and need to be included in a sample to estimate financial distress prediction models for 
private firms. Equally important is that many banks sit on the boards of their clients in order to 
monitor their performance and prevent these private firms from taking excessive risks that 
could lead to financial distress. Eisenberg, Sundgren and Wells (1998) found a negative 
association between board size and firm profitability in small and medium sized Finnish firms. 
Arguably, firms with small boards do not have the same degree of agency problems as firms 
with large boards: in the former, owners are presumably the managers. An alternative 
explanation is that firms with large boards include risk-averse bank officers on their boards: 
these bank officers may reduce a firm’s probability of failure by avoiding risky projects at the 
expense of lower profitability. Dittmann, Maug and Schneider (2009) examined the role of 
bankers on the boards of non-financial firms in Germany in the period of 1994 to 2005, and 
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found that banks helped firms with funding in difficult times. As a consequence, the sample 
created from bank records can be very biased and so limit the generalisability of the resultant 
predictive models.  
To avoid a biased and small sized sample, this study uses a very large private dataset extracted 
from the ORBIS database of Bureau Van Dijk (BvD). BvD receives individual datasets from 
as many as 120 sources worldwide (see Table 0.6 in the appendix for a partial list of sources). 
The database contains information on as many as 140 million firms, both public and private, 
although more than 99.9% of the firms covered in the database are privately held firms. It offers 
various subsets of data: approximately 27 million firms in ORBIS-Asia Pacific, approximately 
80 million firms in ORBIS-Europe, and approximately 40 million firms in ORBIS-Americas. 
The information ORBIS provides includes but is not limited to company reports in a standard 
format, global ratios covering profitability, operation and structure, an option to calculate your 
own accounting ratios, directors and contacts, patents, corporate and ownership structures, 
industry research, and macroeconomic indicators. I have chosen the ORBIS database over other 
databases primarily because it is the largest database of private firms in the world and contains 
very extensive accounting and non-accounting information. The accounting information of 
private firms included in the ORBIS database is typically based on unconsolidated financial 
statements, audited and not audited.8 In order to standardise the financial information across 
all countries and enhance its comparability, the ORBIS database harmonises the financial 
information provided by local information providers into its Global Standard Format.  
Among the world regions for which the ORBIS database offers data in this study, I model 
financial distress for private firms in the EU for two reasons. To begin with, the EU has been 
severely affected by the 2007-2008 financial crisis; therefore, it is necessary to develop a 
                                                            
8 As at 28 August 2015, there are around 62 million firms from the EU in the ORBIS database. Among these firms, only 
202,461 provide consolidated financial statements.  
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predictive model for private firms specifically tailored to the economic environment of the EU 
region. The financial crisis that originated in the USA has engulfed Europe since 2007. The US 
financial crisis was triggered by subprime mortgage loan defaults, and quickly spread to the 
EU through the sales of mortgage backed securities. In 2009, for instance, gross domestic 
product (GDP) fell in real terms in all the 28 EU members except Poland (the European 
Commission 2015a). It is thus necessary to estimate models which can be used to predict 
financial distress for private firms in the EU during the current economic downturn. Second, 
prior studies have typically constructed country-, and industry-specific models, thereby 
limiting the generalisability of their findings (e.g., Hall 1994; Pindado & Rodrigues 2004). As 
the EU currently consists of 28 members, the EU setting allows us to develop mixed-industry 
models whose findings can be generalised across industries and countries in the EU.  
1.4 Organisation of this study 
The rest of this study is structured as follows. Chapter 2 reviews the literature on predicting 
financial distress for privately held firms. Data selection and methodology are described in 
Chapter 3. Chapter 4 presents the descriptive analysis. Chapters 5 and 6 present empirical 
findings for single-period models using logistic regression and neural networks respectively. 
Chapter 7 compares logistic regression and neural networks before it presents estimation results 
for expanded single-period models and multiple-period models as additional tests for the 
comparison of logistic regression and neural networks. Chapter 8 summarises the findings of 
the present study and draws out some conclusions. 
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Chapter 2 Literature review 
The objective of this study is the development of models which predict financial distress for 
privately held firms in the EU. There are a number of prior studies which have predicted and 
classified financial distress for privately held firms. These studies are the focus of this review. 
The review does not simply provide a survey of published works; it also highlights particular 
strengths and weaknesses of the literature, which will be the focus of this study.  
Many prior studies have estimated models on samples collected from bank client records. By 
doing so, they may have created a survivorship bias because banks typically exclude 
unsuccessful prospective clients in their records and sometimes help prevent their clients from 
becoming financially distressed. To create a sample of failed firms, the majority of prior studies 
narrowly defined a single criterion event such as ceasing trading and loan defaults. Yet users 
of a predictive model often have interest in various forms of financial distress before they can 
make economic decisions. Following the sampling of failed firms, the majority of prior studies 
matched failed firms with a sample of non-failed firms by industry and size, thereby overstating 
the proportion of failed firms in the resultant samples. The development of a model requires a 
technique. Although techniques have evolved over time, the literature on predictive models for 
private firms has been dominated by the traditional statistical techniques of multiple 
discriminant analysis, logistic regression and probit regression despite the availability of new 
generations of techniques.  
To contribute to the literature, this study uses data collected from the ORBIS database. It 
defines failure as i) default of payment, ii) insolvency proceedings, iii) bankruptcy, iv) 
dissolved (bankrupt), v) in liquidation and vi) inactive (no precision). No attempt is made to 
match failed and non-failed firms by such factors as industry and size: not only does a matched 
sample overstate the proportion of failed firms in a sample, but it also prevents the use of such 
factors as industry and size as independent variables. This study does not match active and 
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failed firms in order to create a sample which is more representative of the underlying 
population and use firm size and industry as predictors of financial distress. This study selects 
ratios covering profitability, solvency, liquidity, structure soundness based on their significant 
associations with the outcome variable and the recommendations of previous empirical studies. 
To estimate predictive models and compare the predictive capacity of competing techniques 
this study utilises both logistic regression and neural networks.  
There have been three generations of empirical models in the financial distress prediction 
literature. The first generation begins with univariate analysis in Beaver (1966, 1968) and 
multiple discriminant analysis in Altman (1968). The second generation is represented by 
logistic analysis in Ohlson (1980) and probit analysis in Zmijewski (1984). The third 
generation of modelling is dominated by artificial intelligence and duration analysis. As 
techniques for predictive models have evolved over time, this literature review categorises prior 
studies by techniques in Section 2.1 to 2.4 before it suggests areas that can be improved in this 
study in Section 2.5.  
2.1 Multiple discriminant analysis 
Multiple discriminant analysis is one of the most popular early techniques. Altman (1968) is 
the first study which developed bankruptcy prediction models for public firms using multiple 
discriminant analysis (“Z -Score model”). Multiple discriminant analysis is a linear function 
which relates independent variables into a score for the purpose of classifying cases into 
classes. In the case of a binary outcome variable, multiple discriminant analysis can be stated 
as ܦሺܺሻ ൌ ܺᇱ ∑ ሺߤଵ െ ߤଶሻ െ ଵଶିଵ ሺߤଵ െ ߤଶሻ் ∑ ሺߤଵ ൅ ߤଶሻିଵ ,  where ߤଵ  and ߤଶ  are the mean 
vectors, and ∑ isିଵ  inverse of the common covariance matrix. The threshold value of the 
decision rule is ݈݊ሺܥଶଵߨଵ/ܥଵଶߨଶሻ, where ܥଵଶ and ܥଶଵ are misclassification costs, and ߨଵ and 
ߨଶ are prior probabilities of each class. 
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Edmister (1972) is among the earliest studies which developed failure prediction models for 
small businesses (Altman & Sabato 2007, p. 333; Pindado & Rodrigues 2004, p. 52).9 The 
study obtained its data from the Small Business Administration (SBA) and Robert Morris 
Associates. Failed and non-failed firms were defined as loss and non-loss borrowers and 
guarantee recipients from the SBA respectively. Using multiple discriminant analysis, the 
author estimated a multiple-period model on a tri-annual sample (42 observations) and a one-
year-prior-to-failure model on a mono-annual sample (282 observations). The author selected 
19 ratios and decided on the entry of variables into the discriminant functions using a stepwise 
procedure.10 Using the cut-off Z score of 0.520, the seven-variable model estimated on the tri-
annual sample correctly discriminated 93% of failed and non-failed firms.11 Since the tri-
annual sample consisted of only 42 observations, Edmister tested the accuracy of the model 
using the synthetic sample validation approach. In contrast, the model estimated on the mono-
annual sample achieved an in-sample accuracy rate of 75%, which was reduced to 57% for a 
holdout sample. To conclude, the failure prediction model estimated on the tri-annual sample 
discriminated failed and non-failed firms whereas the model estimated on the mono-annual 
sample failed to do so. This suggests that predictive models for private firms be based on at 
least three consecutive financial statements. In contrast, prior studies on the financial distress 
of public firms such as Altman (1968) and Beaver (1966, 1968) found that one financial 
statement was sufficient for a discriminant function for public firms.  
                                                            
9 The author did not clearly explain what constituted American small businesses. Nevertheless, according to U. S. Small 
Business Administration (2011), American small businesses meet the following criteria: profit-seeking, having a place of 
business in US, primarily operating in the US or significantly contributing to the US economy, being independently owned 
and operated, absence of dominance on a national basis, being small in terms of the number of employees or average annual 
sales. Generally speaking, most of these small businesses are privately held in legal forms of sole proprietorship, partnership 
and corporation. 
10 These ratios selected by Edmister (1972) include quick ratio, current ratio, inventory/net working capital, net working 
capital/total assets, current assets/total debts, total debt/equity, fixed assets/equity, cash flow/current liabilities. current 
liabilities/equity, equity and long-term debt/fixed assets, inventory/sales, fixed assets/sales, total assets/sales, net working 
capital/sales, equity/sales, EBIT/sales, EBT/total assets, EBT/equity, and EBT plus depreciation/total debt.  
11 The variables that were used as predictors in Edmister (1972) include the annual funds flow/current liabilities, equity/sales, 
net working capital/sales divided by its respective RMA ratio, current liabilities/equity divided by the respective SBA ratio 
average, inventory/sales divided by the respective RMA ratio, quick ratio/RMA trend and quick ratio divided by the RMA 
quick ratio.  
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One of the most recent studies which have used multiple discriminant analysis is Altman et al. 
(2014). Since the original Z-Score model by Altman (1968) was developed for public firms, 
Altman (1983) introduced the Zᇱᇱ-Score model (the version of Z-Score model for private firms) 
for private firms with the explanatory variables being working capital/total assets, retained 
earnings/total assets, EBIT/total assets, and equity/total liabilities. To check the Zᇱᇱ -Score 
model’s capacity of generalisation, Altman et al. (2014) applied the model on an international 
dataset extracted from the ORBIS database of BvD. The estimation sample consisted of 
2,602,563 non-failed firms and 38,215 failed firms from 28 European and 3 non-European 
countries. The holdout sample from 31 European and 3 non-European countries was slightly 
larger. They found that the original coefficients in Zᇱᇱ-Score model performed well on the 
international dataset. The re-estimated multiple discriminant coefficients using the weighted 
data marginally improved the classification performance. The authors also developed both 
international and country-specific logistic regression models using the four ratios in the Zᇱᇱ-
Score model and additional variables relating to year, size, age and industry. The findings serve 
as evidence of the predictive power of the four ratios, year (as a proxy for macroeconomic 
conditions), size, age and industry.  
Despite its popularity and robustness, multiple discriminant analysis has several limitations. 
To begin with, it requires the assumptions of multivariate normal distribution of independent 
variables and equivalent variance-covariance matrices of independent variables for failed and 
non-failed firms. The first assumption makes it difficult for a multiple discriminant model to 
include dummy variables as predictors (Ohlson 1980, p.112). Most prior studies which have 
utilised multiple discriminant analysis did not check whether their dataset satisfied the two 
assumptions or not, thereby reducing the resultant models’ capacity for generalisation. 
Furthermore, improvement in theoretical underpinnings in multiple discriminant analysis does 
not necessarily translate into higher classification accuracy (Jones 1987, p. 144). Second is the 
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difficulty in interpreting the Z score output of a multiple discriminant model. While it is 
possible to calculate a firm’s posterior probability of failure from a multiple discriminant 
model, the posterior probability is not generated from a probability model (Ohlson 1980).  
2.2 Standard and mixed logistic regression  
To overcome the above problems associated with multiple discriminant analysis, Ohlson 
(1980) estimated bankruptcy prediction models for public firms using logistic regression. A 
logistic regression model is ܲݎሺݕ௜ ൌ 1|ݔ௜ሻ ൌ Φሺߚᇱݔ௜ሻ, where ݕ௜ is a binary outcome variable 
(e.g., 1 for bankruptcy and 0 for non-bankruptcy), ߚᇱݔ௜ a vector of parameter estimates and 
explanatory variables, and Φ the cumulative standard logistic distribution function. A logistic 
regression model assumes that its error structure is independently identically distributed, and 
makes no assumption about the distribution of independent variables. Since Ohlson (1980), 
logistic analysis has been one of the most popular techniques in predictive models for corporate 
failure. Logistic analysis is superior to multiple discriminant analysis in several ways (Ohlson 
1980): it does not require the restrictive assumptions of multivariate normality of independent 
variables and equivalent variance-covariance matrices of independent variables for failed and 
active firms; the application of logistic regression also yields highly interpretable posterior 
probabilities of failure.  
A recent study which has utilised standard logistic regression to predict the financial distress 
of private firms is Bhimani, Gulamhussen and Lopes (2010). The authors collected data from 
the Central Bank of Portugal between 1996 and 2003. Failure was defined as credit losses as a 
result of over 90 days delay in payments or the forgiveness or postponement of principals or 
interest by financial institutions according to Basel II. Having selected both accounting and 
non-accounting explanatory variables via a stepwise procedure, the authors estimated a one-
year-prior-to-failure model on an estimation sample of approximately 1,359 failed firms and 
23,459 non-failed firms and validated the model on an independent sample of 5,866 non-default 
35 
 
firms and 341 default firms.12 Using a cut-off level of 0.03, their default prediction model 
correctly classified 70.5% of the defaulting-firms and 75% of the non-defaulting firms in the 
holdout sample. The authors also developed 22 models in which they interacted every non-
accounting variable with the accounting variables. To sum up, accounting ratios and non-
accounting variables helped predict defaulted loans although their predictive ability varies, and 
their interaction jointly provided more insight into the probability of default.  
Since standard logistic regression models do not take into account the unobserved 
heterogeneity and so may give rise to inconsistent parameter estimates, Jones and Hensher 
(2004) developed mixed logistic regression models to forecast financial distress of Australian 
publicly traded firms. For panel data, a mixed logistic regression model can be set out as ௜ܲ,௞,௟ ൌ
݁ݔ݌൫ߚᇱݔ௜,௞,௟൯ ∑ ݁ݔ݌൫ߚᇱݔ௜,௞,௝൯௝ൗ , where ௜ܲ,௞,௟ is the probability alternative ݈ is chosen for the ݇ݐ݄ 
observation of firm ݅, and ߚ௜ᇱ a vector of firm level coefficients. A recent study which has used 
mixed logistic regression to predict the financial distress of private firms is Bhimani, 
Gulamhussen and Lopes (2014). The authors developed mixed logistic regression models in 
order to examine the effects of owner liability and other explanatory variables (i.e., size, age, 
accounting ratios, volatility of cash flows, industry dummy variables and region dummy 
variables) on the probability of loan defaults.13 They used the dataset of 43,117 annual accounts 
of 16,029 firms compiled from the Central Bank of Portugal between 1996 and 2003. For the 
total sample, the model using volatility of cash flows achieved an AUC of 0.751, suggesting 
that the model provided acceptable discrimination. Using the cut-off point of 0.06, the model 
correctly classified 67.5% of the firms with the Type I and II errors being 30.4% and 32.6% 
respectively. The authors also randomly assigned 50% cases to an estimation sample and 
                                                            
12 Accounting ratios in Bhimani, Gulamhussen and Lopes (2010) include days in payables, days in receivables, financial 
coverage, asset coverage (fixed), interest cost/gross income, investment ratio, return on equity, return on investment, solidity, 
var. of gross income, and working capital/total assets.  
13 Financial ratios used in Bhimani, Gulamhussen and Lopes (2010) include cash to debt, financial coverage, liquidity, solidity, 
asset coverage (fixed), debt ratio, days in payables, and days in receivables.  
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remaining 50% cases to a holdout sample. For the holdout sample the model achieved an AUC 
of 0.766. To conclude, the variable of owner liability did provide additional predictive power 
above accounting and other non-accounting variables.  
2.3 Probit regression 
Like a standard logistic regression model, a probit regression model is a conditional probability 
model ܲݎሺݕ௜ ൌ 1|ݔ௜ሻ ൌ Φሺߚᇱݔ௜ሻ, where Φ is the cumulative standard normal distribution. A 
probit regression model assumes that explanatory variables and error structure are 
independently identically distributed. Both logistic and probit regression models yield a 
probability of failure for a particular firm. While the former model assumes a logistic 
distribution, the latter model assumes a cumulative normal distribution. Zmijewski (1984) is 
the first study which applied probit analysis to predict financial distress for publicly traded 
firms in the USA. In the literature, probit analysis is not as popular as logit analysis and multiple 
discriminant analysis.   
One of the few studies which have utilised probit analysis to forecast the financial distress of 
private firms is Mramor and Valentincic (2003). The authors developed failure models for very 
small private firms. The study developed three groups of industry-specific failure prediction 
models on an estimation sample of 16,882 non-failed firms and 2,745 failed firms. Failure was 
defined as cash shortages. The status of firms and their data were obtained from the central 
database of the Agency of Payments, a government agency in Slovenia. The first group of 
models were naïve models using past liquidity data only: pure strategy model, no-change 
model, and two-period model. The no-change model, for example, predicted that a firm having 
cash shortages in the current period would continue to have cash shortages in the next period. 
The second group of accounting ratio based models were constructed using the statistical 
techniques of logistic regression, probit regression and multiple discriminant analysis. The 
third group of models were constructed using the three statistical methods again but they 
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included both accounting ratios and lagged liquidity indicators as independent variables. The 
no-change model was superior to other competing models with the average Type I error of 
38.3% being the lowest. The second group of models were disappointing given the 70% to 
73.9% Type I errors. The study found that lagged liquidity indicators had more information 
content than accounting ratios in the prediction of cash shortages.  
While probit analysis is seldom used by researchers to predict financial distress for private 
firms, it has been used by practitioners in their proprietary predictive models for private firms. 
Falkenstein, Boral and Carty (2000) provide an overview of Moody’s proprietary default model 
ܴ݅ݏ݇ܥ்݈ܽܿெ for private firms. To develop and validate ܴ݅ݏ݇ܥ்݈ܽܿெ, Moody chose a subset of 
data from its Credit Research Database, that is, Moody’s private firm financial statement and 
default database. Failure was defined as default meeting certain criteria or bankruptcy. Moody 
used the technique of probit regression to estimate ܴ݅ݏ݇ܥ்݈ܽܿெ . Accounting and non-
accounting variables were selected as explanatory variables through a forward selection 
procedure.14 Given probit regression’s underlying assumptions and non-normal distribution of 
original ratios, Moody transformed these ratios according to their univariate relations with 
failure. Testing and validation primarily in the form of AUCs yielded results supporting the 
superiority of ܴ݅ݏ݇ܥ்݈ܽܿெ to benchmark models.  
For other prior studies on the financial distress of private firms which have utilised the 
traditional statistical techniques of multiple discriminant analysis, logistic regression and probit 
regression, please refer to Tables 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3 for their sample design, model development 
and assessment of the overall fit of the models.  
                                                            
14 Ratios used in RiskCalc୘୑ include assets/CPI, inventories/cost of goods sold, liabilities/assets, net income growth, net 
income/assets, quick ratio, retained earnings/assets, sales growth, cash/assets, and debt service coverage ratio.  
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2.4 Artificial intelligence and duration analysis 
The financial distress prediction literature had been dominated by the above traditional 
statistical techniques of multiple discriminant analysis, logistic analysis and probit analysis 
prior to the 1980s. Among these traditional statistical techniques, logistic regression has been 
most commonly used (Jones, Johnstone & Wilson 2015, p. 3). In a sense, logistic regression 
can be regarded as a simple neural network. It consists of an input layer and an output layer 
and the activation function in the output layer is a sigmoid function. Like a neural network, a 
logistic regression model can acquire knowledge through the maximum likelihood method and 
store that knowledge in estimated coefficients. Will a more complicated neural network 
improve the predictive accuracy of a financial distress prediction model?  Since the 1990s, the 
advances in the development of artificial intelligence have brought forth nonlinear classifiers 
such as neural networks. Studies which have used neural networks to predict failure for firms 
other than privately held firms include Tam and Kiang (1992), Tseng and Hu (2010), Fedorova, 
Gilenko and Dovzhenko (2013), and Lee and Choi (2013).  
The empirical models reviewed so far are often referred to as single-period or static 
classification models in that they used only one single firm-year observation for each firm. 
Shumway (2001) summarises several limitations of a static model. First is selection bias as a 
result of its failure to control for each firm’s period at risk. Some firms experience a failure 
event (e.g., bankruptcy) after years of being financially distressed. Other firms experience a 
failure event in the first year of their trading. By selecting when to observe a firm, a static 
model leads to a selection bias into its estimation. Second is failure to incorporate time-varying 
covariates by ignoring the fact that firms change over time. Third is their low out-of-sample 
prediction accuracy by using one firm-year observation for every firm. As a response to these 
limitations, the new technique of survival or duration analysis has emerged in the financial 
distress prediction literature. One of the earliest survival analysis studies is Lane, Looney and 
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Wansley (1986), who utilised the Cox proportional hazards model with time-independent 
covariates to predict bank failure. A more recent study is Shumway (2001), which developed 
discrete duration models with time-varying covariates to predict the bankruptcy of US public 
firms. Other studies which have used duration analysis to predict failure for publicly traded 
firms include Duffie, Saita and Wang (2007) and Bharath and Shumway (2008). While the 
third generation of techniques have been widely used to predict financial distress for public 
firms, they have been less frequently utilised in studies on the financial distress of private firms.    
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Table 2.1 Sample design 
 
 
 
 
Study Prior probability of 
failure estimated  
Estimation sample (s) 
 
Definition of 
failure 
Years Firm type Industry  Country Data source 
 
Edmister 
(1972) 
No  Tri-annual sample of 42 
observations;  
Mono-annual sample  of 282 
observations  
Loss borrowers 
and guarantee 
recipients 
1954-1969 Sole traders, 
partnership, 
corporation or any 
other legal form 
meeting criteria of 
small businesses in 
the US 
Mixed USA Small Business 
Administration, and 
Robert Morris 
Associates (RMA 
used to obtain 
industry data only) 
McNamara, 
Cocks and 
Hamilton 
(1988) 
52% over 3 years 63 failed and 84 non-failed 
observations not matched by 
industry (the authors believed that 
43% failed firms was closed to 
prior probability of failure 52%) 
Being wound 
up by court 
order 
1980-1983 Private unlisted 
companies 
Not clear as a 
result of 
inadequate 
information 
about industry 
categories 
Australia The Queensland 
Commissioner for 
Corporate Affairs 
Keasey and 
Watson 
(1988) & 
Keasey and 
Watson 
(1986) 
10% to 15% per 
year, or 50%-75% 
over 5 years 
The estimation sample of 40 failed 
and non-failed firms in Keasey 
and Watson (1986) 
Liquidation or 
ceased trading 
1970-1980 Small companies 
meeting two of the 
three criteria under 
the UK 1981 
Companies Act  
Manufacturing UK Research centres at 
the University of 
Newcastle upon 
Tyne 
Pindado & 
Rodrigues 
(2004) 
No  24 failed and 24 non-failed small 
firms with every failed firm 
matched by a non-failed firm with 
similar size 
“Sustained 
non-
compliance 
with banking 
obligations, 
throughout the 
whole year”  
1990-1993  Small companies Footwear 
Manufacture 
sector 
Portuguese The Central 
Balance-Sheet 
Office of the Banco 
de Portugal 
Slotemaker 
(2008) 
 
 
 
No 792 failed and 792 non-failed 
firms matched by industry and 
size 
Bankruptcy 2001-2006 Small private firms Mixed Dutch The Dutch Chamber 
of Commerce, and 
Graydon Credit 
Management 
Services 
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Table 2.1 (continued) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Study Prior probability of 
failure estimated  
Estimation sample (s) 
 
Definition of 
failure 
Years Firm type Industry  Country Data source 
 
Peel (1987) No 56 failed and 56 non failed firms 
with marginal non-bankruptcy 
firms excluded 
 
Liquidation or 
entering into 
receivership 
1980-1985 Large private 
companies 
Mixed  UK The Extel Unquoted 
Companies Service  
Bhimani, 
Gulamhussen 
and Lopes 
(2010) 
No Around 1359 failed observations, 
and 23459 non-failed observations 
Loan default as 
defined in 
Basel II 
1997-2003 Private firms Mixed Portuguese The Central Bank of 
Portugal 
Keasey and 
Watson 
(1987) 
No  73 failed and 73 non-failed 
companies (not matched by size or 
industry  due to no significant 
differences in industrial 
composition)  
 1970-1983 Small companies Manufacturing UK Research centres at 
the University of 
Newcastle upon 
Tyne 
Hall (1994) No 28 failed firms and 30 survived 
firms matched by age/start-up 
dates 
Ceasing 
trading 
1985-1990 Small firms defined 
as firms with less 
than 100 employees 
Construction UK Failed & non-failed 
firms identified by 
various sources, and 
non-financial 
variables collected 
by interviews  
Franks (1998) No 483 stable, 78 vulnerable and 57 
stressed farm businesses 
Ordered 
financial 
distress based 
on RE/GM 
1983-1991 Partnerships, 
corporations and 
other businesses 
organizations 
Farming UK The farm business 
survey database 
Grunert, 
Norden and 
Weber (2005) 
2%  240 failed and non-failed firms  
from six major German banks 
between  
Default as 
defined in 
Basel II 
January 
1992 and 
December 
1996 
Small and medium 
sized in terms of 
turnover, loan size, 
among which 83% 
were privately held 
Mixed German Six major German 
banks 
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Table 2.1 (continued) 
Study Prior probability 
of failure 
estimated 
Estimation 
sample(s) 
Definition of 
failure 
Years Firm type Industry  Country  Data source 
Mramor and 
Valentincic 
(2003) 
No  16882 non-failed 
firms and 2745 
failed firms 
Cash shortages as 
short-term 
insolvency 
1996-1998 Very small 
private companies 
with five or less 
than 5 employees 
Mixed Slovenian Central Database 
of the Agency of 
Payments 
Falkenstein, Boral 
and Carty (2000) 
1.7% A subset of data 
from Moody’s 
Credit Research 
Database 
Default or 
bankruptcy 
1983-1999 Middle market 
private firms 
Mixed excluding  
finance, 
insurance, real 
estate industries 
North America Moody’s Credit 
Research 
Database 
Mitchell and Roy 
(2007) 
 Four estimation 
samples for the 
four failure 
prediction models 
Bankruptcy or 
default 
Different time 
periods of the 
four estimation 
samples 
Small private 
firms 
 Belgian  
Altman et al. 
(2014) 
 2,602,563 active 
firms and 38,215 
failed firms 
Bankruptcy, in 
receivership, in 
liquidation, 
inactive (no 
precision), 
delisted and 
special treatment 
etc.  
2007-2010 Private firms Mixed 29 countries 
(mainly from 
Europe) 
The ORBIS 
database 
Bhimani, 
Gulamhussen and 
Lopes (2014) 
No 21558 failed and 
non-failed 
observations 
Loan default as 
defined in Basel II 
1996-2003 Private firms Mixed  Portuguese The Central Bank 
of Portugal 
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Table 2.2 Model development 
Study Statistical 
technique 
Model  The use of financial 
independent variables  
Criteria or theory for 
the consideration of 
financial independent 
variables in the study  
Criteria for the 
inclusion of 
financial 
independent 
variables in a 
failure 
prediction 
model  
The use of non-
financial 
independent 
variables 
Criteria or theory 
for the inclusion of 
non-financial 
independent 
variables in the 
study 
Criteria or theory 
for the integration 
of non-financial 
independent 
variables in a 
failure prediction 
model 
Edmister 
(1972): 
mono-annual 
sample 
 
 
 
Multiple 
discriminant 
analysis 
1 year 
before 
failure  
Original ratios; 
RMA relatives and 
SBA relatives 
(original ratios divided 
by industry averages 
from RMA or SBA 
respectively); 
 
 
 
 
 
Recommendation by 
theorists (i.e. standard 
ratios) and in previous 
empirical research 
Step-wise 
(multiple 
discriminant 
analysis) with 
no restriction on 
the correlation 
of entering 
variables 
 
 
 
 
Three-year up-trend 
dummy variable;  
three-year down-
trend dummy 
variable 
 
 
 
 
Previous empirical 
research 
 
Edmister 
(1972): tri-
annual 
sample 
Not 
applicable 
Original ratios; 
RMA relatives and 
SBA relatives; three-
year averages of RMA 
relatives and SBA 
relatives; trend up-
high level, trend up-
down level, trend 
down-high level, trend 
down-low level for 
every RMA and SBA 
relatives  
The step-wise 
(multiple 
discriminant 
analysis) with a 
restriction on 
the correlation 
of the entering 
variables 
McNamara, 
Cocks and 
Hamilton 
(1988) 
Multiple 
discriminant 
analysis 
ratios based 
on data of 
one year 
prior except 
one ratio 
based on 
two year 
prior 
Ratios which were 
transformed to meet 
the underlying 
assumptions of MDA 
Previous research Step-wise 
procedure 
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Table 2.2 (continued) 
Study Statistical 
technique 
Years prior 
before 
failure  
The use of financial 
independent variables  
Criteria or theory for 
the consideration of 
financial independent 
variables in the study  
Criteria for the 
integration of 
financial 
independent 
variables in a 
failure 
prediction 
model  
The use of non-
financial 
independent 
variables 
Criteria or theory 
for the 
consideration of 
non-financial 
independent 
variables in the 
study 
Criteria or theory 
for the inclusion of 
non-financial 
independent 
variables in a 
failure prediction 
model 
Keasey and 
Watson 
(1988) & 
Keasey and 
Watson 
(1986) 
Multiple 
discriminant 
analysis 
1 year 
historical 
cost model 
before 
failure in 
Keasey and 
Watson 
(1986) 
Ratios Previous research and 
consideration of 
characteristics of small 
companies   
Step-wise 
reduction 
technique based 
upon Rao’s V 
Infinite and finite 
reporting lags  
Previous research  
Pindado and 
Rodrigues 
(2004) 
Multiple 
discriminant 
analysis, and  
logistic 
regression 
1 year 
model 
before 
failure 
Ratios Availability of ratios 
in the data, and 
frequency of ratios in 
previous studies 
Grouping of 
categories, 
dicriminanting 
power based on 
univariate 
analysis, and 
previous studies 
 
 
  
Slotemaker 
(2008) 
 
Multiple 
discriminant 
analysis whose 
accuracy was 
compared 
against logistic 
regression and 
neural network 
1 year prior 
to 
bankruptcy 
Ratios or 3-year 
averages of ratios 
Previous studies, 
Beaver (1966) in 
particular 
Elimination of 
two ratios 
following the 
initial 
construction of 
a model 
integrating five 
ratios 
3-year trends of 
financial ratios as 
dummy variables 
Previous studies  
Peel (1987) Binary logistic 
regression 
Not 
applicable 
      
Bhimani, 
Gulamhussen 
and Lopes 
(2010) 
Binary logistic 
regression 
1 year prior 
to failure 
Ratios  Stepwise 
procedure 
Age, size, and 
dummy variables of 
industries and 
regions 
 Stepwise 
procedure 
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Table 2.2 (continued) 
Study Statistical 
technique 
Years 
before 
failure 
The use of financial 
independent variables 
Criteria or theory for 
the consideration of 
financial independent 
variables in the study 
Criteria for the 
inclusion of 
financial 
independent 
variables in a 
failure 
prediction 
model 
The use of non-
financial 
independent 
variables 
Criteria or theory 
for the 
consideration of 
non-financial 
independent 
variables in the 
study 
Criteria or theory 
for the inclusion of 
non-financial 
independent 
variables in a 
failure prediction 
model 
Keasey and 
Watson 
(1987) 
Binary logistic 
model 
 Ratios Covering profitability, 
liquidity and gearing,  
A backward 
stepwise 
procedure 
Variables relating to 
managerial structure, 
inadequacy of 
accounting 
information system 
and audit lags, 
financial statement 
manipulation, and 
gearing 
Argenti (1976)’s 
hypothesis 
 
Hall (2004) Binary logistic 
regression  
    Variables relating to 
background, reasons 
for starting the 
business, strategy, 
financial 
management, cash 
flow management, 
relationship with 
bank, pricing, 
marketing, external 
advice, quality of 
workforce, 
characteristics of 
owners,  
Previous literature  Principal 
components and 
stepwise procedure 
to reduce variables 
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Table 2.2 (continued) 
Study Statistical 
technique 
Years 
before 
failure 
The use of financial 
independent variables 
Criteria or theory for 
the consideration of 
financial independent 
variables in the study 
Criteria for the 
inclusion of 
financial 
independent 
variables in a 
failure 
prediction 
model 
The use of non-
financial 
independent 
variables 
Criteria or theory 
for the 
consideration of 
non-financial 
independent 
variables in the 
study 
Criteria or theory 
for the inclusion of 
non-financial 
independent 
variables in a 
failure prediction 
model 
Franks 
(1998) 
Multinomial 
logit 
regression 
Not 
applicable 
due to the 
use of 
pooling 
observations 
Ratios Previous research Principal 
component 
analysis and F-
tests 
Farm type, location, 
tenure, use of private 
funds, farm business 
organization etc 
Previous research Principal 
component 
analysis and F-
tests 
Grunert, 
Norden and 
Weber 
(2005) 
Binary probit 
regression 
1 year prior 
to default 
No direct use of ratios 
in the original model 
(they are integral parts 
of rating in model 1 
and 2)  
Availability in credit 
file information from 
banks 
 Internal credit rating 
(financial rating, 
non-financial rating 
and overall rating), 
dummy variables of 
bank and year 
  
Mramor and 
Valentincic 
(2003) 
Group 1      Lagged liquidity 
indicators as dummy 
variable  
  
Group 2: logit 
regression and 
probit 
regression, 
MDA 
 Ratios 
 
Previous studies 
including previous 
studies on liquidity of 
Slovenian companies 
 
Integration of 
ratios having 
highest bivariate 
correlation with 
the full range 
liquidity 
indicator from 
each group of 
ratios 
 
   
Group 3: logit 
regression, 
probit 
regression, 
MDA 
 Lagged liquidity 
indicators as dummy 
variable and 
continuous variable 
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Table 2.2 (continued) 
Study Statistical technique Years before 
failure 
The use of 
financial 
independent 
variables 
Criteria or theory for 
the consideration of 
financial independent 
variables in the study 
Criteria for the 
inclusion of 
financial 
independent 
variables in a 
failure 
prediction 
model 
The use of non-
financial 
independent 
variables 
Criteria or 
theory for the 
consideration 
of non-
financial 
independent 
variables in 
the study 
Criteria or theory 
for the inclusion of 
non-financial 
independent 
variables in a 
failure prediction 
model 
Falkenstein, 
Boral and 
Carty (2000) 
Probit 1 year prior to 
failure 
 
Transformed 
ratios 
Covering profitability, 
leverage, liquidity and 
activity  
A stepwise 
procedure 
Audit quality, sales 
growth, size etc 
 A stepwise 
procedure 
Mitchell and 
Roy (2007) 
 
 
Multiple 
discriminant 
analysis, multiple 
discriminant analysis 
with mathematical 
techniques, probit 
analysis, probit 
analysis with 
transformation, 
utility-based 
framework 
1 year prior to 
failure 
Ratios   The number of 
employees, legal 
status of the firm etc 
  
Altman et al. 
(2014) 
Multiple 
discriminant 
analysis, logistic 
regression 
1 year prior to 
failure 
Ratios  Z-score model Z-score model Year, size, age, 
industry and 
country 
  
Bhimani, 
Gulamhussen 
and Lopes 
(2014) 
Mixed logistic 
regression 
1 year prior to 
failure 
Ratios    Size, age, industry 
and region, owner 
liability 
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Table 2.3 Assessment of the model fit 
Study Cut-off 
point 
Consideration 
of prior 
probability 
and Type I 
and II error 
costs  
Overall 
percentage of 
correct 
classification  
Type I 
error  
Type II 
error  
Long-
range 
predictive 
accuracy 
The holdout 
sample 
Overall percentage of 
correct classification 
in the holdout sample 
Type I error in the 
holdout sample 
Type II error in the 
holdout sample 
Other 
measurement 
criteria 
Edmister 
(1972): 
mono-
annual 
sample  
 No (on the 
grounds of 
impractical 
analysis) 
75%     57% 
 
   
Edminster 
(1972): tri-
annual 
sample 
Cut-off 
score 
of 
0.520 
93% 10% 5%  Synthetic 
sample with 
original 
observations 
reassigned 
to the two 
populations 
not detailed information presented  
McNamara
, Cocks 
and 
Hamilton 
(1988) 
Cut-off 
 score  
of 0 
Consideration 
of prior 
probability 
only 
83.8%    18 failed 
and 22 non-
failed 
observations 
85% 13.6% 16.7%  
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Table 2.3 (continued) 
Study Cut-off 
point 
Consideration 
of prior 
probability 
and Type I 
and II error 
costs  
Overall 
percentage of 
correct 
classification  
Type I 
error  
Type II 
error  
Long-
range 
predictive 
accuracy 
The holdout 
sample 
Overall percentage of 
correct classification 
in the holdout sample 
Type I error in the 
holdout sample 
Type II error in the 
holdout sample 
Other 
measurement 
criteria 
Keasey 
and 
Watson 
(1986, 
1988)  
 Consideration 
of prior 
probability 
only 
 
58.75% 67.5% 15% Two years 
prior to 
failure, 
three-year 
prior to 
failure 
73 failed 
and 73 non-
failed 
companies 
between 
1970 and 
1982 
58.9% for Method 1 69.9% for Method 
1 
12.3% for Method 1  
67.8%  for Method 2 
(the time lag being 12 
months) 
34.2% for Method  
2 (the time lag 
being 12 months)  
30.1% for Method 2 
(the time lag being 
12 months) 
63.7% for Method 3 
(the time lag being 12 
months) 
50.7% for Method 
3 (the time lag 
being 12 months) 
21.9% for Method 3 
(the time lag being 
12 months) 
67.8% for Method 4 
(the time lag being 12 
months) 
34.2% for Method 
4 (the time lag 
being 12 months) 
30.1% for Method 4 
(the time lag being 
12 months) 
Pindado 
and 
Rodrigues 
(2004) 
MDA: 
cut-off 
score 
of 0   
No  MDA: 
89.58%  
 
MDA:12.
5% 
MDA: 
8.33% 
Two year 
mode, and 
three year 
model  
A global 
holdout 
sample of 9 
failed firms 
and 245 
non-failed 
firms 
MDA: 77.95% MDA: 11.11% MDA: 28.95%  Resampling 
using the 
Lachenbruch 
method, the 
inclusion of 
other ratios in 
the models  
LR: 
cut-off 
probab
ility 
0.5  
LR: 
91.67% 
LR: 
8.33% 
LR: 
8.33% LR: 75.98% LR: 11:11% LR: 32.43% 
Slotemaker 
(2008) 
MDA 
0.5 
No MDA: 64.4% MDA: 
5.8% 
MDA: 
65.4% 
Two (also, 
three, four 
and five) 
years 
before 
failure 
     
LR LR: 68.4% LR: 
16.2% 
LR: 
47% 
     
NN NN: 73.3% NN: 28% NN: 
25.4% 
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Table 2.3 (continued) 
Study Cut-off 
point 
Consideration 
of prior 
probability 
and Type I 
and II error 
costs  
Overall 
percentage of 
correct 
classification  
Type I 
error  
Type II 
error  
Long-
range 
predictive 
accuracy 
The holdout 
sample 
Overall percentage of 
correct classification 
in the holdout sample 
Type I error in the 
holdout sample 
Type II error in the 
holdout sample 
Other 
measurement 
criteria 
Peel 
(1987) 
0.5 
cut-off 
probab
ility  
No  
 
Model 6: 
88.39% 
Model 6: 
12.50,  
 
Model 
6: 
10.71% 
 
  Model 6: 88.89% 
 
Model 6: 8.33%, 
 
Model 6: 12.50% 
 
Pseudo ܴଶ 
measure 
Bhimani, 
Gulamhuss
en and 
Lopes 
(2010) 
Several 
cut-off 
points 
No     5866 non-
defaulting 
observations 
and 341 
defaulting 
observations 
Cut-off point 0.06: 
68.7%  
Cut-off point 
0.06:  36.1% 
Cut-off point 0.06: 
31% 
Pseudo ܴଶ 
measure,  
AUCs Cut-off point 0.04: 
70.9% 
Cut-off point 
0.04: 29.7% 
Cut-off point 0.04: 
29.1% 
Cut-off point 0.03: 
74.8% 
Cut-off point 
0.03: 29.5% 
Cut-off point 0.03: 
25% 
Keasey 
and 
Watson 
(1987) 
Model 
1: 
0.576 
No Model 1: 
76.7% 
Model 1: 
23.3% 
Model 
1: 
23.3%  
 10 failed 
and 10 non-
failed 
companies 
Model 1: 
55.% 
Model 1: 
70% 
Model 1: 
20% 
 
Model 
2: 
0.746 
Model 2: 
74.6% 
Model 2: 
24.7% 
Model 
2: 
24.7% 
Model 2: 
65% 
Model 2: 
30% 
Model 2: 
40% 
Model 
3: 
0.777 
Model 3: 
77.7% 
Model 3: 
17.8% 
Model 
3: 
17.8% 
Model 3: 
65% 
Model 3: 
20% 
Model 3: 
50% 
Hall 
(1994) 
          Pseudo ܴଶ 
measure 
Franks 
(1998) 
  86%    85 stable, 22 
vulnerable 
and 10 
stressed 
farm 
businesses 
80%    
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Table 2.3 (continued) 
Study Cut-off 
point 
Consideration 
of prior 
probability 
and Type I 
and II error 
costs  
Overall 
percentage of 
correct 
classification  
Type I 
error  
Type II 
error  
Long-
range 
predictive 
accuracy 
The 
holdout 
sample 
Overall percentage of 
correct classification 
in the holdout sample 
Type I error in the 
holdout sample 
Type II error in the 
holdout sample 
Other 
measurement 
criteria 
Grunert, 
Norden 
and Weber 
(2005) 
0.11 
cut-off 
point 
for all 
the 
three 
models 
Consideration 
of prior 
probability 
only 
 
Model 1  
88.75% 
 
Model 1  
52.17% 
 
Model 1  
2.94% 
 
     Pseudo ܴଶ,  
Brier score, 
overall correct 
classification, 
Type 1 and 
Type 2 error 
 
 
Model 2 
89% 
Model 2 
47.83% 
Model 2 
3.53% 
   
Model 3 
91.69% 
Model 3 
40.58% 
Model 3 
1.76% 
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Table 2.3 (continued) 
Study Cut-
off  
point 
Consideration 
of prior 
probability 
and Type I 
and II error 
costs  
Overall 
percentage of 
correct 
classification  
Type I 
error  
Type II 
error  
Long-
range 
predictive 
accuracy 
The 
holdout 
sample 
Overall percentage of 
correct classification 
in the holdout sample 
Type I error in the 
holdout sample 
Type II error in the 
holdout sample 
Other 
measurement 
criteria 
Mramor 
and 
Valentincic 
(2003) 
 
 
 
Group 
1 
No Pure strategy:  
85.9% 
 
Pure 
strategy: 
100% 
Pure 
strategy: 0% 
      
No-change: 
91.1% 
 
No-
change:38
.3 
No-change: 
4.4% 
Two-period: 
90.4% 
Two-
period: 
59.6% 
Two-period: 
1.7% 
Group 
2  
No but 
sensitivity 
analysis 
performed as 
a remedy 
Logit: 87.9% 
 
Logit: 
70% 
Logit: 
2.6% 
5 year 
prior to 
failure 
    Accuracy 
ratio and 
Cumulative 
Accuracy 
Profile, walk-
forward tests 
Probit: 
88% 
 
Probit 
72.1% 
Probit: 
2.2% 
MDA: 
86.7% 
MDA: 
73.9% 
MDA: 
3.3% 
Group 
3 
No Logit: 91.8% 
 
Logit: 
49.2% 
Logit: 
1.5% 
      
Probit: 
91.5% 
Probit 
49.3% 
Probit: 
1.7% 
MDA: 
90.4% 
MDA: 
61.7% 
MDA: 
0.8% 
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Table 2.3 (continued) 
Study Cut-
off  
poin
t 
Consideration 
of prior 
probability 
and Type I 
and II error 
costs  
Overall 
percentage of 
correct 
classification  
Type I 
error  
Type II 
error  
Long-
range 
predictive 
accuracy 
The 
holdout 
sample 
Overall percentage of 
correct classification 
in the holdout sample 
Type I error in the 
holdout sample 
Type II error in the 
holdout sample 
Other 
measurement 
criteria 
Falkenstein, 
Boral and 
Carty (2000) 
 No    5 years 
prior to 
failure 
A subset 
of 
Moody’
s credit 
research 
database 
   Accuracy 
ratio, AUCs, 
walk-forward 
tests 
Mitchell and 
Roy (2007) 
 
 
 
 
     Five years 
before 
failure 
Holdout 
samples 
of firms 
between 
2001 
and 
2006 
   AUCs 
Altman et al. 
(2014) 
      Holdout 
sample 
slightly 
larger 
than 
analysis 
sample 
   AUCs 
Bhimani, 
Gulamhussen 
and Lopes 
(2014) 
0.06    30.4% 
based on 
overall 
sample 
32.6% 
based on 
overall 
sample 
 50% 
cases of 
the 
overall 
sample a 
holdout 
sample 
   AUCs 
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2.5 Problems relating to prior studies 
2.5.1 Data 
One of the problems in studying the financial distress of private firms is lack of access to data 
(e.g., Edmister 1972, p. 1477; Everett &Watson 1998, p. 374). In many countries, legislation 
seldom requires the lodgement of financial statements and other information by private firms; 
therefore, there is lack of an official depository of private firms’ data. Another reason is the 
high failure rate of private firms. Typically, private firms exist only for a very short period 
(Storey et al. 1987). As indicated in Table 2.1, a bank client record has turned out to be the 
predominant source of data for modelling financial distress for private firms. It should be noted 
that Moody’s Credit Research Database was also compiled from data supplied by participating 
banks in North America. In loan covenants, banks typically require borrowing firms to submit 
financial statements and other data for monitoring purposes. According to Watts and 
Zimmerman (1986, 1990), for instance, borrowing firms are required to regularly submit 
financial statements and other data and meet covenants specified in debt agreements. It is on 
the basis of such a common practice that Watts and Zimmerman formulated the debt covenant 
hypothesis. As mentioned in Chapter 1, the use of a bank client record, however, will invariably 
give rise to data bias and subsequently sampling bias for failure prediction modelling for two 
reasons: not only does a bank excludes unsuccessful prospective clients from its client record, 
but it also prevents its clients from entering into financial distress. As a consequence, the 
sample created from bank records may be very biased and so limit the generalisability of 
resultant predictive models. To reduce the sampling bias inherent in many prior studies, this 
study uses a large private dataset extracted from the ORBIS database, which receives individual 
datasets from as many as 120 sources worldwide. 
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2.5.2 Sampling failed and non-failed firms 
A financial distress prediction model is constructed on an estimation sample of failed and non-
failed firms, thus necessitating a clear definition of financial distress and subsequent sampling 
of failed and non-failed firms from separated subpopulations. The definition of failure, 
however, has turned out to be a formidable challenge. Ideally, financial distress as a dependent 
variable should be an ordered qualitative variable given different degrees of corporate financial 
distress. As Jones (1987, p. 133) argues, financial statement based data could be used to 
measure varying degrees of financial distress. Dependent and explanatory variables based on a 
set of financial statements, however, will cause tautological problems. Not surprisingly, most 
prior studies each narrowly defined a single criterion event as financial distress and so the 
literature ends up with a variety of proxies for financial distress or failure as indicated in Table 
2.1: winding up, ceasing trading, loan default, entering in receivership, bankruptcy and cash 
shortages, among which ceasing trading and loan default have been most frequently used.  
These definitions of failure are not without problems. To begin with, proxies of financial 
distress have been frequently criticised for arbitrariness and consequent artificial classification 
of failed and non-failed firms (e.g., Balcaen & Ooghe 2006, p. 72; Jones 1987, p. 133). After 
all, a firm in studies like Altman (2000) may have filed for bankruptcy for reasons other than 
financial distress, such as accidents or strategic decisions to get rid of debt (Balcaen & Ooghe 
2006, p. 73; Hill, Perry & Andes 1996). Similarly, a small firm in Keasey and Watson (1986, 
1988) may be inactive despite its existence at the same address or continue to trade actively at 
the new address despite its cessation of trading at its previous address. Keasey and Watson 
(1991) failed to distinguish between closure (that is, cessation of trading) and bankruptcy; after 
all, a small firm could cease trading for many reasons. There are a variety of reasons for 
cessation of trading: bankruptcy, avoiding further losses, failure to make a go of it, retirement 
or ill health, realising a profit and other reasons (Everett & Watson 1998, p. 394). A firm in 
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Mramor and Valentincic (2003) may have encountered cash shortages, namely, the excess of 
cash payment orders over a cash balance, for reasons other than financial distress. Mramor and 
Valentincic (2003, p. 747) admitted that cash shortages were often temporary. Secondly, many 
definitions of failure relate to a country’s legal and financial frameworks, which are indeed a 
constraint to the generalisability of corporate failure prediction models. Despite the filing of 
bankruptcy by firms in the USA, for example, the term “bankruptcy” applies to persons only 
in the UK and Australia. Not surprisingly, failure was defined as being wound up by court 
order in McNamara, Cocks and Hamilton (1988), in which financial distress modelling was 
estimated for private firms in Australia. In the UK studies such as Keasey and Watson (1986, 
1987, 1988), Hall (1994), and Peel (1987), failure referred to liquidation, ceasing trading, or 
entering into receivership. Thirdly, determining the time of failure is not as straightforward as 
it may seem due to low reporting requirements, and lack of visibility in small firms (Keasey & 
Watson 1991, p. 15). It will be even more difficult to determine the time of failure in case of 
delays in reporting or non-submission of reports by small firms. Finite and infinite reporting 
lags of small firms are well documented in Keasey and Watson (1987, 1988) and Peel (1987). 
Even though the timing of failure is determinable, it is not without problems. On the one hand, 
a failure date could be arbitrarily defined. Take default as a proxy of failure as a mere example. 
A firm defaulted when it experienced 90 days’ delay in payment in Moody’s ܴ݅ݏ݇ܥ்݈ܽܿெ and 
yet longer than 90 days’ delay in Bhimani, Gulamhussen and Lopes (2010). On the other hand, 
the timing of a failure proxy is often much later than the real time of failure (Balcaen & Ooghe 
2006, p. 73). The main reason lies in the time lag between the moment when a firm cannot 
continue to operate as a result of financial distress and the moment of a failure event (Ooghe, 
Joos & De Bourdeaudhuij 1995; Theodossiou 1993).  
A problematic definition of failure will lead to a contaminated sample of failed and non-failed 
firms and ultimately undermine the explanatory and predictive power of a failure prediction 
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model. This study defines failure as i) default of payment, ii) insolvency proceedings, iii) 
bankruptcy, iv) dissolved (bankrupt), v) in liquidation, vi) inactive (no precision). The 
incorporation of several definitions of failure does not simply reduce excessive reliance on a 
single arbitrary definition of failure; it also takes into account different legal and financial 
frameworks in the 28 member countries in the EU. Unlike many prior studies which have 
predicted financial distress one year ahead, (e.g., Bhimani, Gulamhussen & Lopes 2010, 2014; 
Keasey & Watson 1986, 1988; McNamara , Cocks & Hamilton 1988; Pindado & Rodrigues 
2004), this study develops financial distress prediction models over one to five year time 
horizons as a response to the indeterminable timing of failure events.  
When a sample of failed firms is available, a sample of non-failed firms is to be drawn prior to 
the derivation of a financial distress prediction model. The first question arises of whether the 
control sample of non-failed firms consists of financially healthy firms only or non-failed firms 
which include both financially healthy and distressed firms. Taffler (1982) and Peel (1987), for 
instance, excluded loss-making firms from their non-failed sample to increase the explanatory 
power of a model. Yet it is financially distressed non-failed firms that is a major concern to 
decision makers given the ease of classifying financially distressed failed firms and financially 
healthy non-failed firms (Peel & Peel 1987, p. 57). The next question then arises of whether a 
control sample of non-failed firms is to be drawn randomly or not. Ideally, non-failed firms 
should be drawn at random, which, however, will give rise to considerable differences between 
sampled failed firms and non-failed firms in terms of industry, size and age (Jones 1987, p. 
133; Keasey and Watson 1991, p. 17). Not surprisingly, the majority of prior studies 
summarised in Table 2.1 created a matched sample of failed and non-failed firms. A matched 
sample of failed and active firms have two problems. To begin with, matching firms by such 
characteristics as industry and size makes it impossible to include these characteristics as 
explanatory variables in a failure prediction model (Jones 1987, p. 134). Equally important is 
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the oversampling of failed firms in a matched sample given the relatively small number of 
failed firms in a population. With failed firms being oversampled, a model derived will be 
primarily concerned with the achievement of a lower Type I error at the expense of a higher 
Type II error (Piesse & Wood 1992; Platt & Platt 2002; Zavgren 1983; Zmijewski 1984). 
Following the sampling of failed firms, this study includes all available active firms including 
active loss-making firms in the ORBIS database to create the sample of active firms. No attempt 
is made to match failed and active firms by such factors as industry and size.  
As discussed in Section 2.5.1, one of the difficulties in financial distress prediction modelling 
for private firms is lack of access to data. Even if private firms’ data is available, it might be 
very limited. In statistics, a large sample generally contributes to increased precision of 
estimated coefficients. Many prior studies summarised in Tables 2.1 to 2.3 utilised small sized 
estimation and validation samples of failed and active firms due to limited data, reduction of 
data for modelling, and splitting of a dataset into estimation and validation samples. The tri-
annual sample in Edmister (1972), for instance, was very small mainly because of limited data 
meeting the six requirements. In the development of Moody’s ܴ݅ݏ݇ܥ்݈ܽܿெ, three criteria were 
applied to reduce data: the exclusion of firms in the finance, insurance and real estate industry 
sectors, the exclusion of firms with total assets below $100,000, and the use of annual financial 
statements only. Bhimani, Gulamhussen, and Lopes (2010) split the dataset into an estimation 
sample and a holdout sample. Small sized samples are among the barriers to the development 
of a superior default model (Falkenstein, Boral & Carty 2000, p. 45). To avoid problems 
associated with small sized samples, this study uses a dataset which consists of 6,011,966 firm-
year observations relating to 1,035,445 firms.  
2.5.3 Representativeness of samples 
In statistics, a sample should be as representative of a population of interest as possible. Before 
users make decisions with the assistance of a failure prediction model, they should assess how 
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representative the estimation sample is of the population of interest (Keasey & Watson 1991, 
p. 16). As Table 2.1 indicates, the estimation samples on which prior failure prediction models 
have been estimated differ considerably in industry, country and size. Hall (1994) and Pindado 
and Rodrigues (2004), for instance, estimated their failure prediction models on a sample of 
British construction firms and a sample of Portuguese footwear manufacturers respectively, 
thereby limiting the generalisation of their findings to British construction firms and 
Portuguese footwear manufacturers. This study develops mixed-industry models for the 
financial distress of private firms in the EU, thereby allowing for findings that can generalise 
across different industries and countries in the EU.  
2.5.4 Statistical and machine learning techniques 
The literature on financial distress prediction for public firms has witnessed the construction 
of failure prediction models based on techniques ranging from simple linear models to 
advanced machine learning techniques. The development of failure prediction models for 
private firms, however, primarily relies on traditional statistical techniques. As indicated in 
Table 2.2, prior studies on the financial distress of private firms have been dominated by the 
traditional statistical techniques of multiple discriminant analysis and logit analysis. In 
comparative studies which have utilised more than one technique, empirical results indicate 
that a more advanced technique enhances the predictive accuracy of a model although the 
improvement may be marginal (Balcaen & Ooghe 2006, p. 81). We will not know the value of 
any statistical method developed until we employ it (Box 1976, p. 792). More importantly, 
every technique, either a traditional statistical technique or a machine learning technique, has 
its advantages and disadvantages. This study utilises and compares logistic regression and 
neural networks: the former is a classic statistical technique which has been widely used 
whereas the latter is a machine learning technique which has not been frequently utilised in 
modelling financial distress for privately held firms. 
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2.5.5 Explanatory variables 
The financial distress prediction literature has mainly relied on accounting based measures as 
explanatory variables (Hillegeist et al. 2004, p. 5). On the one hand, the reliance of accounting 
based measures serves as evidence of the predictive power of accounting ratios and other 
accounting data (e.g., annual income growth). Similar to prior studies, this study uses a number 
of accounting ratios as explanatory variables: cash/total assets, creditors/total liabilities, 
EBIT/total assets, fixed assets/total assets, loans/total assets, total liabilities/total assets and 
working capital/total assets. Most of these ratios have been identified as good predictors in 
prior studies: the ratio of cash to total assets was used in Jones and Hensher (2004) and 
Moody’s RiskCalc୘୑, the ratio of creditors to total liabilities in Pompe and Bilderbeek (2005), 
the ratio of EBIT to total assets in Altman (1968, 1983) and Bhimani, Gulamhussen and Lopes 
(2010), the ratio of fixed assets to total assets in Bhimani, Gulamhussen and Lopes (2010, 
2014),  the ratio of loans to total assets in Pompe and Bilderbeek (2005), the ratio of total 
liabilities to total assets in Zmijewski (1984) and Moody’s RiskCalc୘୑, the ratio of working 
capital to total assets in Altman (1968, 1983) and Bhimani, Gulamhussen and Lopes (2010).     
As mentioned in Chapter 1, there has been a long history of calling into question the usefulness 
of financial ratios and their underlying accounting data. The most obvious concern relates to 
the difficulty in measurement. To this must then be added the concern of managerial 
manipulation of accounting data. There are additional problems associated with the use of 
financial ratios as predictors of financial distress for private firms. The question then arises of 
what can be done in the development of financial distress prediction models for private firms. 
Pindado and Rodrigues (2004) made an attempt to develop parsimonious models to predict 
small firm failure using only two financial ratios and yet achieved a fairly high accuracy rate. 
Nevertheless, the study has several limitations. The estimation sample of 24 failed and 24 non-
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failed firms matched by size was too small. In the holdout sample, failed and non-failed firms 
were not matched. Another problem is lack of comparability of the two ratios of accumulated 
profitability to total assets and interest charges to total income. Arguably, financial ratios based 
on cash flow statements will be more comparable and subject to less manipulation. The 
corporate failure prediction literature does include studies which have examined the 
information content of cash flows in corporate failure prediction (e.g., Beaver 1966; Jones & 
Hensher 2004). In this study, I calculated several ratios based on cash flow statements for every 
firm such as the ratio of net cash provided by operating activities to total assets; unfortunately, 
this study does not include these ratios as explanatory variables due to a very large number of 
missing values they each have.  
Another solution is the use of non-financial factors as predictors in the estimation of failure 
prediction models for private firms. The relevance of non-financial factors has been examined 
in a piece meal manner in the majority of prior studies summarised in Table 2.2. Keasey and 
Watson (1988) and Peel (1987) examined the relevance of reporting lags in the development 
of failure prediction models for small firms. Other non-financial factors examined on an ad hoc 
basis include age, size, industry and region in Bhimani, Gulamhussen and Lopes (2010, 2014), 
internal credit rating in Grunert, Norden and Weber (2005), managerial structure, inadequacy 
of accounting information system and audit lags in Keasy and Watson (1987), strategy, 
relations with banks, pricing, marketing, characteristics of owners and quality of working force 
in Hall (2004). It should be noted that many qualitative factors are not objective given the 
difficulty in measurement. Having collected business plan information by phone interview, 
Perry (2001), for example, found that non-failed firms did more planning than failed firms, and 
admitted that the reliability of the findings was subject to the criticism of self-reported biases. 
Another example of self-reporting biases is the study of Hall (2004), in which the author 
collected non-financial factors by interviewing the owners of sampled firms. Even if we ignore 
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self-reported biases, can we consistently measure the impact of cause-related qualitative factors 
on the survival of a firm? While deliberate planning may help a firm survive, another firm may 
prosper due to lack of planning. As the old Chinese saying goes, a watched flower does not 
bloom whereas a carelessly planted willow grows into shade. While Keasey and Watson (1987) 
and Hall (2004) investigated the predictive ability of internal factors, Everett and Watson 
(1998) examined the impact of external factors on the probability of failure. Everett and Watson 
(1998) found a negative association between unemployment rates and small business failure 
rates. During an economic downturn, a firm often reduces its workforce to avoid financial 
distress, thereby contributing to the negative association between unemployment rates and 
small business failure rates. To provide incremental information over accounting ratios, this 
study includes size, age, the categorical variables of industry and region, and the three 
macroeconomic variables (i.e., international reserves per head, unemployment rates and trade 
balance as a percentage of GDP) as predictors of financial distress.   
2.5.6 Assessing the fit of a model 
Various measures are available to assess the goodness-of-fit of a model: classification tables 
with Type I and Type II errors, pseudo ܴଶ and AUCs. According to Table 2.3, a classification 
table with Type I and Type II errors has been most frequently used to assess the goodness-of-
fit of a model. It is indeed intuitively appealing to construct a classification table to summarise 
the results of a fitted model. Having estimated a model on a matched sample (i.e., 50% failed 
firms and 50% active firms), most prior studies chose a cut-off point of 0.5 to classify firms 
into failed and active groups. Ideally, when setting a cut-off point, researchers should consider 
both prior probabilities of failure and non-failure and costs of Type I and Type II errors. Where 
a firm is to be classified as failed or non-failed, for instance, its cut-off point is equal to 
lnሾ݌ଵܿଵ/݌ଶܿଶሿ with ݌ଵ, ݌ଶ being prior probabilities of failure and non-failure, and ܿଵ and ܿଶ 
costs of Type I and Type II errors (Jones 1987). Like most prior studies in Table 2.3, this study 
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ignores prior probabilities of failure and non-failure, and costs of Type I and Type II errors: as 
failure rates of private firms vary by industry and region, it is very difficult to estimate prior 
probabilities of failure and non-failure for a particular population; it is also difficult to estimate 
costs of Type I and Type II errors as they are not known to external observers (Mramor & 
Valentincic 2003, p. 756). In fact, when estimating a failure prediction model, a researcher 
simply bears in mind a general decision maker rather than any specific user in a particular 
decision context (Keasey & Watson 1991, p. 25). A remedy for the problem is a ROC curve 
which plots the true positive rate against the false positive rate at various cut-off points. Another 
problem in assessing the predictive accuracy of a model is the size of a holdout sample. To 
evaluate the predictive success of a failure prediction model, most prior studies validated their 
models on holdout samples. The reliability of the predictive accuracy of most prior models was 
undermined by their small sized holdout samples.  
To assess the goodness-of-fit of predictive models, this study utilises classification tables and 
AUCs in estimation and validation samples. Since no attempt is made to match failed and active 
firms, an optimal cut-off point close to the proportion of failed firms in an estimated sample is 
used to classify firms into failed and active groups. This study also reports AUCs to assess the 
goodness-of-fit of predictive models.   
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Chapter 3 Data and methodology 
The purpose of this chapter is to present the sample design and the research methodology 
employed in this study. Section 3.1 describes the selection of failed and non-failed firms, which 
is contingent upon the definition of failed and non-failed firms and the population from which 
firms are drawn. Section 3.2 describes the selection of the explanatory variables in order to 
model the outcome variable. Section 3.3 introduces logistic regression and neural networks 
employed in the construction of financial distress prediction models for private firms in this 
study.  
3.1 Sample selection 
This study uses a private firm dataset collected from the ORBIS database of BvD. The 
collection of data requires a definition of failed and non-failed firms and a specification of the 
population from which firms are drawn. As mentioned in the literature review in Chapter 2, 
firms can experience varying degrees and forms of financial distress subject to legal and 
financial frameworks. It is not easy to give a definition of failure because financial distress 
prediction models are sensitive to alternative definitions of failure. Bahnson and Bartley 
(1992), for example, estimated two groups of logistic regression models with one being 8-
predictor models and the other being 7-predictor models. In each group of models, they 
estimated models using alternative definitions of failure: bankrupt versus non-bankrupt, 
solvent versus insolvent, and nonevent versus technical default versus insolvent. They found 
that the failure prediction models were sensitive to alternative definitions of failure.  
The ORBIS database classifies firms into groups: active firms, inactive firms and unknown 
situations. Active firms refer to those firms which are active, active (default of payment), active 
(insolvency proceedings), active (dormant) and active (branch). Inactive firms refer to those 
firms which are in the status of bankruptcy, being in liquidation, dissolved (merger or take-
over), dissolved (demerger), dissolved (liquidation), dissolved (bankruptcy), dissolved, 
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inactive (no precision), and inactive (branch). This study excludes some inactive firms from 
failed firms, i.e., dissolved (merger or take-over), dissolved (demerger), dissolved, and inactive 
(branch) because these firms are either branches of firms or dissolved for reasons other than 
financial distress. This study also excludes dissolved (liquidation) from failed firms: these firms 
refer to those firms which experience a friendly liquidation of its assets. When sampling active 
firms, the study excludes active (dormant) and active (branch): the former are still registered 
but not active in trading and the latter refer to branches of firms. To avoid any ambiguity, this 
study also excludes firms with unknown situations from the samples of failed and active firms. 
For the purpose of this study, non-failed firms are thus defined as active firms, and failed firms 
are defined as: i) active (default of payment), ii) active (insolvency proceedings), iii) 
bankruptcy, iv) dissolved (bankrupt), v) inactive (no precision), vi) in liquidation. The ORBIS 
database gives a clear definition of these failure events under consideration: default of payment 
means that a debtor has not paid a debt; a firm is in insolvency proceedings if it remains active 
but is in administration or receivership or under a scheme of arrangement; bankruptcy is a 
legally declared inability of a firm to pay its creditors, and a bankruptcy firm is in the process 
of bankruptcy; a firm is dissolved (bankrupt) if it has been dissolved at the end of a bankruptcy 
process; a firm is in liquidation if it is selling its assets and will be dissolved in the end. This 
study defines a failed firm as a firm which experiences any of the six failure events because 
the examination of a single failure event by the exclusion of other failure events will limit the 
generalisability of a predictive model (Bahnson & Bartley 1992, p.256). Given the number of 
failure events, it is not possible to give a meaningful ranking in terms of chronological sequence 
or severity. Not surprisingly, the study by Altman et al. (2014) provides a similar definition of 
financial distress as this study does.  
The population is restricted by i) the period of 2002 to 2011, ii) private limited companies 
(referred to as “private firms” or “privately held firms” in this study), and iii) the setting of the 
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EU. The EU is a union of 28 member states primarily located in Europe: the United Kingdom 
(UK), Ireland, Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Denmark, 
Finland, Sweden, Italy, Malta, Portugal, Spain, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Greece, Romania, 
Slovenia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and Slovakia. For each 
firm, failed or non-failed, I collected a maximum of 10 years’ data during the sample period of 
2002 to 2011. Consistent with the literature, I eliminated any observations for a firm after it 
experienced a form of financial distress. This study defines year “t” as the last available year 
for an active firm or the year when a failure event occurred for a failed firm. Since I collected 
up to ten years’ data for a firm, this study relates its accounting and non-accounting information 
in previous years to the credit status of the firm in year “t”.  A previous year “t-s” (s=9, 8, 7, 6, 
5, 4, 3, 2, or 1) is defined as the year which is “s” years prior to year “t”. Consistent with Ohlson 
(1980), the dataset used in this study includes newly founded firms and firms having one or 
two years of financial statement records. The study does not match failed and active firms by 
industry and size in order to avoid the problem of oversampling failed firms and inability to 
use industry and size as predictors. At the time of data collection in 2012, a data filter was used 
to exclude observations with no or very limited financial statement records. This procedure 
produced a sample of failed and active firm-year observations. Not every firm year had 
complete data for the selected independent variables. Casewise deletion reduced the original 
sample to 6,011,966 firm-year observations. The final sample of 6,011,966 firm-year 
observations is larger than any sample used in prior studies. 15 
3.2 Dependent and independent variables 
This study models financial distress in two states in logistic regression and neural network 
models: 
                                                            
15 For the distribution of active and failed firms over time and across countries, please refer to Table 4.2 and Table 4.3 
respectively.  
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State 0: active firms 
State 1: failed firms as defined in Section 3.1.  
I collected and calculated 50 accounting ratios covering liquidity, solvency, profitability, 
activity and coverage (see Table 0.1 and Table 0.2 in the appendix for details), 11 
macroeconomic variables (see Table 0.3 in the appendix), industry groupings based on NAICS 
2007 code and US SIC code, country (28 EU member states), age (in years), and natural 
logarithm of total assets as a proxy for size.  
The ORBIS database provides the industry classification systems of BvD major sector, national 
industry classification used by NACE Rev.2, NAICS 2007 and US SIC. It does not provide 
GICS industry classification and Table 0.4 shows how NAICS 2007 sectors relate to GICS 
sectors according to Bos, Frömmel and Lamers (2013). This study partitions industries into ten 
categories by US SIC code: 1) agriculture, forestry, fishing, 2) mining, 3) construction, 4) 
manufacturing, 5) transportation, communications and public utilities, 6) wholesale trade, 7) 
retail trade, 8) finance, insurance and real estate, 9) services and 10) public administration. The 
EU consists of 28 member states, which the study reclassifies into Western Europe including 
the UK and Ireland, Northern Europe, Southern Europe, South Eastern Europe, Eastern Europe 
based on version 2.3 of Standard Australian Classification of Countries 2011 (see Table 0.5 in 
the appendix).  
Model building involves a difficult process in which not only does one try to select a set of 
independent variables that explain maximum variability of an outcome variable, but also aims 
to develop a parsimonious model with a minimum number of independent variables. This study 
selects a set of independent variables based on their significant associations with the outcome 
variable and the recommendations of prior empirical studies. The independent variables 
included in models are age (in years), natural logarithm of total assets, cash/total assets, 
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creditors/total liabilities, EBIT/total assets, fixed assets/total assets, loans/total assets, total 
liabilities/total assets, working capital/total assets, unemployment rates, trade balance (% of 
GDP), international reserves per head (in USD thousand), and the categorical variables of 
industry and region. Other ratios which are not to be used as explanatory variables are those 
variables which are either highly correlated with the selected explanatory variables or have a 
very high number of missing values.  
3.3 Model development and specification 
3.3.1 Logistic regression  
A logistic regression model is 
 ܲݎሺݕ௜ ൌ 1|ݔ௜ሻ ൌ Φሺߚᇱݔ௜ሻ 3.1
 
where ݕ௜ is a binary outcome variable, ߚᇱݔ௜ a vector of parameter estimates and explanatory 
variables, and Φ the cumulative standard logistic distribution function.16 
Since Φ  is the cumulative standard logistic distribution function, Equation in 3.1 can be 
rewritten as 
 ܲݎሺݕ௜ ൌ 1| ݔ௜ሻ ൌ ݁
ఉᇲ௫೔
1 ൅ ݁ఉᇲ௫೔ 
3.2
 
As Train (2009) summarises, logistic regression has the following desirable characteristics. To 
begin with, ܲሺݕ௜ ൌ 1|	ݔ௜ሻ is confined to values between zero and one. When ߚᇱݔ௜ approaches 
൅∞ , ܲሺݕ௜ ൌ 1|	ݔ௜ሻ approaches one but is never exactly one. When ߚᇱݔ௜  approaches െ∞, 
ܲሺݕ௜ ൌ 1|	ݔ௜ሻ approaches zero but is never exactly zero. Secondly, the probabilities for all 
alternatives add up to one. When an outcome is binary, it follows that 
                                                            
16 Since logistic regression is one of the most well-known techniques, the study will not review its derivation in detail.  
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 ܲሺݕ௜ ൌ 0|	ݔ௜ሻ ൌ 1 െ ܲሺݕ௜ ൌ 1| ݔ௜ሻ ൌ 1 െ ݁
ఉᇲ௫೔
1 ൅ ݁ఉᇲ௫೔ , 
 
3.3
which simplifies into 
 ܲሺݕ௜ ൌ 0| ݔ௜ሻ ൌ 11 ൅ ݁ఉᇲ௫೔ . 
 
3.4
Third is the sigmoid or S-shaped relationship between the probability of ݕ௜ and ݔ௜. The simple 
nonlinear relation reveals the non-constant effect of one unit increase in an independent 
variable on the estimated probability: that is, the change in the estimated probability depends 
on where the unit increase in the independent variable takes place.  
With the logistic regression model described, I now move to the discussion of its estimation. 
One common method to estimate coefficients is maximum likelihood. To obtain maximum 
likelihood estimators of unknown coefficients, one first constructs the following likelihood 
function: 
 
ܮሺߚሻ ൌෑܲሺݕ௜ ൌ 1|ݔ௜ሻ௬೔ሾ 1 െ ܲሺݕ௜ ൌ 1|ݔ௜ሻଵି௬೔ሿ
௡
௜ୀଵ
 
 
3.5
As it is mathematically easier to work with the log of the above likelihood function, one can 
maximize the following log-likelihood equation, 
 
݈݊ܮሺߚሻ ൌ෍ሼݕ௜݈݊ሾܲሺݕ௜ ൌ 1|ݔ௜ሻሿ ൅ ሺ1 െ ݕ௜ሻ݈݊ሾ1 െ ܲሺݕ௜ ൌ 1|ݔ௜ሻሿሽ
௡
௜ୀଵ
 
3.6
3.3.2 Neural networks 
Neural networks refer to a family of models that acquire knowledge through a learning process 
and then store the knowledge in synaptic weights by emulating the processes of the brain. They 
can apply to regression or classification. Drawing upon Hastie, Tibshirani and Friedman (2009, 
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pp. 392-397), this section describes a single hidden layer back-propagation network, which is 
also known as a single layer perceptron.  
Figure 3.1 A feedforward single layer neural network (Hastie, Tibshirani & Friedman 
2009, p. 393, Figure 11.2) 
 
The single layer perceptron in Figure 3.1 consists of the input layer, the hidden layer and the 
output layer. The input layer contains an input vector of predictors ܺ. The hidden layer contains 
unobservable nodes or units, each of which is a function of the predictors in the input layer: 
 ܼ௠ ൌ ߪሺߙ଴௠ ൅ ߙ௠்ܺሻ,݉ ൌ 1,… ,ܯ, 3.7
 
where ܼ ൌ ሺܼଵ, ܼଶ, … , ܼ௠ሻ, and ߪሺݒሻ is the activation function that links the weighted sums of 
units in the input layer to the values of units in the hidden layer. The activation function can be 
the sigmoid ߪሺݒሻ ൌ ଵଵା௘షೡ , or hyperbolic tangent ߪሺݒሻ ൌ
௘ೡି௘షೡ
௘ೡା௘షೡ , or Gaussian radial basis 
function.  
71 
 
When a neural network is applied into classification, the output layer contains the ܭ outcomes 
in the categorical dependent variable with each outcome being a function of the hidden units: 
 ௞ܶ ൌ ߚ଴௞ ൅ ߚ௞் ܼ, ݇ ൌ 1,… , ܭ, 
௞݂ሺܺሻ ൌ ݃௞ሺܶሻ, ݇ ൌ 1,… , ܭ, 
 
3.8
 
where ܶ ൌ ሺ ଵܶ, ଶܶ, … , ௞ܶሻ, and ݃௞ሺܶሻ is the activation function which links the weighted sums 
of units in the hidden layer to the outcomes in the output layer. The output activation function 
can be in the softmax form ݃௞ሺܶሻ ൌ ௘
೅ೖ
∑ ௘೅ℓℓ಼సభ
, or the hyperbolic tangent form, or the sigmoid 
form. 
There is only one hidden layer in the neural network described above. There can be more than 
one hidden layer: the weighted sum of the units in the first hidden layer will be transformed by 
a function into the hidden units in the following hidden layer. Where there is more than one 
hidden layer, a neural network is often referred to as a multilayer perceptron.  
With the neural network model described, I now move to the estimation of weights that make 
the neural network model well fit a dataset. Let me denote the set of weights as ߠ: 
 ሼߙ଴௠, ߙ௠;݉ ൌ 1, 2, … ,ܯሽ ܯሺ݌ ൅ 1ሻ weights 
ሼߚ଴௞, ߚ௞; ݇ ൌ 1, 2, … , ܭሽ ܭሺܯ ൅ 1ሻweights 
 
  3.9
 
Equation 3.7 indicates that ݖ௠௜ ൌ ߪሺߙ଴௠ ൅ ߙ௠்ݔ௜ሻ , and let ݖ௜ ൌ ሺݖଵ௜, ݖଶ௜, … , ݖெ௜ሻ.  For 
classification, one can use either sum-of-squared errors  
 
ܴሺߠሻ ൌ෍෍൫ݕ௜௞ െ ௞݂ሺݔ௜ሻ൯ଶ
௄
௞ୀଵ
ே
௜ୀଵ
, 
 
3.10
or cross-entropy as a measure of fit 
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ܴሺߠሻ ൌ െ෍෍ݕ௜௞ log ௞݂ሺݔ௜ሻ
௄
௞ୀଵ
ே
௜ୀଵ
, 
 
3.11
To estimate the weights, one aims to minimise the above error function. The most popular 
learning algorithm to minimise ܴሺߠሻ is gradient descent, which aims to minimise the error at 
the output. I will explain below how to minimise the squared error. I will not dwell upon the 
computational details for cross-entropy as they have the same form as those for squared error.   
For the hidden-to-output and input-hidden connections the gradient descent rules give 
 ߲ܴ௜
߲ߚ௞௠ ൌ െ2൫ݕ௜௞ െ ௞݂ሺݔ௜ሻ൯݃௞
ᇱ ሺߚ௞் ݖ௜ሻݖ௠௜, 
߲ܴ௜
߲ߙ௠ℓ ൌ െ෍2൫ݕ௜௞ െ ௞݂ሺݔ௜ሻ൯݃௞
ᇱ ሺߚ௞் ݖ௜ሻߚ௞௠
௄
௞ୀଵ
ߪᇱሺߙ௠்ݔ௜ሻݔ௜ℓ. 
 
3.12
A gradient descent update at the ሺݎ ൅ 1ሻst iteration has the form 
 
ߚ௞௠ሺ௥ାଵሻ ൌ ߚ௞௠ሺ௥ሻ െ ߛ௥෍
߲ܴ௜
߲ߚ௞௠ሺ௥ሻ
ே
௜ୀଵ
, 
ߙ௠ℓሺ௥ାଵሻ ൌ ߙ௠ℓሺ௥ሻ െ ߛ௥෍
߲ܴ௜
߲ߙ௠ℓሺ௥ሻ
ே
௜ୀଵ
, 
 
 3.13
 
where ߛ௥ is the learning rate. The update in Equation 3.13 is typical of batch learning in which 
synaptic weights will be updated following the passing of all training data and is more useful 
for a small dataset. For a large dataset, online learning is more appropriate because synaptic 
weights will be updated after every single training case comes in.  
If one defines errors at the output and hidden layer units as  ߜ௞௜ and ݏ௠௜ respectively, one can 
rewrite Equation 3.12 as 
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 ߲ܴ௜
߲ߚ௞௠ ൌ ߜ௞௜ݖ௠௜, 
߲ܴ௜
߲ߙ௠ℓ ൌ ݏ௠௜ݔ௜ℓ. 
3.14
 
These errors satisfy 
 
ݏ௠௜ ൌ ߪᇱሺߙ௠்ݔ௜ሻ෍ߚ௞௠
௄
௞ୀଵ
ߜ௞௜, 
3.15
 
Using Equation 3.15, the updates in Equation 3.13 can be implemented by back-propagation. 
In the forward pass, the predicted values ௞݂෡ ሺݔ௜ሻ  with current weights being fixed are 
determined from Equation 3.8. In the backward pass, the errors ߜ௞௜ are computed and then 
back-propagated by Equation 3.15 for the errors ݏ௠௜. The errors ߜ௞௜ and ݏ௠௜ are then used to 
determine the gradients for the updates in Equation 3.13 via Equation 3.14.  
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Chapter 4 Descriptive statistics 
The final sample in this study consists of 6,011,966 firm-year observations representing 96,331 
failed firms and 1,095,366 active firms. The large sample better reflects the underlying 
population of the EU during the sample period of 2002 to 2011. As described in Chapter 3, this 
study models financial distress in two states: 0 for active and 1 for failed. The independent 
variables include age, size, cash/total assets, creditors/total liabilities, EBIT/total assets, fixed 
assets/total assets, loans/total assets, total liabilities/total assets, working capital/total assets, 
unemployment rates, trade balance (% of GDP), international reserves per head (in USD 
thousand), and the categorical variables of industry and region. This chapter presents summary 
statistics for the dependent variable and each of the independent variables during the sample 
period of 2002 to 2011. Section 4.1 describes failure rates and provides a breakdown of failure 
rates by year, country, region and industry. Section 4.2 explores the association between the 
macroeconomic variables and failure rates. Section 4.3 compares the mean values of the firm-
specific continuous variables between failed and active firms, and provides a breakdown of the 
differences by industry, region and calendar year and over a 5-year period leading up to failure. 
The summary statistics in these sections provide some preliminary indication of the behaviour 
of the explanatory variables prior to failure, thereby facilitating an early diagnosis of financial 
distress for privately held firms.  
4.1 Failure rates 
Table 4.1 provides summary statistics for the distribution of active and failed firms and firm-
year observations. As Panel C indicates, 96,331 firms failed in the sample during the period of 
2002 to 2011, representing 8.1% of the total 1,191,697 firms. Panel A shows that 365,504 firm-
year observations relate to the 96,331 failed firms, representing 6.1% of all the available firm-
year observations, both active and failed. On average, a failed firm and an active firm have 3.8 
and 5.2 firm-year observations respectively during the sample period of 2002 to 2011. While 
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the sampled failed firms experienced varying degrees and forms of failure, Panels B and D 
show that most failure events relate to inactive (no precision), bankruptcy, in liquidation and 
active (receivership).  
Table 4.1 Distribution of active and failed firms and firm-year observations 
Panel A Distribution of active and failed firm-year observations 
Status No. of firm-years Percentage 
Active 5,646,462 93.9% 
Failed 365,504 6.1% 
Total 6,011,966 100.0% 
 
Panel B Distribution of failed firm-year observations by failure event 
Status No. of firm-years Percentage 
Active 5,646,462 93.9% 
Active (default of payment) 1,695 0.0% 
Active (insolvency proceedings) 9,234 0.2% 
Active (receivership) 47,026 0.8% 
Bankruptcy 102,054 1.7% 
Dissolved (bankruptcy) 179 0.0% 
In liquidation 85,372 1.4% 
Inactive (no precision) 119,944 2.0% 
Total 6,011,966 100% 
   
Panel C Distribution of failed and active firms 
Status No. of firms Percentage 
Active 1,095,366 91.9% 
Failed 96,331 8.1% 
Total 1,191,697 100.0% 
   
Panel D Distribution of failed firms by failure event 
Status No. of firms Percentage 
Active 1,095,366 91.9% 
Active (default of payment) 416 0.0% 
Active (insolvency proceedings) 1,623 0.1% 
Active (receivership) 10,906 0.9% 
Bankruptcy 28,331 2.4% 
Dissolved (bankruptcy) 50 0.0% 
In liquidation 23,279 2.0% 
Inactive (no precision) 31,726 2.7% 
Total 1,191,697 100% 
 
Table 4.2 shows that the average annual failure rate during the sample period of 2002 to 2011 
was 1.6%. The annual failure rates show considerable fluctuation and generally reflect the 
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overall health of the economy in the EU, with relatively high rates during the 2007-2008 
financial crisis and lower rates preceding and following the financial crisis. At the time of data 
collection in 2012, the ORBIS database provided fewer firm-year observations for 2011, 
thereby reducing the representativeness of the actual failure rate in 2011.  
Table 4.2 Failure rates by year 
Year No. of firms No. of failures Percentage of failed firms 
2002 451,516 5,675 1.3% 
2003 485,264 9,075 1.9% 
2004 563,641 9,110 1.6% 
2005 610,551 9,088 1.5% 
2006 674,771 10,570 1.6% 
2007 686,975 12,308 1.8% 
2008 704,244 12,932 1.8% 
2009 708,182 12,003 1.7% 
2010 645,337 11,154 1.7% 
2011 481,485 4,416 0.9% 
Total 6,011,966 96,331 1.6% 
 
Table 4.3 provides failure rates by country and region. Panel A provides country failure rates 
based on both the number of firms and the number of firm-year observations. As Panel A and 
Figure 4.1 suggest, the failure rates show considerable variation by country: Italy had the 
highest failure rate of 14.2% (measured as the percentage of firms) during the sample period, 
followed by Netherlands 13.0%, Latvia 12.3%, France 10.8%, Ireland 8.2%, Czech Republic 
7.1%, the UK 7.0%, Spain 5.9%, Romania 5.1%, Slovakia 4.1%, Germany 4.0% and Croatia 
3.1%. Countries with the failure rate of less than 1% include Austria 0.04%, Hungary 0.1%, 
Greece 0.1%, Slovenia 0.7%, Bulgaria 0.8%, and Portugal 0.9%. The failure rates in the 
remaining countries were between 1.1% and 2.8%. The ORBIS database must not have 
collected data evenly across the countries given the unrealistically low failure rates in some 
countries such as Greece. Panel B reports failure rates across the five EU regions. According 
to Panel B, Southern Europe experienced the highest failure rate of 10.4% (as a percentage of 
the firms in the region) during the sample period, followed by Western Europe 7.8%, Eastern 
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Europe 4.6%, South Eastern Europe 3.6% and Northern Europe 2.4%. Panel C and Figure 4.2 
show the fluctuation of the annual failure rates within every EU region over time. In Western 
Europe, Northern Europe and Southern Europe, the annual failure rates rose during the 
financial crisis before falling again after the crisis. The annual failure rates in Northern Europe 
did not fluctuate significantly during the financial crisis whereas the annual failure rates in 
South Eastern Europe plummeted during the financial crisis.  
Figure 4.1 Failure rates by country  
 
Figure 4.2 Annual failure rates in the EU between 2002 and 2011 
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Table 4.3 Failure rates by country and region 
Panel A Failure rates by country 
      
Country No. of firm-
years 
No. of firms No. of 
failures 
Percentage of 
firm-years 
failed 
Percentage of 
failed firms 
Austria 26,514 7,174 3 0.01% 0.0% 
Belgium 130,302 34,805 400 0.31% 1.1% 
Bulgaria 36,872 6,568 54 0.15% 0.8% 
Croatia 85,569 12,876 404 0.47% 3.1% 
Cyprus 1,498 643 10 0.67% 1.6% 
Czech Republic 207,546 38,903 2,765 1.33% 7.1% 
Denmark 611 387 5 0.82% 1.3% 
Estonia 37,748 6,424 114 0.30% 1.8% 
Finland 153,804 28,704 707 0.46% 2.5% 
France 951,281 158,123 17,089 1.80% 10.8% 
Germany 239,504 71,130 2,825 1.18% 4.0% 
Greece 15,788 3,112 4 0.03% 0.1% 
Hungary 20,269 10,154 7 0.03% 0.1% 
Ireland 24,807 5,519 454 1.83% 8.2% 
Italy 1,786,042 298,572 42,391 2.37% 14.2% 
Latvia 28,781 6,171 758 2.63% 12.3% 
Lithuania 20,072 4,323 73 0.36% 1.7% 
Luxembourg 3,007 1,333 27 0.90% 2.0% 
Malta 9,774 3,288 73 0.75% 2.2% 
Netherlands 127,690 34,580 4,507 3.53% 13.0% 
Poland 151,019 35,321 980 0.65% 2.8% 
Portugal 26,522 26,522 227 0.86% 0.9% 
Romania 138,623 35,626 1,822 1.31% 5.1% 
Slovakia 46,262 12,444 516 1.12% 4.1% 
Slovenia 14,429 6,588 45 0.31% 0.7% 
Spain 1,108,538 192,659 11,435 1.03% 5.9% 
Sweden 49,270 39,428 904 1.83% 2.3% 
United Kingdom 569,824 110,320 7,732 1.36% 7.0% 
Total 6,011,966 1,191,697 96,331 1.60% 8.1% 
 
Panel B Failure rates by region 
      
Region No. of firm-
years 
No of 
firms 
No. of 
failures 
Percentage of 
firm-years 
failed 
Percentage 
of failed 
firms 
Western Europe 2,072,929 422,984 33,037 1.6% 7.8% 
Northern Europe 203,685 68,519 1,616 0.8% 2.4% 
Southern Europe 2,930,876 521,041 54,126 1.8% 10.4% 
South Eastern Europe 292,779 65,413 2,339 0.8% 3.6% 
Eastern Europe 511,697 113,740 5,213 1.0% 4.6% 
Total 6,011,966 1,191,697 96,331 1.6% 8.1% 
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Table 4.3 (continued) 
 
Panel C Annual failure rates by region  
 
Year Status  Western Europe Northern Europe Southern Europe South Eastern Europe Eastern Europe 
2002 Active 158,661 98.1% 16,008 99.6% 212,002 99.0% 32,322 99.6% 26,848 99.2% 
failed 3,098 1.9% 66 0.4% 2,169 1.0% 127 0.4% 215 0.8% 
2003 Active 170,162 98.2% 16,091 99.1% 216,500 97.7% 36,520 99.2% 36,916 99.1% 
failed 3,139 1.8% 140 0.9% 5,142 2.3% 313 0.8% 341 0.9% 
2004 Active 180,992 98.1% 14,363 99.0% 276,113 98.3% 39,824 99.0% 43,239 98.9% 
failed 3,429 1.9% 146 1.0% 4,653 1.7% 401 1.0% 481 1.1% 
2005 Active 201,572 98.4% 14,565 99.2% 293,475 98.4% 43,709 99.2% 48,142 99.1% 
failed 3,347 1.6% 114 0.8% 4,829 1.6% 362 0.8% 436 0.9% 
2006 Active 220,578 98.6% 15,614 99.1% 316,878 98.2% 44,847 98.3% 66,284 99.0% 
failed 3,188 1.4% 134 0.9% 5,831 1.8% 769 1.7% 648 1.0% 
2007 Active 233,438 98.5% 17,484 99.1% 337,451 97.9% 17,922 99.6% 68,372 98.4% 
failed 3,598 1.5% 161 0.9% 7,401 2.1% 63 0.4% 1,085 1.6% 
2008 Active 241,981 98.3% 18,340 99.2% 346,280 97.8% 18,423 99.7% 66,288 98.8% 
failed 4,123 1.7% 155 0.8% 7,784 2.2% 52 0.3% 818 1.2% 
2009 Active 245,061 98.4% 18,566 99.3% 347,773 98.0% 18,478 99.7% 66,301 99.0% 
failed 4,097 1.6% 130 0.7% 7,014 2.0% 64 0.3% 698 1.0% 
2010 Active 223,108 98.7% 18,129 99.1% 318,544 97.6% 20,019 99.6% 54,383 99.4% 
failed 2,844 1.3% 170 0.9% 7,748 2.4% 79 0.4% 313 0.6% 
2011 Active 164,339 98.7% 52,909 99.2% 211,734 99.3% 18,376 99.4% 29,711 99.4% 
failed 2,174 1.3% 400 0.8% 1,555 0.7% 109 0.6% 178 0.6% 
Total Active 2,039,892 98.4% 202,069 99.2% 2,876,750 98.2% 290,440 99.2% 506,484 99.0% 
Failed 33,037 1.6% 1,616 0.8% 54,126 1.8% 2,339 0.8% 5,213 1.0% 
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Table 4.4 provides industry failure rates and shows the considerable fluctuation of the annual 
failure rates across the ten industry sectors. Panel A provides industry failure rates based on 
both the number of firms and the number of firm-year observations. Public administration had 
the highest failure rate of 13.9% (measured as the percentage of firms in the industry) during 
the sample period, followed by construction 9.8%, manufacturing 9.4%, wholesale trade 7.8%, 
finance, insurance and real estate 7.8%, and transportation, communication and public utilities 
7.6%. Firms in the public administration industry are typically those firms to which a 
government outsources services. The high failure rate in the public administration industry may 
be attributed to significant changes in public policy such as sending firm supplying services to 
the public sector. Agriculture, forestry and fishing had the lowest failure rate of 3.9%, followed 
by mining 5.1%, retail trade 6.9% and services 7.0%. Panel B and Figures 4.3 to 4.13 show the 
fluctuation of the annual failure rates over time within each industry sector. In manufacturing, 
transportation, communications and public utilities, wholesale trade, retail trade, finance, 
insurance and real estate, and services, the annual failure rates rose in 2007 and continued to 
rise or level off in 2008, suggesting that firms in these industries were severely affected during 
the 2007-2008 financial crisis. Firms in agriculture, forestry and fishing seemed to be least 
affected by the financial crisis for the annual failure rate in that sector did not change in 2007 
and even dropped slightly in 2008. In contrast, the annual failure rates for the mining,  
construction and public administration sectors jumped dramatically in 2007 despite a drop in 
2008, suggesting that firms in these industries were the most severely affected by the financial 
crisis.  
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Table 4.4 Failure rates by industry 
Panel A Failure rates by industry 
      
Industry No. of firm-years No. of firms No. of 
failures 
Percentage of 
firm-years 
failed 
Percentage of 
failed firms 
Agriculture, forestry & Fishing 91,629 18,344 718 0.8% 3.9% 
Mining 24,714 4,397 226 0.9% 5.1% 
Construction 938,732 186,711 18,287 1.9% 9.8% 
Manufacturing 1,132,401 204,064 19,270 1.7% 9.4% 
Transportation, communication & public utilities 303,882 60,530 4,601 1.5% 7.6% 
Wholesale trade 1,039,130 196,425 15,353 1.5% 7.8% 
Retail trade 691,449 134,415 9,324 1.3% 6.9% 
Finance, insurance & real estate 763,606 177,973 13,953 1.8% 7.8% 
Services 1,022,539 207,920 14,471 1.4% 7.0% 
Public administration  3,884 918 128 3.3% 13.9% 
Total 6,011,966 1,191,697 96,331 1.6% 8.1% 
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Table 4.4 (continued) 
Panel B Annual failure rates by industry  
Year Status  Agriculture, forestry 
and fishing 
Mining Construction Manufacturing Transportation, 
communication and 
public utilities 
2002 Active 6,858 99.4% 2,039 99.5% 68,556 98.8% 93,297 98.7% 23,070 98.8% 
failed 39 0.6% 11 0.5% 810 1.2% 1,238 1.3% 276 1.2% 
2003 Active 7,542 99.1% 2,115 99.1% 73,712 97.3% 96,777 97.9% 24,757 98.2% 
failed 68 0.9% 19 0.9% 2,069 2.7% 2,028 2.1% 442 1.8% 
2004 Active 8,874 99.2% 2,392 99.3% 88,977 98.4% 108,462 98.3% 27,797 98.5% 
failed 68 0.8% 16 0.7% 1,464 1.6% 1,885 1.7% 417 1.5% 
2005 Active 9,351 99.3% 2,557 99.4% 97,635 98.4% 116,104 98.5% 30,046 98.6% 
failed 65 0.7% 15 0.6% 1,580 1.6% 1,764 1.5% 416 1.4% 
2006 Active 10,150 99.1% 2,745 99.3% 108,170 98.2% 125,597 98.3% 33,427 98.5% 
failed 90 0.9% 19 0.7% 2,004 1.8% 2,147 1.7% 524 1.5% 
2007 Active 9,925 99.1% 2,711 98.8% 108,653 97.7% 123,187 98.0% 33,741 98.2% 
failed 89 0.9% 32 1.2% 2,503 2.3% 2,487 2.0% 617 1.8% 
2008 Active 10,181 99.3% 2,750 98.9% 108,324 97.8% 123,876 97.9% 34,386 98.2% 
failed 70 0.7% 30 1.1% 2,447 2.2% 2,610 2.1% 641 1.8% 
2009 Active 10,597 99.2% 2,770 98.8% 106,488 97.8% 123,937 98.3% 34,799 98.5% 
failed 86 0.8% 34 1.2% 2,399 2.2% 2,151 1.7% 528 1.5% 
2010 Active 9,840 98.9% 2,582 98.7% 94,709 97.8% 112,783 98.2% 31,955 98.5% 
failed 110 1.1% 35 1.3% 2,160 2.2% 2,077 1.8% 487 1.5% 
2011 Active 7,593 99.6% 1,827 99.2% 65,221 98.7% 89,111 99.0% 25,303 99.0% 
failed 33 0.4% 15 0.8% 851 1.3% 883 1.0% 253 1.0% 
Total Active 90,911 99.2% 24,488 99.1% 920,445 98.1% 1,113,131 98.3% 299,281 98.5% 
Failed 718 0.8% 226 0.9% 18,287 1.9% 19,270 1.7% 4,601 1.5% 
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Table 4.4 (continued)  
Panel B continued 
Year Status  Wholesale  Retail  Finance  Services  Public 
administration
 
2002 Active 83,560 98.7% 52,790 99.0% 41,920 98.1% 73,599 98.9% 152 96.8% 
 failed 1,093 1.3% 527 1.0% 820 1.9% 856 1.1% 5 3.2% 
2003 Active 88,353 98.3% 55,936 98.7% 46,248 97.9% 80,559 98.6% 190 96.9% 
 failed 1,532 1.7% 758 1.3% 989 2.1% 1,164 1.4% 6 3.1% 
2004 Active 98,375 98.3% 64,071 98.6% 63,025 97.8% 92,213 98.6% 345 98.6% 
 failed 1,689 1.7% 898 1.4% 1395 2.2% 1,273 1.4% 5 1.4% 
2005 Active 105,945 98.5% 68,715 98.7% 69,752 98.1% 100,871 98.7% 487 97.0% 
 failed 1,583 1.5% 911 1.3% 1373 1.9% 1,366 1.3% 15 3.0% 
2006 Active 115,301 98.5% 75,205 98.7% 79,986 98.2% 113,120 98.7% 500 93.3% 
 failed 1,765 1.5% 996 1.3% 1502 1.8% 1,487 1.3% 36 6.7% 
2007 Active 113,854 98.4% 75,507 98.7% 92,464 98.1% 114,147 98.4% 478 93.0% 
 failed 1,846 1.6% 1,032 1.3% 1,826 1.9% 1,840 1.6% 36 7.0% 
2008 Active 114,728 98.3% 77,921 98.5% 99,386 98.1% 119,243 98.3% 517 98.3% 
 failed 1,925 1.7% 1,208 1.5% 1,944 1.9% 2,048 1.7% 9 1.7% 
2009 Active 115,444 98.5% 79,480 98.4% 100,739 98.3% 121,432 98.3% 493 98.6% 
 failed 1,721 1.5% 1,254 1.6% 1,781 1.7% 2,042 1.7% 7 1.4% 
2010 Active 105,243 98.5% 73,721 98.4% 91,855 98.1% 111,111 98.5% 384 98.0% 
 failed 1,616 1.5% 1,185 1.6% 1,749 1.9% 1,727 1.5% 8 2.0% 
2011 Active 82,974 99.3% 58,779 99.1% 64,278 99.1% 81,773 99.2% 210 99.5% 
 failed 583 0.7% 555 0.9% 574 0.9% 668 0.8% 1 0.5% 
Total Active 1,023,777 98.5% 682,125 98.7% 749,653 98.2% 1,008,068 98.6% 3,756 96.7% 
 Failed 15,353 1.5% 9,324 1.3% 13,953 1.8% 14,471 1.4% 128 3.3% 
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Figure 4.3 Annual failure rates by industry between 2002 and 2011 
 
Figure 4.4 Annual failure rates in agriculture, forestry and fishing 
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Figure 4.5 Annual failure rates in mining 
 
Figure 4.6 Annual failure rates in construction 
 
Figure 4.7 Annual failure rates in manufacturing 
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Figure 4.8 Annual failure rates in transportation, communications and public utilities 
 
Figure 4.9 Annual failure rates in wholesale trade 
 
Figure 4.10 Annual failure rates in retail trade 
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Figure 4.11 Annual failure rates in finance, insurance and real estate 
 
Figure 4.12 Annual failure rates in services 
 
Figure 4.13 Annual failure rates in public administration 
0.00%
0.50%
1.00%
1.50%
2.00%
2.50%
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
0.00%
0.20%
0.40%
0.60%
0.80%
1.00%
1.20%
1.40%
1.60%
1.80%
2.00%
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
0.00%
1.00%
2.00%
3.00%
4.00%
5.00%
6.00%
7.00%
8.00%
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
88 
 
4.2 Macroeconomic variables 
So far I have provided summary statistics for failure rates by year, country, region and industry. 
The failure rates show considerable fluctuation by industry and region, suggesting the 
importance of industry and country effects to corporate failure. While some earlier studies 
controlled the effect of industry and region on corporate failure by a matched sample drawn 
from a country’s population (e.g., Altman 1968; Ohlson 1980), more recent studies have 
included the categorical variables of industry and country or region as explanatory variables 
(e.g., Bhimani, Gulamhussen & Lopes 2010). To incorporate the effect of industry and country 
on corporate failure, the present study includes the categorical variables of industry and region 
as independent variables in predictive models for the financial distress of private firms.  
Business cycles must have had an impact on corporate failure for the annual failure rates show 
considerable fluctuation over time. To model the effect of business cycles, some studies used 
a categorical variable for “year” (e.g., Altman et al. 2014), while other studies selected 
macroeconomic variables as explanatory variables (e.g., Duffie, Saita & Wang 2007). The 
present study includes international reserves per head (USD thousand), unemployment rates 
(% of labour force) and trade balance (% of GDP) as explanatory variables in order to 
incorporate the effect of macroeconomic conditions on corporate failure. Table 4.5 shows the 
average unemployment rate, the average trade balance (% of GDP), the average international 
reserves per head, the percentage of failed firm-year observations and the percentage of failed 
firms in every country during the sample period of 2002 to 2011.17 Graphs representing the 
various relationships are shown in Figures 4.14 to 4.16. The scatter plot in Figure 4.14 shows 
the association between the average unemployment rates and the failure rates across the 28 
countries. Each point in the scatter plot represents one observation, i.e., average unemployment 
rate and percentage of failed firm-year observation in a country during the sample period of 
                                                            
17 Percentage of failed firm-year observations and percentage of failed firms are from Panel A of Table 4.3.  
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2002 to 2011. The best fitting line indicates a negative association between unemployment 
rates and failure rates. Unemployment is counter-cyclical and therefore negatively associated 
with failure risk: in times of economic growth, more production of goods and services requires 
more labour, thereby contributing to a fall in unemployment; in an economic downturn, firms 
often reduce their workforce in order to decrease their probability of financial distress, and so 
unemployment rises. As a country’s measure of liquidity, international reserves can serve as a 
moderator of corporate liquidity. Increases in international reserves are likely to be associated 
with a decrease in corporate failure rates. Figure 4.16 seems to support the negative correlation 
despite the weak association. Trade balance as a percentage of GDP is the ratio of the foreign 
trade balance (i.e., difference between exports and imports) to GDP. Figure 4.15 shows a 
positive correlation between trade balance (%) of GDP and failure rates.  
Figure 4.14 Scatterplot of unemployment rates and failure rates 
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Figure 4.15 Scatterplot of trade balance (% of GDP) and failure rates 
 
Figure 4.16 Scatterplot of international reserves per head and failure rates 
 
 
 
0.00
0.50
1.00
1.50
2.00
2.50
3.00
3.50
4.00
‐0.30 ‐0.20 ‐0.10 0.00 0.10 0.20 0.30
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 of
 fa
ile
d f
irm
‐ye
ar
 ob
se
rv
at
io
ns
Average trade balance (% of GDP)
0.00
0.50
1.00
1.50
2.00
2.50
3.00
3.50
4.00
0.00 1.00 2.00 3.00 4.00 5.00 6.00 7.00 8.00 9.00 10.00
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 of
 fa
ile
d f
irm
‐ye
ar
 ob
se
rv
at
io
ns
Average internatioanl reserves per head (USD thousand)
91 
 
Table 4.5 Macroeconomic variables and failure rates 
Country 
Average 
unemployment 
rate (%) 
Average 
trade 
balance 
(% of 
GDP) 
Average 
international 
reserves per 
head 
Percentage 
of failed 
firm-year 
observations  
Percentage 
of failed 
firms 
Austria 4.48 0.00 1.97 0.01% 0.04% 
Belgium 7.86 0.00 1.71 0.31% 1.15% 
Bulgaria 10.61 -0.15 1.73 0.15% 0.82% 
Croatia 17.37 -0.20 2.56 0.47% 3.14% 
Cyprus 4.90 -0.27 4.21 0.67% 1.56% 
Czech republic 8.36 0.01 3.24 1.33% 7.11% 
Denmark 4.83 0.03 8.85 0.82% 1.29% 
Estonia 9.70 -0.11 1.71 0.30% 1.77% 
Finland 8.07 0.05 1.91 0.46% 2.46% 
France 8.60 -0.02 1.73 1.80% 10.81% 
Germany 8.75 0.07 1.71 1.18% 3.97% 
Greece 10.45 -0.15 0.44 0.03% 0.13% 
Hungary 7.97 -0.01 2.74 0.03% 0.07% 
Ireland 7.30 0.19 0.53 1.83% 8.23% 
Italy 7.71 0.00 1.66 2.37% 14.20% 
Latvia 11.29 -0.16 1.92 2.63% 12.28% 
Lithuania 10.85 -0.10 1.62 0.36% 1.69% 
Luxembourg 4.62 -0.10 0.99 0.90% 2.03% 
Malta 6.95 -0.16 4.69 0.75% 2.22% 
Netherlands 4.12 0.07 1.82 3.53% 13.03% 
Poland 15.15 -0.03 1.55 0.65% 2.77% 
Portugal 8.18 -0.11 1.37 0.86% 0.86% 
Romania 6.16 -0.09 1.41 1.31% 5.11% 
Slovakia 12.25 -0.02 2.01 1.12% 4.15% 
Slovenia 9.90 -0.04 2.25 0.31% 0.68% 
Spain 13.10 -0.06 0.61 1.03% 5.94% 
Sweden 7.11 0.04 3.48 1.83% 2.29% 
UK 5.93 -0.06 0.93 1.36% 7.01% 
 
4.3 Firm-specific variables 
Differences in age, size and financial characteristics between failed and non-failed firms are 
shown in Table 4.6. This table provides summary statistics including the mean, median, 
standard deviation, maximum and minimum values of the firm-specific continuous variables 
in the sample of active firm-year observations and the sample of firm-year observations of 
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firms which ultimately failed. To reduce the effect of outliers on statistical results, Shumway 
(2001) set all values above the 99th percentile of each variable to that value and set all values 
below the 1st percentile to that value. Given the larger sample used in the present study, the 
firm-specific continuous covariates were truncated at the 2nd and 98th percentiles.  
Table 4.6 reveals significant differences between active and failed firms in the firm-specific 
characteristics. On average, failed firms experienced much lower profitability than active firms 
in terms of EBIT/total assets. The ratio of working capital to total assets indicates that active 
firms had more liquidity to meet their short term liabilities than failed firms. The ratio of loans 
to total assets serves as a measure of a firm’s ability to pay its short term loans using all assets, 
both current and non-current. On average, the levels of loans to total assets were greater among 
failed firms than among active firms. The mean total liabilities/total assets of failed firms was 
higher, suggesting that failed firms were not as solvent as active firms. The ratio of creditors 
to total liabilities expresses creditors as a percentage of total liabilities, a useful measurement 
of a firm’s debt structure. On average, the levels of creditors to total liabilities were greater 
among failed firms, which seems to highlight the difficulty of failed firms in settling their trade 
payables. In addition, the mean values of age and size were greater among active firms than 
among failed firms, suggesting that on average active firms were older and larger than failed 
firms. The ratios of cash to total assets and fixed assets to total assets indicate that on average 
active firms made more investment in non-current assets and had more cash and cash 
equivalents than failed firms.  An independent t-test was also conducted in order to test for a 
significant difference in the mean of two groups with unequal variance. The t-test statistics 
reported in Table 4.6 suggest significant differences in the mean values of all the nine firm-
specific continuous variables between failed and active firms. Table 4.6 also provides an insight 
into the distribution of the continuous variables in the sampled failed and active firm-year 
observations. Most continuous variables are characterised by a peak distribution with a long 
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tail to the right (higher values). Exceptions include the following ratios: creditors/total 
liabilities, EBIT/total assets, and fixed assets/total assets. The distribution of creditors/total 
liabilities is skewed towards higher values but very close to a Gaussian distribution in both the 
sample of active firm-years and the sample of failed-years. The ratio of EBIT to total assets 
shows a peak distribution in both the samples but is skewed towards higher values in the sample 
of active firm-years, and towards lower values in the sample of failed firm-years. The ratio of 
fixed assets to total assets has a distribution with a long tail to the right in both the samples, 
and in the sample of active firms, the ratio has a flatter distribution than a Gaussian distribution.  
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Table 4.6 Descriptive statistics for significant covariates between active and failed firms 
 Active firms Failed firms  
               Mean diff t-
statistic 
Variable Mean Median Std dev Min Max Kurtosis Skewness Mean Median Std dev Min Max Kurtosis Skewness  
Age 14.08 11.00 13.82 0.00 893.00 38.17 3.26 11.61 8.00 12.37 0.00 219.00 17.15 3.03 2.466 
(105.18) *** 
Size 14.75 14.68 1.65 1.21 27.33 2.48 0.28 14.64 14.62 1.57 0.54 24.47 2.14 0.04 0.114 
(40.58) *** 
Cash/total assets 0.13 0.05 0.17 0.00 1.00 4.74 2.10 0.09 0.03 0.15 0.00 1.00 9.80 2.89 0.035 
(117.31) *** 
Creditors/total liabilities 0.22 0.10 0.26 0.00 1.00 0.06 1.06 0.25 0.16 0.27 0.00 1.00 -0.22 0.914 -0.027 
(-59.46) *** 
EBIT/total assets 0.07 0.05 0.15 -0.73 0.92 9.60 0.09 0.02 0.03 0.19 -0.73 0.92 6.99 -0.73 0.049 
(183.25) *** 
Fixed assets/total assets 0.33 0.24 0.30 0.00 1.00 -0.63 0.76 0.26 0.16 0.27 0.00 1.00 0.25 1.14 0.067 
(133.69) *** 
Loans/total assets 0.08 0.0004 0.16 0.00 0.95 9.66 2.89 0.10 0.0013 0.18 0.00 0.95 6.07 2.37 -0.023 
(-83.66) *** 
Total liabilities/total assets 0.71 0.75 0.32 0.00 2.38 4.53 0.74 0.87 0.90 0.35 0.00 2.38 5.42 1.22 -0.160 
(-294.35) *** 
Working capital/total assets 0.14 0.13 0.34 -1.29 1.00 2.13 -0.53 0.04 0.04 0.38 -1.29 1.00 2.31 -0.68 0.102 
(175.78) *** 
 
*** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10% 
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While Table 4.6 presents the differences in the mean values of the firm-specific continuous 
variables between failed and active firms, Tables 4.7 to 4.10 provide a breakdown of these 
differences by industry, region, calendar year and over a 5-year period leading up to failure. In 
Table 4.7, Panel A shows that on average, active firms were older than failed firms in all the 
industries. While the mean differences in age between failed and active firms were statistically 
significant across all the industries, the industries of public administration, transportation, 
communications and public utilities and wholesale trade experienced the most noticeable 
differences in age between failed and active firms. Panel B shows that active firms were larger 
than failed firms in terms of natural logarithm of total assets in all the industries with the 
exception of agriculture, forestry and fishing, and retail trade.  
Panels C to I of Table 4.7 provide a breakdown of the financial ratios by industry over the 
sample period of 2002 to 2011. Panel C indicates that on average, the ratio of cash to total 
assets was higher among active firms than among failed firms in all the industries. The most 
noticeable differences in the cash/total assets ratio between failed and active firms occurred in 
services (17.93% for active firms versus 12.53% for failed firms), public administration 
(17.73% for active firms versus 13.79% for failed firms), construction (12.32% for active firms 
versus 8.71% for failed firms), transportation, communications & public utilities (11.98% for 
active firms versus 8.49% for failed firms), and manufacturing (10.14% for active firms versus 
6.72% for failed firms). In Panel D, the levels of creditors to total liabilities were greater among 
failed firms in all the industries except mining and manufacturing. The ratio of creditors to total 
liabilities was noticeably higher among failed firms in public administration (23.68% versus 
15.99% for active firms), retail trade (30.61% versus 25.62% for active firms), finance, 
insurance and real estate (13.55% versus 8.63% for active firms) and services (22.40% versus 
18.39% for active firms). Panel E shows that active firms were more profitable than failed firms 
in terms of EBIT/total assets in all the industries. The ratio of EBIT/total assets was noticeably 
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lower among failed firms in manufacturing (-0.06% versus 6.95% for active firms), mining (-
0.22% versus 6.50% for active firms), and retail trade (0.01% versus 6.24% for active firms). 
Panel F provides a breakdown of fixed assets/total assets across all the industries. The ratio of 
fixed assets to total assets was higher among active firms in every industry. The most noticeable 
differences occurred in firms in finance, insurance and real estate (54.65% for active firms 
versus 38.43% for failed firms), public administration (34.45% for active firms versus 19.11% 
for failed firms) and transportation, communications and public utilities (40.01% for active 
firms versus 30.49% for failed firms). Panel G compares the mean values of loans over total 
assets between active and failed firms in all the industries during the sample period. The ratio 
of loans to total assets was greater among failed firms in all the industries with the exception 
of public administration and mining. In Panel H, the ratio of total liabilities to total assets was 
higher among failed firms across all the industries. Panel I shows that failed firms were less 
liquid in terms of the ratio of working capital to total assets than active firms across all the 
industries. Among failed firms, firms in retail trade experienced the lowest ratio of working 
capital to total assets -6.20%, followed by mining -4.11%, transportation, communications and 
public utilities -3.60%, and agriculture, forestry and fishing -3.55%. 
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Table 4.7 Descriptive statistics for significant covariates in active and failed firms by industry 
Panel A: Mean, standard deviation (in parentheses) and t-values of age between failed and active firms by industry 
 Active Failed  Active Failed    
        
Industry No. of 
observations 
No. of 
observations 
Mean Mean Difference t-statistic  Mean of all observations 
Agriculture, forestry and fishing 88,951 2,678 14.03 13.04 0.99 4.04*** 14.00 
     (12.98) (12.52)       
Mining 23,736 978 19.40 17.39 2.01 4.10*** 19.32 
     (16.97) (14.93)       
Construction 871,313 67,419 12.42 10.11 2.31 52.70*** 12.25 
     (12.08) (10.84)       
Manufacturing 1,054,663 77,738 17.18 14.47 2.71 50.02*** 16.99 
     (16.10) (14.46)       
Transportation, communications, public utilities 286,176 17,706 14.84 11.50 3.34 34.67*** 14.64 
     (14.71) (12.25)       
Wholesale trade 982,118 57,012 14.66 11.60 3.06 59.22*** 14.49 
     (13.45) (11.89)       
Retail trade 655,053 36,396 12.83 10.58 2.25 37.85*** 12.71 
     (12.26) (10.96)       
Finance, insurance and real estate 718,962 44,644 13.65 11.76 1.89 27.62*** 13.54 
     (14.86) (13.93)       
Services 968,715 53,824 12.42 9.93 2.49 55.59*** 12.29 
     (12.11) (10.00)       
Public administration 3,494 390 9.72 4.86 4.86 12.90*** 9.23 
     (12.15) (6.23)       
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Table 4.7 (continued)  
Panel B: Mean, standard deviation (in parentheses) and t-values of size between failed and active firms by industry 
 Active Failed  Active Failed    
        
Industry No. of 
observations 
No. of 
observations 
Mean Mean Difference t-statistic  Mean of all observations 
Agriculture, forestry and fishing 88,951 2,678 14.73 14.84 -0.11 -3.79*** 14.73 
     (1.38) (1.50)       
Mining 23,736 978 15.64 15.37 0.28 5.26*** 15.63 
     (1.94) (1.59)       
Construction 871,313 67,419 14.65 14.56 0.08 13.84*** 14.64 
     (1.51) (1.53)       
Manufacturing 1,054,663 77,738 14.90 14.80 0.10 19.83*** 14.90 
     (1.54) (1.41)       
Transportation, communications, public utilities 286,176 17,706 14.72 14.39 0.33 28.39*** 14.70 
     (1.73) (1.50)       
Wholesale trade 982,118 57,012 14.59 14.47 0.11 18.75*** 14.58 
     (1.44) (1.42)       
Retail trade 655,053 36,396 14.15 14.17 -0.02 -2.89*** 14.15 
     (1.44) (1.49)       
Finance, insurance and real estate 718,962 44,644 15.72 15.48 0.25 27.92*** 15.71 
     (1.74) (1.80)       
Services 968,715 53,824 14.51 14.40 0.11 15.45*** 14.50 
     (1.77) (1.60)       
Public administration 3,494 390 15.54 (14.47) 1.07 10.79*** 15.43 
     (2.03) (1.84)       
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Table 4.7 (continued)  
Panel C: Mean, standard deviation (in parentheses) and t-values of cash/total assets between failed and active firms by industry 
 Active Failed  Active Failed    
        
Industry No. of 
observations 
No. of 
observations 
Mean Mean Difference t-statistic  Mean of all observations 
Agriculture, forestry and fishing 88,951 2,678 8.62% 7.61% 1.01% 3.25*** 8.59% 
     (0.14) (0.16)       
Mining 23,736 978 9.78% 7.11% 2.67% 5.31*** 9.68% 
     (0.15) (0.15)       
Construction 871,313 67,419 12.32% 8.71% 3.61% 61.61*** 12.06% 
     (0.17) (0.14)       
Manufacturing 1,054,663 77,738 10.14% 6.72% 3.42% 75.43*** 9.91% 
     (0.14) (0.12)       
Transportation, communications, public utilities 286,176 17,706 11.98% 8.49% 3.49% 32.89*** 11.77% 
     (0.16) (0.14)       
Wholesale trade 982,118 57,012 12.22% 9.30% 2.92% 46.26*** 12.06% 
     (0.16) (0.15)       
Retail trade 655,053 36,396 14.58% 11.59% 2.99% 33.90*** 14.42% 
     (0.17) (0.16)       
Finance, insurance and real estate 718,962 44,644 10.24% 8.99% 1.25% 14.10*** 10.17% 
     (0.19) (0.18)       
Services 968,715 53,824 17.93% 12.53% 5.40% 66.51*** 17.65% 
     (0.21) (0.18)       
Public administration 3,494 390 17.73% 13.79% 3.94% 3.14*** 17.33% 
     (0.23) (0.24)       
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Table 4.7 (continued)  
Panel D: Mean, standard deviation (in parentheses) and t-values of creditors/total liabilities between failed and active firms by industry 
 Active Failed  Active Failed    
        
Industry No. of 
observations 
No. of 
observations 
Mean Mean Difference t-statistic  Mean of all observations 
Agriculture, forestry and fishing 88,951 2,678 14.43% 17.76% -3.33% -6.84*** 14.53% 
     (0.21) (0.25)       
Mining 23,736 978 17.53% 15.41% 2.12% 3.04*** 17.44% 
     (0.22) (0.21)       
Construction 871,313 67,419 19.44% 22.03% -2.59% -25.03*** 19.63% 
     (0.25) (0.26)       
Manufacturing 1,054,663 77,738 25.30% 25.16% 0.14% 1.51 25.29% 
     (0.25) (0.25)       
Transportation, communications, public utilities 286,176 17,706 22.85% 26.82% -3.97% -19.41*** 23.08% 
     (0.26) (0.26)       
Wholesale trade 982,118 57,012 32.23% 34.31% -2.08% -15.40*** 32.34% 
     (0.31) (0.31)       
Retail trade 655,053 36,396 25.62% 30.61% -4.99% -32.96*** 25.88% 
     (0.27) (0.28)       
Finance, insurance and real estate 718,962 44,644 8.63% 13.55% -4.92% -44.48*** 8.92% 
     (0.18) (0.23)       
Services 968,715 53,824 18.39% 22.40% -4.01% -35.26*** 18.60% 
     (0.24) (0.26)       
Public administration 3,494 390 15.99% 23.68% -7.69% -4.44*** 16.76% 
     (0.25) (0.33)       
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Table 4.7 (continued)  
Panel E: Mean, standard deviation (in parentheses) and t-values of EBIT/total assets between failed and active firms by industry 
 Active Failed  Active Failed    
        
Industry No. of 
observations 
No. of 
observations 
Mean Mean Difference t-statistic  Mean of all observations 
Agriculture, forestry and fishing 88,951 2,678 4.06% -1.22% 5.28% 16.29*** 3.91% 
     (0.12) (0.17)       
Mining 23,736 978 6.50% -0.22% 6.72% 11.45*** 6.24% 
     (0.17) (0.18)       
Construction 871,313 67,419 6.76% 3.23% 3.53% 50.99*** 6.50% 
     (0.14) (0.18)       
Manufacturing 1,054,663 77,738 6.95% -0.06% 7.01% 106.13*** 6.47% 
     (0.14) (0.18)       
Transportation, communications, public utilities 286,176 17,706 5.64% 0.80% 4.84% 34.72*** 5.36% 
     (0.15) (0.18)       
Wholesale trade 982,118 57,012 7.36% 2.30% 5.06% 67.34*** 7.09% 
     (0.14) (0.18)       
Retail trade 655,053 36,396 6.24% 0.01% 6.23% 59.43*** 5.91% 
     (0.15) (0.20)       
Finance, insurance and real estate 718,962 44,644 3.63% 2.16% 1.47% 16.24*** 3.54% 
     (0.14) (0.19)       
Services 968,715 53,824 8.06% 2.23% 5.83% 56.54*** 7.75% 
     (0.21) (0.23)       
Public administration 3,494 390 5.90% 1.64% 4.26% 3.57*** 5.47% 
     (0.21) (0.23)       
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Table 4.7 (continued) 
Panel F: Mean, standard deviation (in parentheses) and t-values of fixed assets/total assets between failed and active firms by industry 
 Active Failed  Active Failed    
        
Industry No. of 
observations 
No. of 
observations 
Mean Mean Difference t-statistic  Mean of all observations 
Agriculture, forestry and fishing 88,951 2,678 52.77% 47.67% 5.10% 7.99*** 52.62% 
     (0.29) (0.33)       
Mining 23,736 978 45.31% 42.46% 2.85% 3.19*** 45.20% 
     (0.26) (0.27)       
Construction 871,313 67,419 22.45% 17.19% 5.26% 59.69*** 22.08% 
     (0.25) (0.22)       
Manufacturing 1,054,663 77,738 31.80% 28.39% 3.41% 39.38*** 31.57% 
     (0.23) (0.23)       
Transportation, communications, public utilities 286,176 17,706 40.01% 30.49% 9.52% 45.72*** 39.46% 
     (0.29) (0.27)       
Wholesale trade 982,118 57,012 19.67% 15.89% 3.78% 45.47*** 19.46% 
     (0.20) (0.19)       
Retail trade 655,053 36,396 39.79% 33.48% 6.31% 40.51*** 39.46% 
     (0.30) (0.29)       
Finance, insurance and real estate 718,962 44,644 54.65% 38.43% 16.22% 90.40*** 53.70% 
     (0.37) (0.37)       
Services 968,715 53,824 32.24% 27.77% 4.47% 35.52*** 32.00% 
     (0.30) (0.28)       
Public administration 3,494 390 34.45% 19.11% 15.34% 9.65*** 32.91% 
     (0.34) (0.29)       
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Table 4.7 (continued)  
Panel G: Mean, standard deviation (in parentheses) and t-values of loans/total assets between failed and active firms by industry 
 Active Failed  Active Failed    
        
Industry No. of 
observations 
No. of 
observations 
Mean Mean Difference t-statistic  Mean of all observations 
Agriculture, forestry and fishing 88,951 2,678 7.00% 8.25% -1.25% -3.86*** 7.04% 
     (0.13) (0.17)       
Mining 23,736 978 10.24% 11.20% -0.96% -1.53 10.28% 
     (0.19) (0.19)       
Construction 871,313 67,419 7.40% 10.10% -2.70% -37.29*** 7.59% 
     (0.16) (0.18)       
Manufacturing 1,054,663 77,738 9.16% 12.44% -3.28% -49.74*** 9.39% 
     (0.14) (0.18)       
Transportation, communications, public utilities 286,176 17,706 7.04% 9.10% -2.06% -17.82*** 7.16% 
     (0.13) (0.15)       
Wholesale trade 982,118 57,012 8.99% 11.78% -2.79% -34.79*** 9.15% 
     (0.16) (0.19)       
Retail trade 655,053 36,396 7.03% 9.23% -2.20% -24.95*** 7.15% 
     (0.14) (0.17)       
Finance, insurance and real estate 718,962 44,644 8.39% 9.75% -1.36% -13.61*** 8.47% 
     (0.19) (0.21)       
Services 968,715 53,824 7.99% 9.06% -1.07% -13.69*** 8.05% 
     (0.17) (0.18)       
Public administration 3,494 390 7.54% 7.06% 0.48% 0.49 7.49% 
     (0.17) (0.18)       
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Table 4.7 (continued)  
Panel H: Mean, standard deviation (in parentheses) and t-values of total liabilities/total assets between failed and active firms by industry 
 Active Failed  Active Failed    
        
Industry No. of 
observations 
No. of 
observations 
Mean Mean Difference t-statistic  Mean of all observations 
Agriculture, forestry and fishing 88,951 2,678 64.46% 80.95% -16.49% -21.03*** 64.94% 
     (0.33) (0.40)       
Mining 23,736 978 64.59% 80.04% -15.45% -12.69*** 65.20% 
     (0.34) (0.37)       
Construction 871,313 67,419 75.41% 89.69% -14.28% -122.16*** 76.44% 
     (0.28) (0.29)       
Manufacturing 1,054,663 77,738 69.66% 88.64% -18.98% -149.33*** 70.96% 
     (0.28) (0.35)       
Transportation, communications, public utilities 286,176 17,706 72.68% 89.72% -17.04% -67.66*** 73.68% 
     (0.29) (0.33)       
Wholesale trade 982,118 57,012 72.58% 87.69% -15.11% -114.13*** 73.41% 
     (0.27) (0.31)       
Retail trade 655,053 36,396 75.51% 91.33% -15.82% -80.04*** 76.34% 
     (0.32) (0.37)       
Finance, insurance and real estate 718,962 44,644 63.92% 79.67% -15.75% -79.94*** 64.84% 
     (0.38) (0.41)       
Services 968,715 53,824 71.61% 87.28% -15.67% -86.74*** 72.43% 
     (0.37) (0.41)       
Public administration 3,494 390 74.20% 92.89% -18.69% -8.05*** 76.08% 
     (0.36) (0.44)       
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Table 4.7 (continued)  
Panel I: Mean, standard deviation (in parentheses) and t-values of working capital/total assets between failed and active firms by industry 
 Active Failed  Active Failed    
        
Industry No. of 
observations 
No. of 
observations 
Mean Mean Difference t-statistic  Mean of all observations 
Agriculture, forestry and fishing 88,951 2,678 6.33% -3.55% 9.88% 13.25*** 6.05% 
     (0.32) (0.38)       
Mining 23,736 978 10.48% -4.11% 14.59% 11.11*** 9.91% 
     (0.34) (0.40)       
Construction 871,313 67,419 22.94% 11.82% 11.12% 76.68*** 22.14% 
     (0.34) (0.36)       
Manufacturing 1,054,663 77,738 15.40% 0.76% 14.64% 112.77*** 14.40% 
     (0.29) (0.35)       
Transportation, communications, public utilities 286,176 17,706 6.81% -3.60% 10.41% 39.98*** 6.20% 
     (0.30) (0.34)       
Wholesale trade 982,118 57,012 19.30% 7.71% 11.59% 84.59*** 18.66% 
     (0.28) (0.32)       
Retail trade 655,053 36,396 4.86% -6.20% 11.06% 53.30*** 4.28% 
     (0.34) (0.39)       
Finance, insurance and real estate 718,962 44,644 11.35% 9.00% 2.35% 11.07*** 11.22% 
     (0.39) (0.43)       
Services 968,715 53,824 12.92% 1.29% 11.63% 65.39*** 12.31% 
     (0.36) (0.40)       
Public administration 3,494 390 18.72% 15.18% 3.54% 1.43 18.36% 
     (0.39) (0.47)       
 
*** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10% 
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Table 4.8 provides a breakdown of the firm-specific continuous variables across the five EU 
regions during the sample period. Panel A shows that on average, active firms were older than 
failed firms across the regions. In Panel B, active firms were larger in terms of total assets than 
failed firms across the regions except Southern Europe. Panel C shows that on average, active 
firms had a higher cash to total assets ratio than failed firms across the regions. The ratio of 
cash to total assets was noticeably lower among failed firms in Northern Europe (9.13% versus 
14.97% for active firms) and Western Europe (12.05% versus 16.62 for active firms). Panel D 
shows that the levels of creditors to total liabilities were greater for active firms (23.99% versus 
16.24% for failed firms) in South Eastern Europe and smaller for active firms in other regions. 
In Panel E, active firms were more profitable in terms of the EBIT/total assets ratio than failed 
firms across the regions. The ratio of EBIT to total assets was noticeably lower among failed 
firms in Northern Europe (-1.94% versus 9.77% for active firms), Eastern Europe (1.11% 
versus 8.59% for active firms) and South Eastern Europe (3.26% versus 10.59% for active 
firms). Panel F compares the mean value of the fixed assets/total assets ratio between failed 
and active firms across the regions. On average, the levels of fixed assets to total assets among 
active firms were greater than among failed firms. The levels of fixed assets to total assets were 
noticeably lower among failed firms in Southern Europe (25.99% versus 32.82% for active 
firms) and Western Europe (25.11% versus 31.60% for active firms). Panel G shows that the 
levels of loans to total assets were higher for failed firms in all the regions but South Eastern 
Europe. Panel H shows that the levels of total liabilities to total assets were higher among failed 
firms in all the regions although they were noticeably higher for failed firms in Northern Europe 
(92.39% versus 63.33% for active firms), Eastern Europe (87.12% versus 64.30% for active 
firms) and South Eastern Europe (93.81% versus 75.77% for active firms). Panel I shows that 
on average, the ratio of working capital to total assets was lower among failed firms in all the 
regions. The ratio of working capital to total assets was noticeably lower among failed firms in 
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Northern Europe (2.16% versus 20.69% for active firms), Eastern Europe (-2.09% versus 14.42 
for active firms) and South Eastern Europe (-10.97% versus 4.50% for active firms).  
Table 4.8 Descriptive statistics for significant covariates in active and failed firms by region 
Panel A: Mean, standard deviation (in parentheses) and t-values of age between failed and active firms by region 
 Active Failed  Active Failed    
        
Region No. of 
observations 
No. of 
observations 
Mean Mean Difference t-statistic  Mean of all 
observations 
Western Europe 1,959,736 113,193 17.38 13.89 3.49 74.00*** 17.19 
     (17.72) (15.30)       
Northern Europe 198,517 5,168 16.53 11.86 4.67 26.90*** 16.41 
     (14.94) (12.22)       
Southern Europe 2,716,496 214,380 12.82 10.87 1.95 80.35*** 12.68 
     (10.97) (10.84)       
South Eastern 
Europe 284,895 7,884 9.14 7.20 1.94 18.92*** 9.09 
     (8.18) (9.00)       
Eastern Europe 493,537 18,160 9.67 8.22 1.45 28.16*** 9.62 
   (7.90) (6.79)    
 
Panel B: Mean, standard deviation (in parentheses) and t-values of size between failed and active firms by region 
 Active Failed  Active Failed    
        
Region No. of 
observations 
No. of 
observations 
Mean Mean Difference t-statistic  Mean of all 
observations 
Western Europe 1,959,736 113,193 15.09 14.51 0.57 108.88*** 15.06 
     (1.87) (1.71)       
Northern Europe 198,517 5,168 14.56 14.06 0.50 23.35*** 14.55 
     (1.59) (1.52)       
Southern Europe 2,716,496 214,380 14.73 14.84 -0.11 -35.64*** 14.74 
     (1.30) (1.38)       
South Eastern 
Europe 284,895 7,884 13.46 12.96 0.50 20.02*** 13.45 
     (2.06) (2.18)       
Eastern Europe 493,537 18,160 14.31 14.00 0.31 23.63*** 14.30 
   (1.66) (1.75)       
 
Panel C: Mean, standard deviation (in parentheses) and t-values of cash/total assets between failed and active firms by 
region 
 Active Failed  Active Failed    
        
Region No. of 
observations 
No. of 
observations 
Mean Mean Difference t-statistic  Mean of all 
observations 
Western Europe 1,959,736 113,193 16.62% 12.05% 4.57% 86.16*** 16.37% 
     (0.20) (0.17)       
Northern Europe 198,517 5,168 14.97% 9.13% 5.84% 27.86*** 14.82% 
     (0.18) (0.15)       
Southern Europe 2,716,496 214,380 9.79% 7.53% 2.26% 72.48*** 9.62% 
     (0.15) (0.14)       
South Eastern 
Europe 284,895 7,884 10.73% 8.52% 2.21% 12.76*** 10.67% 
     (0.16) (0.15)       
Eastern Europe 493,537 18,160 14.23% 12.57% 1.66% 11.77*** 14.17% 
   (0.18) (0.19)       
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Table 4.8 (continued) 
Panel D: Mean, standard deviation (in parentheses) and t-values of creditors/total liabilities between failed and active 
firms by region 
 Active Failed  Active Failed    
        
Region No. of 
observations 
No. of 
observations 
Mean Mean Difference t-statistic  Mean of all 
observations 
Western Europe 1,959,736 113,193 25.57% 30.55% -4.98% -65.97*** 25.84% 
     (0.24) (0.25)       
Northern Europe 198,517 5,168 20.58% 24.86% -4.28% -14.37*** 20.69% 
     (0.21) (0.21)       
Southern Europe 2,716,496 214,380 17.14% 21.05% -3.91% -63.75*** 17.43% 
     (0.26) (0.27)       
South Eastern 
Europe 284,895 7,884 23.99% 16.24% 7.76% 25.61*** 23.78% 
     (0.30) (0.26)       
Eastern Europe 493,537 18,160 34.00% 35.33% -1.33% -5.60*** 34.05% 
   (0.30) (0.31)       
 
Panel E: Mean, standard deviation (in parentheses) and t-values of EBIT/total assets between failed and active firms by 
region 
 Active Failed  Active Failed    
        
Region No. of 
observations 
No. of 
observations 
Mean Mean Difference t-statistic  Mean of all 
observations 
Western Europe 1,959,736 113,193 7.42% 2.47% 4.95% 78.15*** 7.15% 
     (0.17) (0.21)       
Northern Europe 198,517 5,168 9.77% -1.94% 11.71% 33.46*** 9.47% 
     (0.18) (0.25)       
Southern Europe 2,716,496 214,380 4.93% 1.20% 3.73% 99.92*** 4.65% 
     (0.12) (0.17)       
South Eastern 
Europe 284,895 7,884 10.59% 3.26% 7.33% 23.64*** 10.40% 
     (0.23) (0.27)       
Eastern Europe 493,537 18,160 8.59% 1.11% 7.48% 41.43*** 8.32% 
   (0.19) (0.24)       
 
Panel F: Mean, standard deviation (in parentheses) and t-values of fixed assets/total assets between failed and active firms 
by region 
 Active Failed  Active Failed    
        
Region No. of 
observations 
No. of 
observations 
Mean Mean Difference t-statistic  Mean of all 
observations 
Western Europe 1,959,736 113,193 31.60% 25.11% 6.49% 81.04*** 31.24% 
     (0.29) (0.26)       
Northern Europe 198,517 5,168 39.35% 34.11% 5.24% 13.30*** 39.22% 
     (0.31) (0.28)       
Southern Europe 2,716,496 214,380 32.82% 25.99% 6.83% 108.99*** 32.32% 
     (0.30) (0.28)       
South Eastern 
Europe 284,895 7,884 36.64% 34.27% 2.37% 7.58*** 36.58% 
     (0.27) (0.27)       
Eastern Europe 493,537 18,160 34.50% 30.66% 3.84% 17.34*** 34.36% 
   (0.29) (0.29)       
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Table 4.8 (continued) 
Panel G: Mean, standard deviation (in parentheses) and t-values of loans/total assets between failed and active firms by 
region 
 Active Failed  Active Failed    
        
Region No. of 
observations 
No. of 
observations 
Mean Mean Difference t-statistic  Mean of all 
observations 
Western Europe 1,959,736 113,193 10.40% 11.45% -1.05% -17.94*** 10.46% 
     (0.19) (0.19)       
Northern Europe 198,517 5,168 3.83% 6.31% -2.48% -15.81*** 3.89% 
     (0.08) (0.11)       
Southern Europe 2,716,496 214,380 7.41% 10.52% -3.11% -77.47*** 7.64% 
     (0.14) (0.18)       
South Eastern 
Europe 284,895 7,884 5.36% 4.78% 0.58% 3.88*** 5.35% 
     (0.13) (0.13)       
Eastern Europe 493,537 18,160 6.91% 8.48% -1.57% -12.66*** 6.97% 
   (0.13) (0.16)       
 
Panel H: Mean, standard deviation (in parentheses) and t-values of total liabilities/total assets between failed and active 
firms by region 
 Active Failed  Active Failed    
        
Region No. of 
observations 
No. of 
observations 
Mean Mean Difference t-statistic  Mean of all 
observations 
Western Europe 1,959,736 113,193 69.52% 85.90% -16.38% -139.60*** 70.42% 
     (0.34) (0.39)       
Northern Europe 198,517 5,168 63.33% 92.39% -29.06% -50.99*** 64.07% 
     (0.33) (0.41)       
Southern Europe 2,716,496 214,380 74.15% 88.22% -14.07% -200.22*** 75.18% 
     (0.28) (0.32)       
South Eastern 
Europe 284,895 7,884 75.77% 93.81% -18.04% -36.83*** 76.26% 
     (0.35) (0.43)       
Eastern Europe 493,537 18,160 64.30% 87.12% -22.82% -63.06*** 65.11% 
   (0.36) (0.48)       
 
Panel I: Mean, standard deviation (in parentheses) and t-values of working capital/total assets between failed and active 
firms by region 
 Active Failed  Active Failed    
        
Region No. of 
observations 
No. of 
observations 
Mean Mean Difference t-statistic  Mean of all 
observations 
Western Europe 1,959,736 113,193 16.36% 5.22% 11.14% 97.23 15.75% 
     (0.35) (0.38)       
Northern Europe 198,517 5,168 20.69% 2.16% 18.53% 33.50 20.22% 
     (0.31) (0.39)       
Southern Europe 2,716,496 214,380 13.73% 4.63% 9.10% 111.77 13.07% 
     (0.32) (0.37)       
South Eastern 
Europe 284,895 7,884 4.50% -10.97% 15.47% 31.12 4.08% 
     (0.37) (0.44)       
Eastern Europe 493,537 18,160 14.42% -2.09% 16.51% 47.90 13.83% 
   (0.36) (0.46)       
*** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10% 
 
Table 4.9 provides a breakdown of the firm-specific continuous variables by year. In Panel A, 
the difference in the mean age between failed and active firms rose steadily from 2002 onwards 
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until it reached a peak in 2007. Panel B shows that the mean size of failed firms rose steadily 
from 2002 onwards before it reached a plateau between 2007 and 2009. The mean size of active 
firms followed a similar trend. Interestingly, the mean size of active firms was not greater than 
that of failed firms until 2007. In Panel C, the mean cash/total assets ratio of failed firms 
declined slightly from 9.91% in 2002 to 9.25% in 2006 before it plummeted during the 2007-
2008 financial crisis prior to a recovery in 2009. The mean value of the cash/total assets ratio 
among active firms followed a similar trend. In Panel D, the levels of creditors to total liabilities 
among failed and active firms increased steeply prior to the financial crisis before levelling off 
and then declining steadily during the crisis. Panel E shows that the EBIT/total assets ratio 
remained fairly constant for active and failed firms between 2002 and 2007. The ratio dropped 
dramatically from 2008 onwards among failed firms, and fell significantly in 2008 and 2009 
prior to a recovery in 2010 among active firms. In Panel F, the ratio of fixed assets to total 
assets among all firms remained relatively constant between 2002 and 2006. It then rose 
gradually from 2007 onwards before it declined slightly in 2010 and 2011. In Panel G, the ratio 
of loans to total assets jumped to 11.50% for failed firms and to 7.80% for active firms in 2005 
before it rose steadily from 2006 to 2008. Panel H suggests that the levels of total liabilities to 
total assets remained fairly constant for failed and active firms prior to 2007 before the ratio 
rose steadily among failed firms but declined gradually among active firms. In Panel I, the ratio 
of working capital to total assets rose steadily for both failed and active firms between 2002 
and 2006. From 2007 to 2011, the ratio continued to increase among active firms and but 
dropped dramatically among failed firms. Overall, Table 4.9 indicates that both active and 
failed firms in the EU were affected by the 2007-2008 global financial crisis. During the crisis, 
both failed and active firms were less liquid in terms of cash to total assets and less profitable 
in terms of EBIT/total assets. Failed firms were more severely affected by the crisis: only failed 
firms experienced an increase in the ratio of total liabilities to total assets and a decrease in the 
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ratio of working capital to total assets during the crisis. In the meantime, the differences in the 
mean values of several ratios (i.e., size, EBIT/total assets, total liabilities/total assets and 
working capital/total assets) between failed and active firms have been increasingly noticeable 
since the crisis.  
Table 4.9 Descriptive statistics for significant covariates in active and failed firms by year 
Panel A: Mean, standard deviation (in parentheses) and t-values of age between failed and active firms by year 
 Active Failed  Active Failed    
        
Year No. of 
observations 
No. of 
observations 
Mean Mean Difference t-statistic  Mean of all 
observations 
2002 404,742 46,774 12.57 11.43 1.14 18.12*** 12.45 
     (13.28) (12.81)       
2003 438,709 46,555 12.78 11.56 1.22 19.87*** 12.66 
     (13.29) (12.57)       
2004 512,237 51,404 12.80 11.19 1.61 27.95*** 12.65 
     (13.16) (12.39)       
2005 562,029 48,522 13.18 11.19 1.99 34.11*** 13.03 
     (13.55) (12.22)       
2006 628,071 46,700 13.37 11.20 2.17 37.36*** 13.22 
     (13.59) (12.03)       
2007 644,065 42,910 13.95 11.43 2.52 41.26*** 13.79 
     (13.95) (12.13)       
2008 669,735 34,509 14.32 11.92 2.40 35.44*** 14.20 
     (14.05) (12.17)       
2009 684,267 23,915 14.87 12.68 2.19 27.10*** 14.80 
     (14.14) (12.25)       
2010 632,257 13,080 15.51 13.79 1.72 15.51*** 15.47 
     (13.99) (12.52)       
2011 477,069 4,416 16.66 15.96 0.70 3.35*** 16.65 
     (14.21) (13.71)       
 
Panel B: Mean, standard deviation (in parentheses) and t-values of size between failed and active firms by year 
 Active Failed  Active Failed    
        
Year No. of 
observations 
No. of 
observations 
Mean Mean Difference t-statistic  Mean of all 
observations 
2002 404,742 46,774 14.04 14.21 -0.18 -21.98*** 14.05 
     (1.74) (1.63)    
2003 438,709 46,555 14.25 14.44 -0.19 -23.34*** 14.27 
     (1.74) (1.61)       
2004 512,237 51,404 14.42 14.56 -0.14 -18.34*** 14.44 
     (1.69) (1.58)    
2005 562,029 48,522 14.45 14.54 -0.09 -11.97*** 14.46 
     (1.68) (1.55)    
2006 628,071 46,700 14.71 14.77 -0.06 -7.91*** 14.71 
     (1.65) (1.53)    
2007 644,065 42,910 14.99 14.96 0.03 3.45*** 14.98 
     (1.62) (1.53)    
2008 669,735 34,509 15.02 14.95 0.06 7.67*** 15.01 
     (1.59) (1.50)       
2009 684,267 23,915 15.07 14.96 0.11 11.58*** 15.07 
     (1.54) (1.46)    
2010 632,257 13,080 15.07 14.79 0.27 21.96*** 15.06 
     (1.47) (1.41)    
2011 477,069 4,416 14.97 14.53 0.44 20.81*** 14.97 
     (1.44) (1.41)    
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Table 4.9 (continued) 
Panel C: Mean, standard deviation (in parentheses) and t-values of cash/total assets between failed and active firms by 
year 
 Active Failed  Active Failed    
        
Year No. of 
observations 
No. of 
observations 
Mean Mean Difference t-statistic  Mean of all 
observations 
2002 404,742 46,774 13.68% 9.91% 3.77% 50.25*** 13.29% 
     (0.18) (0.15)       
2003 438,709 46,555 13.83% 9.86% 3.97% 52.06*** 13.45% 
     (0.18) (0.15)       
2004 512,237 51,404 13.31% 9.40% 3.91% 54.35*** 12.95% 
     (0.18) (0.15)       
2005 562,029 48,522 13.35% 9.36% 3.99% 54.29*** 13.03% 
     (0.18) (0.15)       
2006 628,071 46,700 13.36% 9.25% 4.11% 55.54*** 13.08% 
     (0.18) (0.15)       
2007 644,065 42,910 12.51% 8.79% 3.72% 47.86*** 12.27% 
     (0.17) (0.15)       
2008 669,735 34,509 11.82% 8.06% 3.76% 45.27*** 11.63% 
     (0.17) (0.15)       
2009 684,267 23,915 12.08% 8.46% 3.62% 34.79*** 11.96% 
     (0.17) (0.16)       
2010 632,257 13,080 11.96% 9.37% 2.59% 17.01*** 11.90% 
     (0.17) (0.17)       
2011 477,069 4,416 12.77% 10.96% 1.81% 6.49*** 12.75% 
     (0.17) (0.18)       
 
Panel D: Mean, standard deviation (in parentheses) and t-values of creditors/total liabilities between failed and active 
firms by year 
 Active Failed  Active Failed    
        
Year No. of 
observations 
No. of 
observations 
Mean Mean Difference t-statistic  Mean of all 
observations 
2002 404,742 46,774 19.70% 22.04% -2.34% -18.01*** 19.94% 
     (0.26) (0.27)       
2003 438,709 46,555 19.82% 23.46% -3.64% -26.53*** 20.17% 
     (0.27) (0.28)       
2004 512,237 51,404 17.05% 18.77% -1.72% -14.57*** 17.21% 
     (0.25) (0.26)       
2005 562,029 48,522 22.07% 27.84% -5.77% -44.13*** 22.53% 
     (0.27) (0.28)       
2006 628,071 46,700 22.99% 28.63% -5.64% -42.71*** 23.38% 
     (0.27) (0.28)       
2007 644,065 42,910 24.16% 28.33% -4.17% -30.76*** 24.42% 
     (0.27) (0.27)       
2008 669,735 34,509 22.31% 25.57% -3.26% -22.02*** 22.47% 
     (0.26) (0.27)       
2009 684,267 23,915 21.92% 24.03% -2.11% -12.22*** 21.99% 
     (0.26) (0.26)       
2010 632,257 13,080 22.79% 23.51% -0.72% -3.08*** 22.81% 
     (0.26) (0.26)       
2011 477,069 4,416 25.61% 25.55% 0.06% 0.17 25.61% 
     (0.25) (0.24)       
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Table 4.9 (continued) 
Panel E: Mean, standard deviation (in parentheses) and t-values of EBIT/total assets between failed and active firms by 
year 
 Active Failed  Active Failed    
        
Year No. of 
observations 
No. of 
observations 
Mean Mean Difference t-statistic  Mean of all 
observations 
2002 404,742 46,774 7.52% 3.61% 3.91% 46.78*** 7.12% 
     (0.16) (0.17)       
2003 438,709 46,555 7.33% 2.95% 4.38% 52.01*** 6.91% 
     (0.17) (0.17)       
2004 512,237 51,404 7.21% 2.70% 4.51% 55.04*** 6.80% 
     (0.16) (0.18)       
2005 562,029 48,522 7.00% 2.61% 4.39% 52.90*** 6.65% 
     (0.16) (0.18)       
2006 628,071 46,700 7.40% 2.71% 4.69% 54.17*** 7.08% 
     (0.16) (0.18)       
2007 644,065 42,910 7.34% 2.42% 4.92% 53.55*** 7.04% 
     (0.15) (0.19)       
2008 669,735 34,509 6.10% -0.66% 6.76% 59.73*** 5.77% 
     (0.15) (0.21)       
2009 684,267 23,915 4.76% -4.06% 8.82% 60.31*** 4.46% 
     (0.15) (0.22)       
2010 632,257 13,080 5.52% -5.84% 11.36% 51.03*** 5.29% 
     (0.14) (0.25)       
2011 477,069 4,416 6.32% -7.49% 13.81% 34.26*** 6.19% 
     (0.15) (0.27)       
 
Panel F: Mean, standard deviation (in parentheses) and t-values of fixed assets/total assets between failed and active firms 
by year 
 Active Failed  Active Failed    
        
Year No. of 
observations 
No. of 
observations 
Mean Mean Difference t-statistic  Mean of all 
observations 
2002 404,742 46,774 31.92% 25.36% 6.56% 53.57*** 31.24% 
     (0.28) (0.25)       
2003 438,709 46,555 32.09% 25.52% 6.57% 52.82*** 31.46% 
     (0.28) (0.25)       
2004 512,237 51,404 32.32% 25.41% 6.91% 56.31*** 31.69% 
     (0.29) (0.26)       
2005 562,029 48,522 32.26% 25.22% 7.04% 55.61*** 31.70% 
     (0.29) (0.27)       
2006 628,071 46,700 32.13% 25.37% 6.76% 51.88*** 31.66% 
     (0.29) (0.27)       
2007 644,065 42,910 32.35% 26.54% 5.81% 40.83*** 31.98% 
     (0.30) (0.28)       
2008 669,735 34,509 33.99% 28.06% 5.93% 36.11*** 33.70% 
     (0.31) (0.30)       
2009 684,267 23,915 34.46% 29.52% 4.94% 24.22*** 34.29% 
     (0.31) (0.31)       
2010 632,257 13,080 34.01% 29.59% 4.42% 15.60*** 33.92% 
     (0.31) (0.32)       
2011 477,069 4,416 33.13% 28.97% 4.16% 9.20*** 33.09% 
     (0.30) (0.30)       
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Table 4.9 (continued) 
Panel G: Mean, standard deviation (in parentheses) and t-values of loans/total assets between failed and active firms by 
year 
 Active Failed  Active Failed    
        
Year No. of 
observations 
No. of 
observations 
Mean Mean Difference t-statistic  Mean of all 
observations 
2002 404,742 46,774 6.36% 7.80% -1.44% -19.31*** 6.51% 
     (0.14) (0.15)       
2003 438,709 46,555 6.05% 7.65% -1.60% -21.31*** 6.20% 
     (0.14) (0.16)       
2004 512,237 51,404 5.68% 7.13% -1.45% -20.66*** 5.82% 
     (0.14) (0.15)       
2005 562,029 48,522 7.80% 11.50% -3.70% -43.39*** 8.10% 
     (0.16) (0.18)       
2006 628,071 46,700 8.15% 12.36% -4.21% -47.01*** 8.44% 
     (0.16) (0.19)       
2007 644,065 42,910 9.06% 13.17% -4.11% -42.20*** 9.32% 
     (0.17) (0.20)       
2008 669,735 34,509 9.48% 13.22% -3.74% -33.62*** 9.66% 
     (0.17) (0.20)       
2009 684,267 23,915 9.08% 12.65% -3.57% -26.21*** 9.20% 
     (0.16) (0.21)       
2010 632,257 13,080 9.22% 12.83% -3.61% -18.64*** 9.29% 
     (0.16) (0.22)       
2011 477,069 4,416 9.13% 13.91% -4.78% -13.94*** 9.17% 
     (0.16) (0.23)       
 
Panel H: Mean, standard deviation (in parentheses) and t-values of total liabilities/total assets between failed and active 
firms by year 
 Active Failed  Active Failed    
        
Year No. of 
observations 
No. of 
observations 
Mean Mean Difference t-statistic  Mean of all 
observations 
2002 404,742 46,774 73.19% 85.87% -12.68% -84.84*** 74.50% 
     (0.31) (0.31)       
2003 438,709 46,555 72.69% 85.89% -13.20% -85.72*** 73.96% 
     (0.31) (0.32)       
2004 512,237 51,404 73.02% 86.49% -13.47% -90.97*** 74.25% 
     (0.31) (0.32)       
2005 562,029 48,522 72.93% 86.61% -13.68% -89.92*** 74.02% 
     (0.31) (0.32)       
2006 628,071 46,700 72.73% 86.95% -14.22% -90.20*** 73.72% 
     (0.31) (0.33)       
2007 644,065 42,910 71.80% 86.82% -15.02% -87.54*** 72.74% 
     (0.31) (0.35)       
2008 669,735 34,509 70.45% 88.64% -18.19% -84.58*** 71.34% 
     (0.32) (0.39)       
2009 684,267 23,915 70.00% 92.01% -22.01% -75.44*** 70.74% 
     (0.33) (0.45)       
2010 632,257 13,080 69.81% 98.01% -28.20% -61.39*** 70.38% 
     (0.33) (0.52)       
2011 477,069 4,416 68.15% 100.73% -32.58% -40.15*** 68.45% 
     (0.32) (0.54)       
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Table 4.9 (continued) 
Panel I: Mean, standard deviation (in parentheses) and t-values of working capital/total assets between failed and active 
firms by year 
 Active Failed  Active Failed    
        
Year No. of 
observations 
No. of 
observations 
Mean Mean Difference t-statistic  Mean of all 
observations 
2002 404,742 46,774 10.33% 3.28% 7.05% 44.08*** 9.60% 
     (0.32) (0.33)       
2003 438,709 46,555 11.41% 4.19% 7.22% 43.74*** 10.72% 
     (0.33) (0.34)       
2004 512,237 51,404 11.98% 4.57% 7.41% 45.34*** 11.30% 
     (0.33) (0.35)       
2005 562,029 48,522 13.01% 5.46% 7.55% 45.15*** 12.41% 
     (0.33) (0.35)       
2006 628,071 46,700 13.96% 5.84% 8.12% 46.79*** 13.40% 
     (0.33) (0.36)       
2007 644,065 42,910 15.17% 5.67% 9.50% 50.49*** 14.58% 
     (0.34) (0.38)       
2008 669,735 34,509 15.85% 3.87% 11.98% 52.91*** 15.27% 
     (0.34) (0.41)       
2009 684,267 23,915 16.28% 1.12% 15.16% 50.65*** 15.77% 
     (0.35) (0.46)       
2010 632,257 13,080 16.37% -2.76% 19.13% 41.97*** 15.98% 
     (0.34) (0.52)       
2011 477,069 4,416 17.99% -4.23% 22.22% 28.12*** 17.79% 
     (0.34) (0.52)       
*** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10% 
 
While Tables 4.7 to 4.9 provide a breakdown of the mean values of the firm-specific continuous 
variables of active and failed firms by industry, region and calendar year, Table 4.10 provides 
the mean values of these continuous variables for active and failed firms over a five-year period 
leading up to a failure event (event year=0). To better understand Table 4.10, this study also 
graphs Figures 4.17 to 4.25.  Figure 4.17 graphs the mean age for failed firms over a 5-year 
period prior to failure, suggesting that failed firms were younger than active firms. The control 
group of active firms experienced a steady increase in their mean age. In contrast, the average 
age of failed firms had been on the decrease since 5 years prior to the failure event, suggesting 
that failed firms were getting younger over time. Panel B of Table 4.10 shows that the mean 
size of failed firms did not become statistically smaller than that of active firms until 4 years 
prior to failure. As Panel B and Figure 4.18 indicate, the mean size of active firms experienced 
a steady increase over time. In contrast, the mean size of failed firms increased more slowly 
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before it declined slightly 1 year prior to failure. As failed firms approached failure, the size 
discrepancy between active and failed firms had widened gradually.  
Panel C of Table 4.10 shows that the ratio of cash to total assets was statistically higher among 
active firms than among failed firms over time. As Figure 4.19 and Panel C suggest, the ratio 
of cash to total assets declined gradually among failed firms as firms approached failure despite 
a moderate increase in the failure event year. The ratio of cash to total assets among active 
firms followed a similar trend although it had been on the decrease more slowly. Panel D shows 
that the levels of creditors to total liabilities were not statistically greater among failed firms 
than among active firms until 4 years prior to failure. As Panel D and Figure 4.20 indicate, the 
mean creditors/total liabilities ratio of failed firms rose steadily from 22.79% to 26.34% in the 
period of 5 to 1 years prior to failure. In contrast, the mean creditors to total liabilities ratio of 
active firms rose more slowly before it declined and rose again. Panel E suggests that the ratio 
of EBIT to total assets was statistically lower among failed firms than among active firms over 
time. In Figure 4.21, the mean EBIT/total assets ratio of failed firms experienced a steady 
decline from 3.45% to 1.24% in the period of 5 to 2 years prior to failure before it plummeted 
to -3.22% during the failure event year. Over time, the mean EBIT/total assets ratio of active 
firms declined but managed to stabilise. Panel F compares the mean values of fixed assets/total 
assets between active and failed firms over time. The levels of fixed assets to total assets were 
statistically lower among failed firms than among active firms. In Figure 4.22, the mean fixed 
assets/total assets ratio decreased gradually among failed firms and increased stably over time 
among active firms. As a result, the gap in the ratio between these two groups of sampled firms 
widened over time. Panel G provides a breakdown of the mean values of the levels of loans to 
total assets over a 5-year period leading up to failure. The levels of loans to total assets among 
failed firms were statistically greater than among active firms over time. In Figure 4.23, the 
ratio of loans to total assets increased steadily among failed firms as firms approached failure, 
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and yet remained fairly constant among active firms despite a slight decrease from one year 
before the last available year. Not surprisingly, the discrepancy in the ratio between failed and 
active firms had widened gradually over time. Panel H indicates that the levels of total liabilities 
to total assets among failed firms were statistically greater than among active firms. In Figure 
4.24, while the mean total liabilities/total assets ratio fluctuated over time among active firms, 
it experienced a gradual increase over time among failed firms prior to a jump in the failure 
event year. Panel I shows that the ratio of working capital to total assets among active firms 
was statistically higher than among failed firms over time. In Figure 4.25, the control group of 
active firms experienced a steady increase in the working capital/total assets ratio despite an 
initial fall. In contrast, the ratio of working capital to total assets among failed firms declined 
steadily in the four-year period prior to failure before it plummeted in the failure event year.  
Table 4.10 and Figures 4.17 to 4.25 reveal several important trends. Firstly, as failed firms 
approached failure, the mean values of all the ratios except the ratios of EBIT/total assets and 
working capital/total assets deteriorated continuously during a five-year period prior to failure. 
The mean values of the ratios of EBIT/total assets and working capital/total assets followed a 
similar trend although they experienced a slight recovery four years prior to failure. Secondly, 
the mean values of the ratios either fluctuated or improved continuously among active firms 
over time. Thirdly, if one compares failed firms with active firms, on average a failed firm was 
less liquid and less profitable but more highly leveraged, held less cash and cash equivalents 
and made less investment in fixed assets than an active firm over a five-year period leading up 
to failure. The discrepancy in most ratios between the two groups of firms worsened as failed 
firms approached failure. This does not simply provide a preliminary indication of the 
predictive power of financial ratios covering liquidity, profitability, solvency and structural 
soundness over one to five year time horizons; it also provides an insight into the early 
symptoms of a financially distressed firm. The early symptoms of financial distress include a 
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relatively constant value of natural logarithm of total assets and a steady rise in the ratio of 
creditors to total liabilities over a four-year period leading up to failure. Over a five-year period 
leading up to failure, the early symptoms of financial distress also include a stable decline in 
the ratio of cash to total assets, a rapid decrease in the ratio of EBIT to total assets, a gradual 
decline in the ratio of fixed assets to total assets, a rapid rise in the ratio of loans to total assets, 
a stable increase in the ratio of total liabilities to total assets, and a decreasing trend in the ratio 
of working capitals to total assets. An early diagnosis of financial distress should also allow 
for the effects of industry, region and business cycles on failure risk. During the sample period, 
firms in Southern Europe were vulnerable to the highest failure rate, followed by firms in 
Western Europe, Eastern Europe, South Eastern Europe and Northern Europe. Firms in all the 
regions except Northern Europe and South Eastern Europe experienced a higher failure rate 
during the current economic downturn. Firms in public administration experienced the highest 
failure rate, followed by firms in construction, manufacturing, wholesale trade, finance, 
insurance and real estate, transportation, communication and public utilities, services, retail 
trade, mining and agriculture, forestry and fishing. In times of economic turmoil, firms in all 
the industries except agriculture, forestry and fishing were subject to a higher failure rate. To 
consider the effect of business cycles on failure risk, one should also allow for the association 
of failure rates with macroeconomic indicators: a negative association between failure rates 
and unemployment rates and international reserves per head, and a positive association between 
failure rates and trade balance (% of GDP). 
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Table 4.10 Descriptive statistics for significant covariates in active and failed firms for 
each of the five years prior to failure 
Panel A: Mean, standard deviation (in parentheses) and t-values of age between failed and active firms over a 5-year 
period prior to failure 
 Active Failed Active Failed   
              
Years prior 
to failure 
No. of 
observations 
No. of 
observations Mean Mean Difference t-statistic 
0 1,094,244 72,840 15.00 11.22 3.78 85.54*** 
   (14.33) (11.33)   
1 802,779 61,459 14.44 11.09 3.35 67.82*** 
   (14.06) (11.59)   
2 723,250 53,742 14.12 11.39 2.73 49.74*** 
   (14.01) (12.13)   
3 657,555 46,055 13.84 11.67 2.17 35.87*** 
   (13.82) (12.50)   
4 587,806 37,715 13.67 11.92 1.75 25.82*** 
   (13.62) (12.71)   
5 500,106 29,800 13.72 12.18 1.54 19.74*** 
   (13.57) (13.13)   
 
 
Panel B: Mean, standard deviation (in parentheses) and t-values of size between failed and active firms over a 5-year 
period prior to failure 
 Active Failed Active Failed   
       
Years prior 
to failure 
No. of 
observations 
No. of 
observations Mean Mean Difference t-statistic 
0 1,094,244 72,840 14.94 14.64 0.30 52.54*** 
   (1.60) (1.47)   
1 802,779 61,459 14.93 14.70 0.22 35.34*** 
   (1.65) (1.50)   
2 723,250 53,742 14.88 14.70 0.19 26.22*** 
   (1.68) (1.58)   
3 657,555 46,055 14.82 14.67 0.14 18.27*** 
   (1.71) (1.62)   
4 587,806 37,715 14.72 14.65 0.08 8.99*** 
   (1.70) (1.64)   
5 500,106 29,800 14.64 14.64 0.00 0.52 
   (1.57) (1.60)   
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Table 4.10 (continued) 
 
Panel C: Mean, standard deviation (in parentheses) and t-values of cash/total assets between failed and active firms 
over a 5-year period prior to failure 
 Active Failed Active Failed   
              
Years prior 
to failure 
No. of 
observations 
No. of 
observations Mean Mean Difference t-statistic 
0 1,094,244 72,840 12.33% 8.75% 3.58% 56.78*** 
   (0.18) (0.16)   
1 802,779 61,459 12.09% 8.25% 3.84% 62.55*** 
   (0.17) (0.14)   
2 723,250 53,742 12.19% 8.80% 3.39% 50.52*** 
   (0.17) (0.15)   
3 657,555 46,055 12.50% 9.30% 3.20% 43.83*** 
   (0.17) (0.15)   
4 587,806 37,715 13.13% 9.67% 3.46% 42.40*** 
   (0.17) (0.15)   
5 500,106 29,800 13.46% 9.97% 3.49% 37.91*** 
   (0.17) (0.15)   
 
Panel D: Mean, standard deviation (in parentheses) and t-values of creditors/total liabilities between failed and active 
firms over a 5-year period prior to failure 
 Active Failed Active Failed   
       
Years prior 
to failure 
No. of 
observations 
No. of 
observations Mean Mean Difference t-statistic 
0 1,094,244 72,840 21.53% 26.34% -4.81% -45.52*** 
   (0.26) (0.28)   
1 802,779 61,459 20.91% 26.08% -5.17% -44.76*** 
   (0.26) (0.28)   
2 723,250 53,742 21.27% 25.98% -4.71% -38.51*** 
   (0.26) (0.27)   
3 657,555 46,055 22.49% 25.67% -3.18% -24.34*** 
   (0.26) (0.27)   
4 587,806 37,715 24.36% 24.65% -0.29% -2.04** 
   (0.27) (0.27)   
5 500,106 29,800 24.27% 22.79% 1.48% 9.35*** 
   (0.27) (0.27)   
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Table 4.10 (continued) 
Panel E: Mean, standard deviation (in parentheses) and t-values of EBIT/total assets between failed and active firms 
over a 5-year period prior to failure 
 Active Failed Active Failed   
       
Years prior 
to failure 
No. of 
observations 
No. of 
observations Mean Mean Difference t-statistic 
0 1,094,244 72,840 5.60% -3.22% 8.82% 93.26*** 
   (0.16) (0.25)   
1 802,779 61,459 5.99% 1.24% 4.75% 58.59*** 
   (0.15) (0.18)   
2 723,250 53,742 5.97% 2.38% 3.59% 47.08*** 
   (0.16) (0.17)   
3 657,555 46,055 7.08% 3.14% 3.94% 49.01*** 
   (0.16) (0.17)   
4 587,806 37,715 7.58% 3.68% 3.90% 44.75*** 
   (0.15) (0.17)   
5 500,106 29,800 7.18% 3.45% 3.73% 38.59*** 
   (0.14) (0.16)   
 
Panel F: Mean, standard deviation (in parentheses) and t-values of fixed assets/total assets between failed and active 
firms over a 5-year period prior to failure 
 Active Failed Active Failed   
              
Years prior 
to failure 
No. of 
observations 
No. of 
observations Mean Mean Difference t-statistic 
0 1,094,244 72,840 34.04% 25.41% 8.63% 79.13*** 
   (0.31) (0.28)   
1 802,779 61,459 34.12% 25.85% 8.27% 70.46*** 
   (0.31) (0.28)   
2 723,250 53,742 33.92% 26.09% 7.83% 63.11*** 
   (0.30) (0.28)   
3 657,555 46,055 33.10% 26.31% 6.79% 51.56*** 
   (0.30) (0.27)   
4 587,806 37,715 32.17% 26.47% 5.70% 39.94*** 
   (0.29) (0.27)   
5 500,106 29,800 31.83% 26.65% 5.18% 32.69*** 
   (0.29) (0.26)   
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Table 4.10 (continued) 
Panel G: Mean, standard deviation (in parentheses) and t-values of loans/total assets between failed and active firms 
over a 5-year period prior to failure 
 Active Failed Active Failed   
              
Years prior 
to failure 
No. of 
observations 
No. of 
observations Mean Mean Difference t-statistic 
0 1,094,244 72,840 8.42% 12.28% -3.86% -50.18*** 
   (0.16) (0.20)   
1 802,779 61,459 8.57% 11.31% -2.74% -35.88*** 
   (0.16) (0.18)   
2 723,250 53,742 8.63% 11.08% -2.45% -30.27*** 
   (0.16) (0.18)   
3 657,555 46,055 8.65% 10.56% -1.91% -22.22*** 
   (0.16) (0.18)   
4 587,806 37,715 8.66% 9.83% -1.17% -12.84*** 
   (0.16) (0.17)   
5 500,106 29,800 8.47% 9.16% -0.69% -6.95*** 
   (0.16) (0.17)   
 
Panel H: Mean, standard deviation (in parentheses) and t-values of total liabilities/total assets between failed and 
active firms over a 5-year period prior to failure 
 Active Failed Active Failed   
              
Years prior 
to failure 
No. of 
observations No. of observations Mean Mean Difference t-statistic 
0 1,094,244 72,840 70.77% 96.04% -25.27% -151.66*** 
   (0.35) (0.44)   
1 802,779 61,459 71.29% 88.72% -17.43% -121.95*** 
   (0.33) (0.34)   
2 723,250 53,742 70.99% 86.47% -15.48% -106.28*** 
   (0.32) (0.33)   
3 657,555 46,055 71.44% 85.39% -13.95% -90.78*** 
   (0.31) (0.32)   
4 587,806 37,715 72.15% 84.40% -12.25% -74.17*** 
   (0.30) (0.31)   
5 500,106 29,800 71.89% 84.09% -12.20% -66.26*** 
   (0.29) (0.31)   
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Table 4.10 (continued) 
Panel I: Mean, standard deviation (in parentheses) and t-values of working capital/total assets between failed and 
active firms over a 5-year period prior to failure 
 Active Failed Active Failed   
              
Years prior 
to failure 
No. of 
observations 
No. of 
observations Mean Mean Difference t-statistic 
0 1,094,244 72,840 15.51% -2.16% 17.67% 102.96*** 
   (0.37) (0.45)   
1 802,779 61,459 15.16% 4.00% 11.16% 70.73*** 
   (0.35) (0.38)   
2 723,250 53,742 15.18% 5.43% 9.75% 60.63*** 
   (0.35) (0.36)   
3 657,555 46,055 14.60% 6.05% 8.55% 50.71*** 
   (0.34) (0.35)   
4 587,806 37,715 14.07% 6.42% 7.65% 42.18*** 
   (0.33) (0.34)   
5 500,106 29,800 14.13% 6.37% 7.76% 38.79*** 
   (0.32) (0.34)   
*** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10% 
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Figure 4.17 Age leading up to failure 
 
Figure 4.18 Size leading up to failure 
 
Figure 4.19 Cash/total assets leading up to failure 
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Figure 4.20 Creditors/total liabilities leading up to failure 
 
Figure 4.21 EBIT/total assets leading up to failure 
 
Figure 4.22 Fixed assets/total assets leading up to failure 
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Figure 4.23 Loans/total assets leading up to failure 
 
Figure 4.24 Total liabilities/total assets leading up to failure 
 
Figure 4.25 Working capital/total assets leading up to failure 
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4.4 Correlation  
A correlation matrix of all the covariates is shown in Table 4.11. All the correlations are 
statistically significant at the 1% level. A close examination of the partial correlations reveals 
generally weak correlations across these covariates, suggesting that covariates provide distinct 
and unique information. The highest correlation of -0.543 is between working capital/total 
assets and total liabilities/total assets, followed by the correlation of -0.490 between working 
capital/total assets and fixed assets/total assets. They are not large enough to cause serious 
implications for collinearity since prior studies have reported similarly large correlations: the 
correlation of -0.78 between EBIT/total assets and sales/total assets in Altman (1968) and the 
correlation of -0.49 between total liabilities/total assets and a dummy variable in Ohlson 
(1980). 
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Table 4.11 Pearson product-moment correlations between significant covariates for the entire sample 
 age size CA/ 
TA 
CR/ 
TL 
EB/ 
TA 
FA/ 
TA 
LO/ 
TA 
TL/ 
TA 
WC/ 
TA 
IR UR TB WE NE SE SEE EE AFF MI CO MA TCP WT RT FIR SR PA 
age 1                           
size .261 1                          
CA/TA -.025 -.232 1                         
CR/TL .018 -.085 .071 1                        
EB/TA -.014 -.057 .197 .049 1                       
FA/TA .036 .207 -.284 -.288 -.114 1                      
LO/TA .036 .140 -.152 -.017 -.131 -.040 1                     
TL/TA -.176 -.122 -.183 -.019 -.339 -.143 .276 1                    
WC/TA .101 .067 .273 .044 .296 -.490 -.288 -.543 1                   
IR .051 .002 .021 .229 .021 -.032 .006 -.026 .036 1                  
UR -.099 -.104 -.026 -.079 -.022 .063 -.107 -.074 .026 -.143 1                 
TB .137 .119 -.017 .086 .007 -.050 -.011 .027 .045 .348 -.269 1                
WE .172 .138 .160 .101 .041 -.032 .097 -.044 .040 .005 -.302 .188 1               
NE .034 -.022 .025 -.011 .038 .042 -.052 -.048 .035 .233 -.058 .254 -.136 1              
SE -.088 .000 -.166 -.176 -.100 -.008 -.041 .086 -.023 -.252 .176 -.071 -.708 -.183 1             
SEE -.080 -.179 -.025 .014 .060 .031 -.042 .027 -.065 -.003 .104 -.434 -.164 -.042 -.221 1            
EE -.096 -.083 .028 .138 .040 .019 -.026 -.069 .000 .295 .155 -.023 -.221 -.057 -.297 -.069 1           
AFF .001 -.001 -.029 -.036 -.019 .084 -.010 -.029 -.029 -.004 .031 -.033 -.034 .005 .003 .017 .037 1          
MI .025 .035 -.011 -.012 .000 .027 .008 -.014 -.007 -.011 -.001 -.012 -.002 .000 .002 .001 -.001 -.008 1         
CO -.052 -.027 -.012 -.041 .006 -.153 -.020 .055 .104 -.056 .041 -.053 -.044 -.021 .083 -.025 -.040 -.054 -.028 1        
MA .107 .045 -.074 .057 .006 -.016 .032 -.021 .008 .030 -.020 .049 -.087 -.016 .052 .031 .042 -.060 -.031 -.207 1       
TCP .012 -.006 -.011 .008 -.013 .054 -.017 .009 -.052 .004 .018 .004 .004 .023 -.031 .009 .028 -.029 -.015 -.099 -.111 1      
WT .019 -.044 -.013 .177 .024 -.203 .024 .015 .064 .010 .032 -.004 -.022 -.016 -.009 .034 .038 -.057 -.029 -.197 -.220 -.105 1     
RT -.032 -.131 .039 .051 -.008 .084 -.026 .045 -.101 .020 .014 -.017 .031 .007 -.027 .016 -.022 -.045 -.023 -.155 -.174 -.083 -.165 1    
FIR -.011 .224 -.053 -.192 -.066 .273 .004 -.089 -.030 .008 -.069 .051 .033 .019 .015 -.062 -.048 -.047 -.025 -.164 -.184 -.088 -.174 -.138 1   
SR -.054 -.067 .133 -.061 .043 -.009 -.008 .001 -.021 -.009 -.022 -.015 .109 .015 -.097 -.012 -.011 -.056 -.029 -.195 -.218 -.104 -.207 -.163 -.173 1  
PA -.009 .011 .007 -.005 -.001 .000 -.001 .003 .003 -.004 -.007 .003 .005 -.003 .001 -.004 -.006 -.003 -.002 -.011 -.012 -.006 -.012 -.009 -.010 -.012 1 
 
All the correlations are significant at the 0.01 level (two-tailed). 
age=age (in years); size=natural logarithm of total assets; CA/TA=cash/total assets; CR/TL=creditors/total liabilities; EB/TA=EBIT/total assets; 
FA/TA=fixed assets/total assets; LO/TA=loans/total assets; TL/TA=total liabilities/total assets; WC/TA=working capital/total assets; IR=international 
reserves per head (USD thousand); UR=unemployment rates (% of labour force); TB=trade balance (% of GDP); WE=1 for Western Europe, 0 otherwise; 
NE=1 for Northern Europe, 0 otherwise; SEE=1 for South Eastern Europe, 0 otherwise; SE=1 for Southern Europe, 0 otherwise; EE=1 for Eastern Europe, 0 
otherwise; AFF=1 for agriculture, forestry and fishing, 0 otherwise; MI=1 for mining, 0 otherwise; CO=1 for construction, 0 otherwise; MA=1 for 
manufacturing, 0 otherwise; TCP=1 for transportation, communications and public utilities, 0 otherwise; WT=1 for wholesale trade, 0 otherwise; RT=1 for 
retail trade, 0 otherwise; FIR=1 for finance, insurance and real estate, 0 otherwise; SR=1 for services, 0 otherwise; PA=1 for public administration, 0 
otherwise.   
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Chapter 5 Empirical findings for single-period models using logistic regression 
Since the descriptive analysis in Chapter 4 provides a preliminary indication of the predictive 
power of a set of risk factors, I will utilise logistic regression to predict financial distress for 
privately held firms using these risk factors over one to five year time horizons in this chapter. 
In other words, I will estimate the probability of a firm entering into failure in year “t” based 
on accounting and non-accounting information in a previous year “t-s”, where “s” is 1, 2, 3, 4 
or 5 years prior to year “t”. In the accounting literature, logistic regression is often described 
as a cross-sectional statistical method, which results in single-period or static models due to 
the use of only one firm-year observation (i.e., one annual account) for every firm in an 
estimation sample (e.g., Balcaen & Ooghe 2006). To estimate a static model on a sample and 
validate it on another independent sample, this study uses a 70-30 cross validation: namely, the 
whole dataset of one to five years prior to year “t” is randomly split into 70% cases and 30% 
cases: 70% cases are used to estimate models before their accuracy is evaluated on the 
remaining 30% cases.18 Ideally an estimation sample is based on one period and the holdout 
sample another period. The sample period of 2002 to 2011, however, consists of three 
distinctive periods, namely, the period preceding the financial crisis, the 2007-2008 financial 
crisis, the period following the financial crisis, thereby making it difficult to split the dataset 
into two periods. As described in Chapter 4, both active and failed firms were affected during 
the 2007-2008 financial crisis in terms of their size, liquidity, solvency and structural soundness, 
and the differences in the mean values of several ratios between active and failed firms have 
widened since the financial crisis.  
The descriptive analysis in Chapter 4 indicates that on average a failed firm and an active firm 
have approximately 3.8 and 5.2 firm-year observations respectively during the sample period 
                                                            
18 For a firm, its observation in the annual financial statement in year “t” will not be used for model estimation and validation 
to avoid the backcasting problem because data in the financial statement of a failed firm in year “t” may have been collected 
either before or after the failure date. 
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of 2002 to 2011. I did not impose the restriction of 5 consecutive annual financial statements 
prior to year “t” on a firm. If I had done so, models would be estimated on the same firms; 
however, the restriction would considerably reduce the sample size. Sections 5.1 to 5.5 estimate 
and validate up to five years prior to failure models using logistic regression. Following the 
construction of a model, this study will assess its in-sample and out-of-sample prediction of 
the model by classification tables and AUCs. Section 5.6 summarises the principal findings in 
this chapter.   
5.1 One year prior to failure model using logistic regression 
This section estimates one year prior to failure model based on accounting and non-accounting 
information of 561,304 active firms and 42,861 failed firms in year “t-1”, namely, one year 
prior to the year in which a failure event occurred for a failed firm or one year prior to the last 
available year for an active firm. The results of the one year prior to failure model are 
summarised in Table 5.1, which reports the maximum likelihood estimates of coefficients, 
estimates of the standard errors of the estimated coefficients, Wald Chi-squares for the null 
hypothesis that a coefficient is equal to zero, p-values, and marginal effects.19  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
19 Wald Chi-squares are calculated as the ratios of the estimated coefficients to their estimated standard errors.  
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Table 5.1 Estimation results for one year prior to failure model using logistic regression 
Variable ઺ SE z Pr(>|z|) Marginal effect 
Age (in years) -.010 .000 -20.792 .000 -.00056066 
Size (natural log of total assets) -.111 .004 -26.898 .000 -.00618240 
Cash/total assets -1.440 .044 -32.938 .000 -.07999200 
Creditors/total liabilities 1.011 .022 45.708 .000 .05619500 
EBIT/total assets -.648 .037 -17.706 .000 -.03598900 
Fixed assets/total assets -1.047 .030 -34.962 .000 -.05815800 
Loans/total assets .301 .032 9.484 .000 .01671800 
Total liabilities/total assets .339 .026 13.117 .000 .01884400 
Working capital/total assets -.636 .026 -24.615 .000 -.03533200 
Agriculture, forestry & fishing      
Mining .140 .126 1.112 .266 .00811860 
Construction .406 .063 6.465 .000 .02465600 
Manufacturing .649 .063 10.377 .000 .04136100 
Transportation & communications .458 .066 6.932 .000 .02909700 
Wholesale trade .263 .063 4.166 .000 .01549000 
Retail trade .423 .064 6.636 .000 .02622700 
Finance, insurance &real estate .492 .063 7.786 .000 .03076800 
Services .344 .063 5.455 .000 .02069300 
Public administration .817 .156 5.231 .000 .05862700 
Western Europe      
Northern Europe -.172 .042 -4.049 .000 -.00904490 
Southern Europe 1.395 .015 92.458 .000 .07836700 
South Eastern Europe -.147 .038 -3.835 .000 -.00783370 
Eastern Europe .917 .030 30.094 .000 .06635300 
International reserves per head -1.544 .010 -159.639 .000 -.08580600 
Trade balance % of GDP .181 .002 114.433 .000 .01003700 
Unemployment rates -.268 .002 -115.403 .000 -.01489800 
Constant 3.105 .096 32.212 .000  
Null deviance: 309,417      
Residual deviance: 243,124      
Pseudo ܴଶ: .259      
 
5.1.1 Testing for the significance of the model 
Since the multivariable logistic regression model in Table 5.1 has been estimated, one can now 
begin the process of model assessment. Does the model including the independent variables 
inform us more about the dependent variable than a model without these independent variables? 
To answer such a question, one can conduct the likelihood ratio test for the overall significance 
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of the coefficients for the independent variables in the model. The likelihood ratio test is based 
on the statistic G=Deviance (model without the independent variables)-Deviance (model with 
the independent variables). According to the empirical results in Table 5.1, the value of the 
likelihood ratio test is G=309,417-243,124=66,293 and the p-value for the test is ܲሾ߯ଶሺ25ሻሿ ൌ
0.000, which is significant at the 1% level. The null hypothesis is thus rejected, suggesting that 
at least one and perhaps all the coefficients are different from zero. In addition to the likelihood 
ratio test, one may wish to have a look at the univariate Wald test statistics. Under the 
hypothesis that an individual coefficient is zero, these statistics follow a standard normal 
distribution. The p-values are provided in the fifth column of Table 5.1. It can be seen that all 
the independent variables except the dummy variable for mining are significant at the 1% level. 
5.1.2 Interpreting the fitted logistic regression model 
In the logistic regression model in Table 5.1, the slope coefficient of an independent variable 
represents the change in the logit corresponding to a change of one unit in the independent 
variable. An increase of one unit in a continuous variable, however, is too large for some 
continuous variables (e.g., financial ratios) and yet too small for other continuous variables 
(e.g., age) to be meaningful. To indicate how the risk of failure changes with the explanatory 
variables, I have calculated the effect of an arbitrary change of “c” unit in the continuous 
variables in Table 5.2. For a change of “c” unit in a continuous variable, the change in the log-
odds ratio is ݃ሺݔ ൅ ܿሻ െ ݃ሺݔሻ ൌ ܿߚመ . The associated odds ratio is ݁ݔ݌൫ܿߚመ൯ and the endpoints 
of the 95% confidence interval estimate of the odds ratio is ݁ݔ݌ൣܿߚመ േ 1.96	ܿ	ܵܧ෢൫ߚመ൯൧.  
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Table 5.2 A change of “c” unit in every independent variable and associated odds ratios 
Variable Unit ઺ ۳ܠܘሺ઺ሻ SE 95% confidence interval of odd ratio 
Age 10 -0.010 0.904 0.000 (0.903, 0.913) 
Size 1 -0.111 0.895 0.004 (0.887, 0.902) 
Cash/total assets 0.25 -1.440 0.698 0.044 (0.683, 0.713) 
Creditors/total liabilities 0.25 1.011 1.288 0.022 (1.274, 1.302) 
EBIT/total assets 0.25 -0.648 0.851 0.037 (0.835, 0.866) 
Fixed assets/total assets 0.25 -1.047 0.770 0.030 (0.759, 0.781) 
Loans/total assets 0.25 0.301 1.078 0.032 (1.061, 1.095) 
Total liabilities/total assets 0.25 0.339 1.088 0.026 (1.075, 1.102) 
Working capital/total assets 0.25 -0.636 0.853 0.026 (0.842, 0.864) 
Agriculture, forestry and fishing      
Mining 1 0.140 1.150 0.126 (0.899, 1.471) 
Construction 1 0.406 1.501 0.063 (1.327, 1.698) 
Manufacturing 1 0.649 1.914 0.063 (1.693, 2.164) 
Transportation & communications 1 0.458 1.581 0.066 (1.389, 1.800) 
Wholesale trade 1 0.263 1.301 0.063 (1.149, 1.472) 
Retail trade 1 0.423 1.526 0.064 (1.347, 1.729) 
Finance, insurance and real estate 1 0.492 1.636 0.063 (1.445, 1.852) 
Services 1 0.344 1.411 0.063 (1.247, 1.596) 
Public administration 1 0.817 2.263 0.156 (1.666, 3.073) 
Western Europe      
Northern Europe 1 -0.172 0.842 0.042 (0.775, 0.915) 
Southern Europe 1 1.395 4.036 0.015 (3.918, 4.157) 
South Eastern Europe 1 -0.147 0.863 0.038 (0.800, 0.931) 
Eastern Europe 1 0.917 2.503 0.030 (2.358, 2.657) 
International reserves per head 1 -1.544 0.213 0.010 (0.209, 0.218) 
Trade balance (% of GDP) 1 0.181 1.198 0.002 (1.194, 1.202) 
Unemployment rates  1 -0.268 0.765 0.002 (0.761, 0.768) 
 
Table 5.2 suggests that for an increase of 10 years in firm age, the odds of failure are estimated 
to decrease by 0.904 times and the decrease ranges from 0.903 to 0.913 times at a 95% 
confidence interval. For one unit increase in natural logarithm of total assets, the odds of failure 
decrease by 0.895 times and the decrease can be as little as 0.902 times or much as 0.887 times. 
An increase of 0.25 in the ratio of cash to total assets reduces the odds of failure by 0.698 times 
and the decrease can be as little as 0.713 times or much as 0.683 times. Similarly, an increase 
of 0.25 in the ratios of EBIT to total assets, fixed assets to total assets and working capital to 
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total assets reduces the odds of failure by 0.851, 0.770 and 0.853 times respectively. Table 5.2 
provides the 95% confidence intervals for these estimated odds ratios. While the ratios of cash 
to total assets, EBIT to total assets, fixed assets to total assets and working capital to total assets 
reduce the risk of failure, other financial ratios increase the likelihood of failure. An increase 
of 0.25 in the ratio of creditors to total liabilities will lead to an increase in the odds of failure 
by 1.288 times, and at a 95% confidence interval, the increase is between 1.274 and 1.302 
times. Similarly, an increase of 0.25 in the ratios of loans to total assets and total liabilities to 
total assets increases the odds of failure by 1.078 and 1.088 times respectively. Table 5.2 also 
reports the effect of one unit increase in every macroeconomic variable on the risk of failure. 
An increase of USD 1000 in international reserves per head reduces the odds of failure by 0.213 
times, and the decrease is between 0.209 and 0.218 times at a 95% confidence interval. With 
an increase of 1% in trade balance (% of GDP), the odds of failure increase by 1.198 times and 
the increase ranges from 1.194 to 1.202 times at a 95% confidence interval. For an increase of 
1% in unemployment rates, the odds of failure decrease by 0.765 times, and the decrease is 
between 0.761 and 0.768 times at a 95% confidence interval.  
Table 5.2 also presents the odds ratios for the dummy variables for industry and region. The 
independent variable of region has five categories: Western Europe, Northern Europe, Southern 
Europe, and South Eastern Europe, and Eastern Europe. According to the odds ratio of 
ܱ෢ܴ ሺܰ݋ݎݐ݄݁ݎ݊	ܧݑݎ݋݌݁,ܹ݁ݏݐ݁ݎ݊	ܧݑݎ݋݌݁ሻ, the odds of failure in Northern European firms 
are 0.842 times the odds of failure in Western European firms. At a 95% level of confidence, 
the odds of failure in Northern European firms could be as little as 0.915 times or much as 
0.775 times the odds of failure in Western European firms. One can interpret the odds ratios 
for the dummy variables for other regions and their 95% confidence intervals in a similar way. 
The categorical independent variable of industry has ten categories: 1) agriculture, forestry and 
fishing, 2) mining, 3) construction, 4) manufacturing, 5) transportation, communications and 
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public utilities, 6) wholesale trade, 7) retail trade, 8) finance, insurance and real estate, 9) 
services, and 10) public administration. The estimated coefficients for the industry dummy 
variables except mining are statistically significant at the 1% level. The odds ratio of 
OR෢ሺservices, agriculture, forestry	&fishingሻ, for example, is 1.411, suggesting that the odds 
of failure among  firms in  services are 1.411 times the odds of failure among firms in 
agriculture, forestry and fishing. The 95% confidence interval indicates that the odds of failure 
among firms in services could be as little as 1.247 times or much as 1.596 times the odds for 
those firms in agriculture, forestry and fishing. A similar interpretation can be made of the odds 
ratios for the dummy variables for other industries and their 95% confidence intervals.  
Because of the above simple relationship between the estimated coefficients and the odds 
ratios, logistic regression has proved to be a very highly interpretable tool. An alternative way 
to assess the effect of an independent variable on the probability of failure is to examine its 
marginal effect. The marginal effect (also called the partial change in the probability) measures 
the expected instantaneous change in the event probability as a function of a change in an 
independent variable when all other independent variables are held constant. The marginal 
effect is contingent on the values of all predictors and their estimated coefficients; therefore, 
one has to decide on the levels of the independent variables in the computation of the marginal 
effect. Long (1997, pp. 72-74) compares two approaches. The first approach is to compute the 
marginal effect at every observation and then calculate the sample average. The second 
approach is to compute the marginal effect at the mean of the predictors. The second approach 
has several problems. First is the difficulty in the translation of a marginal effect into the change 
in the probability in case of a discrete change in an independent variable. Secondly, mean 
values of predictors may not correspond to any observed values in the population under 
consideration. Third is its inappropriateness for binary predictors. That is why the first 
approach is preferred. The last column of Table 5.1 reports average marginal effects. For age, 
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the marginal effect of -0.0006 indicates that an increase of one unit in age reduces the 
probability of failure by 0.0006. The marginal effect of size is -0.0062, suggesting that an 
increase of one unit in size decreases the probability of failure by 0.0062. In a similar way, the 
marginal effects of financial ratios and macroeconomic variables indicate that an increase of 
one unit in the ratios of cash to total assets, EBIT to total assets, fixed assets to total assets and 
working capital to total assets, international reserves per head, and unemployment rates 
decreases the probability of failure by 0.0800, 0.0360, 0.0582, 0.0353, 0.0858 and 0.0149 
respectively. In contrast, an increase of one unit in the ratios of creditors to total liabilities, 
loans to total assets and total liabilities to total assets, and trade balance (% of GDP) increases 
the probability of failure by 0.0562, 0.0167, 0.0188 and 0.0100 respectively. The marginal 
effect of the construction dummy variable is 0.0247, suggesting that firms in construction is 
0.0247 more likely to fail than firms in agriculture, forestry and fishing (the reference industry). 
A similar interpretation can be made of the marginal effects of the dummy variables for other 
industries except that the marginal effect of the mining dummy variable is not statistically 
significant at the 10% level. Interestingly, firms in all other industries are more likely to fail 
than firms in the agriculture, forestry and fishing industry. For the dummy variables for 
Northern Europe and South Eastern Europe, their marginal effects suggest that firms in 
Northern Europe and South Eastern Europe are 0.0090 and 0.0078 respectively less likely to 
fail than firms in Western Europe (the reference category). In contrast, firms in South Europe 
and Eastern Europe are 0.0784 and 0.0664 respectively more likely to fail than firms in Western 
Europe.  
5.1.3 Assessing the fit of the model 
This section addresses the question of how effectively the one year prior to failure model 
describes the outcome variable, which is often referred to as its goodness-of-fit. The pseudo 
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ܴଶ  in Table 5.1 is 0.259. 20  This measure, however, is difficult to interpret in a logistic 
regression model: a logistic regression model is not estimated to minimise variance and so the 
ordinary least square approach to goodness-of-fit does not apply. Nevertheless, pseudo ܴଶ 
indices allow for the comparison of logistic regression models as up to five years prior to failure 
models will be developed using logistic regression. Since the purpose of a financial distress 
prediction model is to predict the status of a firm, failed or active, it is intuitively appealing to 
assess the fit of the one year prior to failure model via a classification matrix like Table 5.3: 
Table 5.3 Classification matrix for a binary outcome variable 
 Predicted  
Observed Active Failed Total 
Active c f c + f 
Failed m h m + h 
Total c + m f + h n 
 
Table 5.3 is the matrix of cross-classifying the outcome variable with a dichotomous variable 
whose values are derived from comparing each estimated probability to a cut-off point: if the 
estimated probability is more than the cut-off point the derived variable is equal to 1, otherwise 
it is equal to 0. Out of the total number of observations n, c and h refer to the number of correctly 
predicted active firms (or the number of correct rejections) and the number of correctly 
predicted failed firms (or the number of hits ) respectively. The letters of m and f refer to the 
number of incorrectly predicted failed firms (or the number of misses), and the number of 
incorrectly predicted active firms (or the number of false alarms) respectively. A Type I error 
rate (also called miss rate) and a Type II error rate (also called false alarm rate) can be 
calculated as ௠௠ା௛ and 
௙
௖ା௙ respectively.  
 
                                                            
20 The pseudo ܴଶ is calculated as (1-exp(-LR/n))/(1-exp(-(-2ܮ଴)/n)), where LR=null residual deviance-residual deviance and െ2ܮ଴ refers to null deviance. 
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Table 5.4 One year prior to failure logistic regression model’s classification of firms in the 
estimation sample  
The estimation sample comprises 561,304 active firms and 42,861 failed firms. Using the optimal cut-
off point of 0.068, the model correctly predicts 416,163 active firms and 31,778 failed firms.  
 Predicted  
Observed Active Failed Total 
Active 416,163 145,141 561,304 
Failed 11,083 31,778 42,861 
Total 427,246 176,919 604,165 
 
Using the optimal cut-off point of 0.068, the one year prior to failure model estimated in Table 
5.1 correctly classifies 74.1% of the firms in the estimation sample in Table 5.4 with the Type 
I and Type II errors being 25.9%. The optimal cut-off point of 0.068 lies in the point where the 
sensitivity (the hit rate ௛௠ା௛) and specificity (correct rejection rate 
௖
௖ା௙ ) curves cross in Figure 
5.1. 
Figure 5.1 Plot of one year prior to failure logistic regression model’s sensitivity &specificity 
versus all possible cut-off points in the estimation sample 
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Since the classification of firms into active and failed firms depends on the choice of a cut-off 
point, an alternative way to assess the forecasting accuracy of a predictive model is a ROC 
curve, which is a plot of the hit rate (sensitivity) versus the false alarm rate (1-specificity) 
across all possible cut-off levels. The steeper the ROC curve at the left and the larger the AUC, 
the higher the predictive accuracy of a model. The AUC represents the probability that a 
randomly selected failed firms is rated with greater suspicion of failure than a randomly 
selected active firm. As a general rule, a model with an AUC of 0.5 has no discrimination, 0.7 
to 0.8 acceptable discrimination, 0.8 to 0.9 excellent discrimination and 0.9 or above 
outstanding discrimination (Hosmer & Lemeshow 2000, p. 162). When a model provides 
perfect discriminant power, the AUC it achieves will be 1 with the hit rate being 1 and the false 
alarm rate being 0.    
To check the predictive capacity of the one year prior to failure model using logistic regression, 
I graph its ROC curve across all possible cut-off points in Figure 5.2. The AUC provides a 
measure of discrimination which is the likelihood that a failed firm has a higher probability of 
failure than an active firm. The AUC in Figure 5.2 is 0.818, suggesting that for a randomly 
selected failed firm and a randomly selected active firms, there is 0.818 probability that the 
model predicted probability of failure will be higher for the failed firm than for the active firm. 
At a 95% confidence interval, the AUC is between 0.815 and 0.820. According to Hosmer and 
Lemeshow (2000)’s general rule, the one year prior to failure model provides excellent in-
sample discrimination.  
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Figure 5.2 One year prior to failure logistic regression model’s ROC curve in the estimation 
sample 
 
 
Since the one year prior to failure model is estimated based on the 70% observations, its 
goodness-of-fit can be assessed on the remaining 30% observations referred to as the holdout 
sample. The reason for this type of assessment of model performance is that a fitted model 
usually performs in an optimistic manner on an estimation sample. Using the values of the 
coefficients reported in Table 5.1, the one year prior to failure model achieves a similar one-
year-ahead out-of-sample predictive accuracy rate: correct classification of 74.0% of the firms 
using the optimal cut-off point of 0.067 in Table 5.5, and an AUC of 0.816, as small as 0.813 
or large as 0.820 at a 95% confidence interval.21   
 
                                                            
21 As the one to five years prior to failure models achieve similar out-of-sample accuracy, I will not reproduce the ROCs and 
the derivation of the optimal cut-off points for the holdout samples.  
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Table 5.5 One year prior to failure logistic regression model’s classification of firms in the 
holdout sample  
The holdout sample comprises 241,475 active firms and 18,598 failed firms. Using the optimal cut-off 
point of 0.067, the model correctly predicts 178,571 active firms and 13,767 failed firms.  
 Predicted  
Observed Active Failed Total 
Active 178,571 62,904 241,475 
Failed 4,831 13,767 18,598 
Total 183,402 76,671 260,073 
 
In summary, the one year prior to failure model using logistic regression effectively describes 
the outcome variable, which serves as important evidence of the predictive accuracy of those 
independent variables in the model. To address the question of how far one can predict financial 
distress for privately held firms with acceptable discrimination, Sections 5.2 to 5.5 will develop 
financial distress prediction models over two to five year time horizons.  
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5.2 Two years prior to failure model using logistic regression 
Table 5.6 Estimation results for two years prior to failure model using logistic regression 
Variable ઺ SE z Pr(>|z|) Marginal effect 
Age (in years) -.012 .001 -22.826 .000 -.00066887 
Size (natural log of total assets) -.129 .004 -30.858 .000 -.00751650 
Cash/total assets -1.530 .045 -34.090 .000 -.08888600 
Creditors/total liabilities .952 .023 41.462 .000 .05528500 
EBIT/total assets -.428 .038   -11.212 .000 -.02486900 
Fixed assets/total assets -1.235 .032 -39.046 .000 -.07170700 
Loans/total assets .004 .033    0.108 .914 .00020808 
Total liabilities/total assets .340 .027 12.397 .000 .01975900 
Working capital/total assets -.772 .028   -27.792 .000 -.04485800 
Agriculture, forestry & fishing      
Mining .232 .125 1.857 .063 .01466200 
Construction .479 .065 7.364 .000 .03123600 
Manufacturing .684 .065 10.568 .000 .04660100 
Transportation & communications  .468 .068 6.839 .000 .03162200 
Wholesale trade .238 .065 3.646 .000 .01466900 
Retail trade .409 .066 6.216 .000 .02677000 
Finance, insurance &real estate .575 .066   8.782 .000 .03914300 
Services .381 .065 5.840 .000 .02438500 
Public administration .751 .178 4.229 .000 .05680000 
Western Europe      
Northern Europe -.281 .047 -5.935 .000 -.01478900 
Southern Europe .761 .015 51.441 .000 .04306400 
South Eastern Europe -.774 .041 -18.739 .000 -.03480700 
Eastern Europe 1.144 .033 34.585 .000 .09579700 
International reserves per head  -1.715 .013 -129.069 .000 -.09958300 
Trade balance % of GDP .186 .002 108.776 .000 .01079600 
Unemployment rates -.208 .003    -72.340 .000 -.01205900 
Constant 3.154 .101 31.104 .000  
Null deviance: 273,912      
Residual deviance: 232,779      
Pseudo ܴଶ: .184      
 
Table 5.6 summarises the results of the two years prior to failure logistic regression model 
estimated on an estimation sample of 506,280 active firms and 37,686 failed firms. The value 
of the likelihood ratio test is G=273,912-232,779=41,133 and the p-value for the test is 
ܲሾ߯ଶሺ25ሻሿ ൌ 0.000, which is significant at the 1% level. It can be concluded from the rejection 
of the null hypothesis that not all the coefficients are insignificantly different from zero. The 
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univariate Wald test statistics also indicate that all the independent variables but loans/total 
assets and the mining dummy variable are significant at the 1% level.   
How effectively does the two years prior to failure model using logistic regression describe the 
outcome variable? As the allowable time horizon for financial distress lengthens, the predictive 
ability of the selected explanatory variables decays for the pseudo ܴଶ drops from 0.259 in the 
one year prior to failure model to 0.184 in the two years prior to failure model. Using the 
optimal cut-off point of 0.072 derived in Figure 5.3, the two years prior to failure model 
correctly classifies 72.0% of the firms with the Type I and II errors being 28.0%. The AUC in 
Figure 5.4 is 0.787: that is to say, there is 0.787 probability that a randomly selected failed firm 
is ranked with greater suspicion of failure than a randomly selected active firm. At a 95% 
confidence interval the AUC is as large as 0.789 or as small as 0.784, suggesting the acceptable 
in-sample discrimination the two years prior to failure model provides. The model achieves a 
slightly better two-year-ahead out-of-sample distress prediction: correct classification of 72.3% 
of the firms in the holdout sample based on the cut-off point of 0.072 in Table 5.8, and an AUC 
of 0.790, as large as 0.794 or small as 0.787 at a 95% confidence interval.  
Table 5.7 Two years prior to failure logistic regression model’s classification of firms in the 
estimation sample  
The estimation sample comprises 506,280 active firms and 37,686 failed firms. Using the optimal cut-
off point of 0.072, the model correctly predicts 364,317 active firms and 27,116 failed firms.  
 Predicted  
Observed Active Failed Total 
Active 364,317 141,963 506,280 
Failed 10,570 27,116 37,686 
Total 374,887 169,079 543,966 
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Figure 5.3 Plot of two years prior to failure logistic regression model’s sensitivity &specificity 
versus all possible cut-off points in the estimation sample 
 
Figure 5.4 Two years prior to failure logistic regression model’s ROC curve in the estimation 
sample 
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Table 5.8 Two years prior to failure logistic regression model’s classification of firms in the 
holdout sample  
The holdout sample comprises 216,970 active firms and 16,056 failed firms. Using the optimal cut-off 
point of 0.072, the model correctly predicts 156,977 active firms and 11,611 failed firms.  
 Predicted  
Observed Active Failed Total 
Active 156,977 59,993 216,970 
Failed 4,445 11,611 16,056 
Total 161,422 71,604 233,026 
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5.3 Three years prior to failure model using logistic regression 
Table 5.9 Estimation results for three years prior to failure model using logistic regression 
Variable ઺ SE z Pr(>|z|) Marginal effect 
Age (in years) -.012 .001 -22.834 .000 -.00069972 
Size (natural log of total assets) -.122 .004 -27.608 .000 -.00699140 
Cash/total assets -1.447 .047 -31.086 .000 -.08273100 
Creditors/total liabilities .670 .025 27.219 .000 .03833100 
EBIT/total assets -.584 .041 -14.128 .000 -.03339600 
Fixed assets/total assets -1.302 .034 -38.134 .000 -.07444900 
Loans/total assets -.107 .036 -2.945 .003 -.00610900 
Total liabilities/total assets .256 .030 8.512 .000 .01461700 
Working capital/total assets -.869 .030 -28.681 .000 -.04969000 
Agriculture, forestry & fishing      
Mining .193 .133 1.458 .145 .01190900 
Construction .486 .068 7.128 .000 .03160000 
Manufacturing .559 .068 8.229 .000 .03674400 
Transportation & communications  .379 .072 5.278 .000 .02475100 
Wholesale trade .135 .069 1.975 .048 .00801870 
Retail trade .338 .069 4.885 .000 .02144900 
Finance, insurance &real estate .548 .069 7.968 .000 .03705500 
Services .335 .068 4.903 .000 .02102700 
Public administration .602 .204 2.947 .003 .04331300 
Western Europe      
Northern Europe -1.270 .055 -23.010 .000 -.04618100 
Southern Europe .169 .015 11.491 .000 .00954660 
South Eastern Europe -1.509 .049 -30.773 .000 -.05160200 
Eastern Europe .960 .039 24.767 .000 .07681400 
International reserves per head  -1.638 .018 -88.687 .000 -.09366900 
Trade balance % of GDP .197 .002 104.705 .000 .01124500 
Unemployment rates -.046 .003 -13.099 .000 -.00261870 
Constant 1.999 .112 17.842 .000  
Null deviance: 238,385      
Residual deviance: 213,014      
Pseudo ܴଶ: .131      
 
Table 5.9 presents the empirical results of the three years prior to failure model using logistic 
regression estimated on a sample of 460,620 active firms and 32,281 failed firms. The value of 
the likelihood ratio test is G=238,385-213,014=25,371 and the p-value for the test is 
ܲሾ߯ଶሺ25ሻሿ ൌ 0.000 . The null hypothesis is thus rejected, suggesting that not all the 
147 
 
coefficients are equal to zero. According to the univariate Wald tests, all the independent 
variables but the mining dummy variable and the wholesale trade dummy variable are 
significant at the 1% level. The ratio of loans to total assets is statistically significant at the 1% 
level but has got a negative sign, suggesting that the higher the ratio three years prior to failure, 
the less likely a firm is to fail. 
Several methods are used to assess the goodness-of-fit of the three years prior to failure model 
using logistic regression. The pseudo ܴଶ is 0.131, lower than 0.184 in the two years prior to 
failure model. Based on the optimal cut-off point of 0.069 derived in Figure 5.5, the model 
correctly classifies of 69.5% firms in the estimation sample in Table 5.10 with the Type I and 
II errors being 30.5%. The AUC in Figure 5.6 is 0.756, suggesting that there is 0.756 probability 
that a randomly selected failed firm is ranked with greater suspicion of failure than a randomly 
selected active firm. The model provides acceptable in-sample discrimination for the AUC 
ranges between 0.753 and 0.759 at a 95% confidence interval. The model achieves a similar 
three-year-ahead out-of-sample distress prediction: correct classification of 69.5% of the firms 
based on the cut-off point of 0.069 in Table 5.11, and an AUC of 0.755, as large as 0.760 or 
small as 0.751 at a 95% confidence interval. 
Table 5.10 Three years prior to failure logistic regression model’s classification of firms in the 
estimation sample  
The estimation sample comprises 460,620 active firms and 32,281 failed firms. Using the optimal cut-
off point of 0.069, the model correctly predicts 319,998 active firms and 22,426 failed firms.  
 Predicted  
Observed Active Failed Total 
Active 319,998 140,622 460,620 
Failed 9,855 22,426 32,281 
Total 329,853 163,048 492,901 
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Figure 5.5 Plot of three years prior to failure logistic regression model’s sensitivity &specificity 
versus all possible cut-off points in the estimation sample 
 
 
Figure 5.6 Three years prior to failure logistic regression model’s ROC curve in the estimation 
sample 
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Table 5.11 Three years prior to failure logistic regression model’s classification of firms in the 
holdout sample  
The holdout sample comprises 196,935 active firms and 13,774 failed firms. Using the optimal cut-off 
point of 0.069, the model correctly predicts 136,931 active firms and 9,579 failed firms.  
 Predicted  
Observed Active Failed Total 
Active 136,931 60,004 196,935 
Failed 4,195 9,579 13,774 
Total 141,126 69,583 210,709 
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5.4 Four years prior to failure model using logistic regression 
Table 5.12 Estimation results for four years prior to failure model using logistic regression 
Variable ઺ SE z Pr(>|z|) Marginal effect 
Age (in years) -.012 .001 -20.469 .000 -.00063842 
Size (natural log of total assets) -.072 .005 -14.893 .000 -.00387570 
Cash/total assets -1.500 .051 -29.594 .000 -.08100000 
Creditors/total liabilities .123 .027 4.533 .000 .00664770 
EBIT/total assets -.690 .046 -15.031 .000 -.03726100 
Fixed assets/total assets -1.442 .038 -38.265 .000 -.07784300 
Loans/total assets -.392 .041 -9.598 .000 -.02118500 
Total liabilities/total assets .132 .034 3.943 .000 .00714820 
Working capital/total assets -.938 .034 -27.923 .000 -.05061600 
Agriculture, forestry & fishing      
Mining .346 .136 2.542 .011 .02150400 
Construction .482 .074 6.518 .000 .02984200 
Manufacturing .568 .074 7.723 .000 .03559200 
Transportation & communications  .390 .078 5.014 .000 .02436100 
Wholesale trade .179 .074 2.410 .016 .01016400 
Retail trade .386 .075 5.155 .000 .02368100 
Finance, insurance &real estate .487 .075 6.508 .000 .03078600 
Services .321 .074 4.328 .000 .01902600 
Public administration .168 .280 0.597 .550 .00967840 
Western Europe      
Northern Europe -1.266 .061 -20.863 .000 -.04279500 
Southern Europe -.099 .016 -6.293 .000 -.00540380 
South Eastern Europe -1.498 .051 -29.461 .000 -.04794600 
Eastern Europe .692 .043 16.122 .000 .04821100 
International reserves per head  -1.403 .022 -64.547 .000 -.07573300 
Trade balance % of GDP .163 .002 78.040 .000 .00881500 
Unemployment rates -.027 .004 -7.007 .000 -.00143060 
Constant .989 .124 7.993 .000  
Null deviance: 198,889      
Residual deviance: 182,784      
Pseudo ܴଶ: .099      
 
The results of the four years prior to failure model estimated on a sample of 411,115 active 
firms and 26,305 failed firms are presented in Table 5.12. The value of the likelihood ratio test 
is G=198,889-182,784=16,105 and the p-value for the test is ܲሾ߯ଶሺ25ሻሿ ൌ 0.000. The null 
hypothesis is rejected. The univariate Wald test statistics suggest that all the independent 
variables but the dummy variables for mining, wholesale trade and public administration are 
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significant at the 1% level. The ratio of loans to total assets is statistically significant at the 1% 
level although its estimated coefficient is negative.  
As Table 5.13 shows, the four years prior to failure model correctly classifies 68.2% of the 
firms in the estimation sample with the Type I and II errors being 31.8% using the optimal cut-
off point of 0.065 derived in Figure 5.7. The AUC in Figure 5.8 is 0.737: namely, for a 
randomly selected failed firm and a randomly selected active firm, there is 0.737 probability 
that the predicted probability of failure will be greater for the failed firm than for the active 
firm. The AUC ranges from 0.733 to 0.740 at a 95% confidence interval, suggesting that the 
model provides acceptable in-sample discrimination. The model provides a slightly better four-
year-ahead out-of-sample distress prediction: correct classification of 68.4% of the firms based 
on the optimal cut-off point of 0.065 in Table 5.14, and an AUC of 0.746, as large as 0.742 or 
small as 0.732 at a 95% confidence interval.  
Table 5.13 Four years prior to failure logistic regression model’s classification of firms in the 
estimation sample  
The estimation sample comprises 411,115 active firms and 26,305 failed firms. Using the optimal cut-
off point of 0.065, the model correctly predicts 280,585 active firms and 17,935 failed firms.  
 Predicted  
Observed Active Failed Total 
Active 280,585 130,530 411,115 
Failed 8,370 17,935 26,305 
Total 288,955 148,465 437,420 
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Figure 5.7 Plot of four years prior to failure logistic regression model’s sensitivity &specificity 
versus all possible cut-off points in the estimation sample 
 
Figure 5.8 Four years prior to failure logistic regression model’s ROC curve in the estimation 
sample 
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Table 5.14 Four years prior to failure logistic regression model’s classification of firms in the 
holdout sample  
The holdout sample comprises 176,691 active firms and 11,410 failed firms. Using the optimal cut-off 
point of 0.065, the model correctly predicts 120,851 active firms and 7,799 failed firms.  
 Predicted  
Observed Active Failed Total 
Active 120,851 55,840 176,691 
Failed 3,611 7,799 11,410 
Total 124,462 63,639 188,101 
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5.5 Five years prior to failure model using logistic regression 
Table 5.15 Estimation results for five years prior to failure model using logistic regression 
Variable ઺ SE z Pr(>|z|) Marginal effect 
Age (in years) -.011 .001 -17.044 .000 -.00056195 
Size (natural log of total assets) -.015 .005 -2.694 .007 -.00075518 
Cash/total assets -1.395 .056 -24.878 .000 -.07164000 
Creditors/total liabilities -.440 .030 -14.490 .000 -.02261500 
EBIT/total assets -.756 .053 -14.293 .000 -.03880400 
Fixed assets/total assets -1.546 .042 -36.767 .000 -.07939700 
Loans/total assets -.868 .047 -18.608 .000 -.04458400 
Total liabilities/total assets .145 .038 3.810 .000 .00742690 
Working capital/total assets -1.077 .038 -28.381 .000 -.05528100 
Agriculture, forestry & fishing      
Mining .279 .160 1.746 .081 .01608000 
Construction .682 .087 7.874 .000 .04289400 
Manufacturing .703 .086 8.162 .000 .04383000 
Transportation & communications  .554 .091 6.118 .000 .03527800 
Wholesale trade .319 .087 3.666 .000 .01800700 
Retail trade .465 .088 5.300 .000 .02807000 
Finance, insurance &real estate .562 .087 6.427 .000 .03505700 
Services .439 .087 5.057 .000 .02579200 
Public administration .070 .339 0.207 .836 .00371430 
Western Europe      
Northern Europe -1.169 .068 -17.234 .000 -.03841900 
Southern Europe -.098 .017 -5.705 .000 -.00506140 
South Eastern Europe .437 .086 5.102 .000 .02685900 
Eastern Europe .701 .048 14.751 .000 .04693100 
International reserves per head  -.803 .027 -30.029 .000 -.04124000 
Trade balance % of GDP .126 .003 50.236 .000 .00649000 
Unemployment rates -.054 .004 -13.507 .000 -.00279490 
Constant -.555 .142 -3.908 .000  
Null deviance: 160,709      
Residual deviance: 151,221      
Pseudo ܴଶ: .072      
 
Table 5.15 presents the empirical results of the five years prior to failure model estimated on a 
sample of 350,544 active firms and 20,869 failed firms. The value of the likelihood ratio test 
is G=160,709-151,221=9,488 and the p-value for the test is ܲሾ߯ଶሺ25ሻሿ ൌ 0.000. It can be 
concluded from the rejection of the null hypothesis that at least one and perhaps all the 
coefficients are significantly different from zero. At the 1% significance level, all the 
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independent variables except two dummy variables are statistically significant. The mining 
dummy variable is statistically significant at the 10% level whereas the public administration 
dummy variable is not statistically significant at the 10% level. The ratio of loans to total assets 
continues to be statistically significant at the 1% level with its negative coefficient.  
As Table 5.16 shows, the five years prior to failure model correctly classifies 65.1% of the 
firms in the estimation sample with the Type I and II errors being 34.9% using the optimal cut-
off point of 0.058 derived in Figure 5.9. The AUC in Figure 5.10 is 0.700: namely, there is 
0.700 probability that the model predicted probability of failure will be higher for a randomly 
selected failed firm than for a randomly selected active firm. The AUC is between 0.696 and 
0.704 at a 95% confidence interval, suggesting that the model provides acceptable in-sample 
discrimination. The model provides a similar five-year-ahead out-of-sample predictive 
accuracy rate: it correctly classifies 65.3% of the firms using the optimal cut-off point of 0.058 
in Table 5.17, and achieves an AUC of 0.701, as large as 0.707 or small as 0.695 at a 95% 
confidence interval.  
Table 5.16 Five years prior to failure logistic regression model’s classification of firms in the 
estimation sample  
The estimation sample comprises 350,544 active firms and 20,869 failed firms. Using the optimal cut-
off point of 0.058, the model correctly predicts 228,204 active firms and 13,576 failed firms.  
 Predicted  
Observed Active Failed Total 
Active 228,204 122,340 350,544 
Failed 7,293 13,576 20,869 
Total 235,497 135,916 371,413 
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Figure 5.9 Plot of five years prior to failure logistic regression model’s sensitivity &specificity 
versus all possible cut-off points in the estimation sample 
 
Figure 5.10 Five years prior to failure logistic regression model’s ROC curve in the estimation 
sample 
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Table 5.17 Five years prior to failure model’s classification of firms in the holdout sample  
The holdout sample comprises 149,562 active firms and 8,931 failed firms. Using the optimal cut-off 
point of 0.058, the model correctly predicts 97,687 active firms and 5,828 failed firms.  
 Predicted  
Observed Active Failed Total 
Active 97,687 51,875 149,562 
Failed 3,103 5,828 8,931 
Total 100,790 57,703 158,493 
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5.6 Principal findings 
In this chapter, the traditional statistical technique of logistic regression has been used to predict 
financial distress over one to five year time horizons. The models estimated are highly 
significant with reference to likelihood ratio tests in predicting the financial distress of private 
firms over one to five year time horizons. Consistent with prior studies, the study finds in Table 
5.18 that as the allowable time horizon for financial distress lengthens, the predictive power of 
the models declines: as the models are estimated using accounting and non-accounting 
information in more distant years, they deteriorate with reference to pseudo ܴଶand AUCs. 
While prior accounting based distress prediction models achieve fairly good prediction for 
private firms over a time horizon of one year, the models in this chapter, with the addition of 
the macroeconomic variables, manage to provide acceptable discrimination over a time horizon 
of five years.  
Table 5.18 Logit estimation results 
  Estimation sample Holdout sample 
Year prior to failure Pseudo ܴଶ AUC  AUC 
1 0.259 0.818 0.816 
2 0.184 0.787 0.790 
3 0.131 0.756 0.755 
4 0.099 0.737 0.746 
5 0.072 0.700 0.701 
 
During the period of 1 to 5 years prior to failure, both size and age are statistically significant 
at the 1% level with negative coefficients. The estimated coefficients of all the ratios except 
the ratios of loans to total assets and creditors to total liabilities are statistically significant at 
the 1% level and have the expected negative or positive signs. In the one year prior to failure 
model the estimated coefficient of the loans/total assets ratio is statistically significant at the 
1% level and has the expected positive sign. In the two years prior to failure model, the ratio 
of loans to total assets is not statistically significant at the 10% level. In the three to five years 
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prior to failure models, the estimated coefficients of the ratio of loans to total assets are 
statistically significant at the 1% level and have a negative sign. As for the ratio of creditors to 
total liabilities, its estimated coefficients are statistically significant with a positive sign in all 
the models except the five years prior to failure model in which the estimated coefficient has 
the negative sign. 22 
The last columns in Tables 5.1, 5.6, 5.9, 5.12 and 5.15 report the marginal effects of the 
independent variables, whose magnitude provides a reasonable insight into the predictive 
capacity of every independent variable.  In the one year prior to failure model, the ratio of cash 
to total assets is the most important explanatory variable, followed by the ratios of fixed assets 
to total assets, creditors to total liabilities, EBIT to total assets, working capital to total assets, 
total liabilities to total assets and loans to total assets. In the two years prior to failure model, 
the magnitude of the marginal effect of working capital to total assets becomes larger than that 
of EBIT to total assets while the ratio of loans to total assets is not statistically significant at 
the 10% level. In the three years prior to failure model, the ratios of cash to total assets and 
fixed assets to total assets continue to be the most important explanatory variables, followed 
by the ratios of working capital to total assets, creditors to total liabilities, EBIT to total assets, 
and total liabilities to total assets and loans to total assets. In the four years prior to failure 
model, the ratio of creditors to total liabilities is the least important explanatory variable. In the 
five years prior to failure model, the ratio of fixed assets to total assets has a larger marginal 
effect than the ratio of cash to total assets. Overall, the assets structural soundness ratios are 
the most important predictors, followed by the liquidity and profitability ratios and finally the 
leverage ratios. The debt structural soundness ratio of creditors to total liabilities is an important 
predictor in the short run but not in the long run.  
                                                            
22 The estimated coefficients of the ratios of loans to total assets and creditors to total liabilities suggest that these two ratios 
have both positive and negative effects on the probability of financial distress. Section 6.1 of Chapter 6 will discuss such 
complex nonlinear relationships between accounting ratios and the probability of financial distress.  
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In the one to five years prior to failure models, the three macroeconomic variables are 
statistically significant at the 1% level and have the expected negative or positive signs, 
suggesting that the macroeconomic variables do have the incremental information over the 
firm-specific variables. In terms of the magnitude of the marginal effects, the variable of 
international reserves per head (in USD thousand) is the most important explanatory variable, 
followed by unemployment rates and trade balance (% of GDP) in the one to two years prior 
to failure models. In the three to five years prior to failure models, the variable of international 
reserves per head (in USD thousand) is the most important predictor, followed by trade balance 
(% of GDP) and unemployment rates. If the macroeconomic variables are compared with the 
firm-specific variables, the variable of international reserves per head is the most important 
predictor over short time (one to three years) horizons although the magnitude of its marginal 
effect loses grounds to accounting ratios over long time horizons.  
The marginal effects of the dummy variables show how more or less likely firms in an industry 
or region is to fail than firms in the reference industry or region.  In the one year prior to failure 
model, firms in public administration is 5.86% more likely to fail than firms in agriculture, 
forestry and fishing, followed by firms in manufacturing, finance, insurance and real estate, 
transportation, communications and public utilities, retail trade, construction, services, 
wholesale trade and mining (the mining dummy variable is not statistically significant at the 
10% level). In the two years prior to failure model, compared with firms in agriculture, forestry 
and fishing, firms in construction are more likely to fail than those in retail trade. In the three 
years prior to failure model, firms in public administration are more likely to fail than firms in 
agriculture, forestry and fishing, followed by firms in finance, insurance and real estate, 
manufacturing, construction, transportation, communications and public utilities, retail trade, 
services, wholesale trade and mining (the dummy variable for mining is not statistically 
significant at the 5% level). In the four years prior to failure model, the dummy variable for 
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public administration is not statistically significant, and firms in manufacturing are more likely 
to fail than firms in finance, insurance and real estate, construction, transportation, 
communications and public utilities, retail trade, mining and services. In the five years prior to 
failure model, firms in manufacturing are more likely to fail than firms in agriculture, forestry 
and fishing, followed by firms in construction, transportation, communications and public 
utilities, finance, insurance and real estate, retail trade, services, ,wholesale trade, mining and 
public administration (the dummy variables for mining and public administration are not 
statistically significant at the 1% level).   
The marginal effects of the dummy variables for industry vary over time and so do the marginal 
effects for region. In the one to three years prior to failure models, firms in Southern Europe 
and Eastern Europe are more likely to fail than firms in Western Europe whereas firms in 
Northern Europe and South Eastern Europe are less likely to fail.  In the four years prior to 
failure model, firms in Eastern Europe are more likely to fail than firms in Western Europe 
whereas firms in other regions are less likely to fail. In the five years prior to failure model, 
firms in South Eastern Europe and Eastern Europe are more likely to fail whereas firms in 
Northern Europe and Southern Europe are less likely to fail than those in Western Europe. 
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Chapter 6 Empirical results for single-period models using neural networks 
The logistic analysis in Chapter 5 suggests that financial distress is dependent upon a variety 
of risk factors. The dependence, however, might be based on more complex nonlinear 
relationships that are difficult to detect and model. In addition, there might be interactions 
among the explanatory variables that are also difficult to detect and model. Section 6.1 checks 
whether there are more complex nonlinear relationships between the outcome and explanatory 
variables and interactions among the explanatory variables in the private dataset used in this 
study. To explicitly detect and model more complex relationships between the outcome and 
explanatory variables and among the explanatory variables, Section 6.2 develops neural 
network models to predict financial distress over one to five year time horizons. Section 6.3 
summarises the principal findings. 
6.1 More complex relationships in the private dataset 
Chapter 4 provides a breakdown of failure rates by industry and region, suggesting the 
importance of the industry and region effects to failure. While the logistic analysis in Chapter 
5 confirms the dependence of financial distress on the risk factors of industry and region, the 
descriptive statistics in Chapter 4 indicate that the risk factors of industry and region may 
interact with the firm-specific continuous variables. Take industry and total liabilities/total 
assets as a mere example. The ratio of total liabilities to total assets is not simply associated 
with the outcome variable in the logistic analysis in Chapter 5; the ratio of total liabilities to 
total assets seems to be also associated with the risk factor of industry for there is a significant 
difference in the mean total liabilities/total assets across the ten industries in Panel H of Table 
4.7. To illustrate interactions among the explanatory variables, I will determine whether there 
is evidence of the categorical variable of industry interacting with the firm-specific variables. 
I add each of the 9 interactions one at a time to the one year prior to failure model using logistic 
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regression in Table 5.1. The likelihood ratio tests of adding each of the interactions one at a 
time are presented in Table 6.1. Table 6.1 indicates that all the interaction terms are significant 
at the 1% level.  Next these significant interaction terms are added to the model in Table 5.1 
(not shown). The Wald statistics for the coefficients of some significant interaction terms are 
not significant probably due to high correlation among the firm-specific variables themselves. 
It is cumbersome for researchers to test each possible two-way interaction, not to mention 
higher order interactions.   
Table 6.1 Deviance, likelihood ratio test Statistic (G), degrees of freedom (df), and p-value for 
interactions of interest when added to the model in Table 5.1 
Interaction Deviance G df p-value 
Main effects model 243,124    
Cash/total assets*industry 243,036 88.261   9 0.000 *** 
Creditors/total liabilities*industry 242,902 221.85 9 0.000 *** 
EBIT/total assets*industry 242,751 372.57 9 0.000 *** 
Fixed assets/total assets*industry 242,966 157.74 9 0.000 *** 
Loans/total assets*industry 242,875 248.93 9 0.000 *** 
Total liabilities/total assets*industry 242,667 456.52 9 0.000 *** 
Working capital/total assets*industry 242,806 317.87 9 0.000 *** 
Age*industry 242,994 129.74 9 0.000 *** 
Size*industry 242,839 284.64 9 0.000 *** 
*** significant at 1%, **significant at 5%, *significant at 10% 
In addition to interactions among the explanatory variables, there might be more complex 
nonlinear relationships between the outcome and explanatory variables. Take the ratio of total 
liabilities to total assets as an example. The logistic analysis in Chapter 5 assumes a simple 
nonlinear relationship between the ratio of total liabilities to total assets and the probability of 
financial distress: the simple nonlinear relation reveals a non-constant but always positive 
effect of one unit increase in the ratio on the probability of financial distress. Yet accounting 
theorists expect a more complex nonlinear relationship: the ratio of total liabilities to total 
assets has both positive and negative effects on the probability of financial distress depending 
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on where the unit increase in the ratio takes place. To finance its operations, a firm may choose 
to use equity or debt financing. Debt financing carries with it some advantages and 
disadvantages. When a firm’s debts are low, the excess of additional profit over interest 
expenses reduces its probability of failure. When a firm’s debts are high, a further rise in debt 
levels increases the probability of failure because a firm has the obligation to pay its creditors 
regardless of its financial status. To illustrate complex nonlinear relationships between the 
outcome and explanatory variables, I will empirically examine whether there is such a complex 
nonlinear relationship between the ratio of total liabilities to total assets and the probability of 
financial distress. Three methods recommended by Hosmer and Lemeshow (2000) are used to 
explore the scales of the total liabilities/total assets ratio: 1) a univariable smoothed scatterplot 
on the logit scale, 2) dummy variables based on the quartiles of the distribution of a continuous 
variable and 3) the method of fractional polynomials.  
The first method involves developing a univariable logistic regression model for the estimated 
coefficient of a continuous variable and then plotting the variable against the smoothed logit. 
The shape of the plot will shed some light on the relationship between the variable and the log-
odds. The second method involves fitting a multivariable logistic regression model in which 
the continuous variable under consideration is converted into a categorical variable whose 4 
levels are based on the quartiles of the distribution of the continuous variable. Following the 
fit of the multivariable model, one can plot the estimated coefficient zero versus the median of 
the first quartile as well as the estimated coefficients of the 3 dummy variables versus the 
medians of the remaining quartiles. Connecting the four plotted points will provide one with 
some idea about the relationship between the outcome variable and the continuous variable 
under consideration. The third method is to use Royston and Altman (1994)’s fractional 
polynomial analysis to check the linearity of a continuous variable in the log-odds. If any best 
non-linear transformation is significantly different from the linear model, the continuous 
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variable should not be regarded as linear in the log-odds. I will briefly describe the method of 
fractional polynomials based on the introduction by Hosmer and Lemeshow (2000, pp.100-
102). The fractional polynomial analysis can be used in a multiple variable logistic regression 
model. To make the fractional polynomial analysis more understandable, I will describe it using 
a model containing only one continuous variable. One way to generalise a logit function is: 
 
݃ሺݔ, ߚሻ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅෍ܨ௝
௃
௝ୀଵ
ሺݔሻߚ௝. 
 
6.1
where ߚ refers to a vector of model coefficients, and ܨ௝ሺݔሻ a particular type of power function. 
The first function is ܨଵሺݔሻ ൌ ݔ௣భ. Royston and Altman (1994) propose restricting the ݌ଵ to be 
among the set ߮ ൌ ሼെ2,െ1, െ0.5, 0, 0.5, 1, 2, 3ሽ, where ݌ଵ ൌ 0 denotes the log of the variable. 
The remaining functions can be specified as: 
 ܨ௝ሺݔሻ ൌ ቊ ݔ
௣ೕ, ݌௝ ് ݌௝ିଵ
ܨ௝ିଵሺݔሻ݈݊ሺݔሻ, ݌௝ ൌ ݌௝ିଵ 
6.2
for j ൌ 2,… , J and restricting powers to those in φ. A satisfactory transformation in most 
settings requires J ൌ 1 or 2 although J can be any number. When J is equal to 1, one needs to 
fit 8 models, that is, pଵ ∈ φ with the best model being the one with the largest log likelihood 
Lሺpଵሻ. When J is equal to 2, one will fit as many as 36 models, that is,ሺpଵ, pଶሻ ∈ φ ൈ φ with 
the best model being the one with the largest log likelihood Lሺpଵ, pଶሻ . Since Lሺpଵሻ  and 
Lሺpଵ, pଶሻ denote the log likelihood for the best J ൌ 1 model and for the best J ൌ 2 model 
respectively, let Lሺ1ሻ denote the log likelihood of the linear model. To decide which model is 
best, the best J ൌ 1 model, the best J ൌ 2 model or the linear model, one can undertake partial 
likelihood ratio tests since each term in the fractional polynomial model contributes 
approximately 2 degrees of freedom to the model with one being for the power and the other 
being for the coefficient.  
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I use firm-year observations in year “t-1” to explore the scale of the ratio of total liabilities to 
total assets. The univariable lowess smoothed plot in Figure 6.1 is initially flat before it shows 
a very steep increase followed by a less steep increase. The plot indicates that when the ratio 
of total liabilities to total assets is less than 0.5, a firm’s debts either reduce or have little impact 
on the probability of failure. A firm’s debts do not increase the probability of failure until the 
ratio of total liabilities to total assets exceeds 0.5. Overall, the results in Table 6.2 and Figure 
6.2 agree with the pattern in Figure 6.1: the coefficients in Table 6.2 show a very trivial increase 
followed by a progressive increase. Table 6.3 presents the results of the fractional polynomial 
analysis for the total liabilities/total assets ratio. Here the best J=1 model happens to be the 
linear model. The significance level of the best J=2 model versus the linear model is 
ܲݎሾ߯ଶሺ3ሻ ൒ 802.9ሿ ൌ 0.000 , suggesting that the best J=2 model makes a substantial 
improvement on the linear model. The two fractional polynomial transformations are: 
 ݐ݋ݐ݈ܽ	݈ܾ݈݅ܽ݅݅ݐ݅݁ݏ	݋ݒ݁ݎ ݐ݋ݐ݈ܽ ܽݏݏ݁ݐݏ 1 ൌ ൬ݐ݋ݐ݈ܽ ݈ܾ݈݅ܽ݅݅ݐ݅݁ݏݐ݋ݐ݈ܽ ܽݏݏ݁ݐݏ ൰
ଷ
 
6.3
 ݐ݋ݐ݈ܽ	݈ܾ݈݅ܽ݅݅ݐ݅݁ݏ	݋ݒ݁ݎ	ݐ݋ݐ݈ܽ	ܽݏݏ݁ݐݏ2 ൌ ൬ݐ݋ݐ݈ܽ ݈ܾ݈݅ܽ݅݅ݐ݅݁ݏݐ݋ݐ݈ܽ ܽݏݏ݁ݐݏ ൰
ଷ
ൈ ݈݊ ൬ݐ݋ݐ݈ܽ ݈ܾ݈݅ܽ݅݅ݐ݅݁ݏݐ݋ݐ݈ܽ	ܽݏݏ݁ݐݏ ൰ 
6.4
 
To conclude, the three methods support treating the ratio of total liabilities to total assets as 
nonlinear in the log-odds, suggesting a complex nonlinear relationship between the ratio and 
the probability of financial distress.  
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Figure 6.1 Univariable lowess smoothed logit versus total liabilities/total assets 
 
 
Table 6.2 Results of the quartile analyses of total liabilities/total assets from the multivariable 
model  
Quartile 1 2 3 4 
Median .3279 .6588 .8596 .9883 
Coeff. 0 0.044 0.321 0.481 
95% CI  (0.003, 0.085) (0.282, 0.360) (0.438, 0.524) 
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Figure 6.2 Plot of estimated logistic regression coefficients vs quartile medians of total 
liabilities/total assets  
 
 
Table 6.3 Summary of the use of the method of fractional polynomials for total liabilities/total 
assets 
 df Deviance G for Model 
vs. linear 
Approx. 
p-value 
Powers 
Not in the model 0 248132.9    
Linear 1 248025.5 0 0.0∗ 1 
J=1 1 248025.5 0 ݊. ܽ.ା 1 
J=2 4 247222.6 802.90 0.0# 3, 3 
* Compares linear model to model without loans/total assets 
+ Compares the J=1 model to the linear model 
# Compares the J=2 model to the J=1 model 
0
0.1
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0.3
0.4
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I have provided evidence of interactions among the explanatory variables and complex 
nonlinear relationships between the outcome and explanatory variables in the private dataset 
used in this study. By doing so, I have also demonstrated the difficulty of the logistic analysis 
in Chapter 5 to explicitly detect and model interactions and complex nonlinear relationships in 
the dataset. Logistic regression cannot automatically detect and model interactions among 
explanatory variables and complex nonlinear relationships between outcome and explanatory 
variables; therefore, logistic regression either requires researchers’ specification of possible 
interaction terms and transformation of continuous variables, or ignore interactions among 
explanatory variables and complex nonlinear relationships between outcome and explanatory 
variables. Unlike logistic regression, neural networks are among the fully general and nonlinear 
models which can better capture nonlinearity and interactions in a dataset. To exploit the 
advantages offered by neural networks, Section 6.2 predicts financial distress for private firms 
over one to five year time horizons using neural networks.  
6.2 One to five years prior to failure models using neural networks 
The architecture of a neural network depends on a number of factors including the number of 
hidden layers, the number of neurons in every hidden layer, the activation functions in the 
output layer and the hidden layers, learning algorithms, learning modes, learning rates etc. In 
this section, I will train feed-forward multilayer perceptrons with traditional back-propagation. 
This study includes only one hidden layer in a neural network because one hidden layer is 
generally sufficient (Hornik, Stichcombe & White 1989). The activation function in the output 
layer is the sigmoid function and the activation function in the hidden layer is the hyperbolic 
tangent function. Since this study uses a very large dataset, it chooses online learning. The 
estimation algorithm stops when the error does not decrease after a consecutive step in the 
algorithm. As the nonconvex error function has many local minima, the “best” neural network 
architecture is chosen through trial and error. To compare the predictive accuracy of logistic 
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regression and neural networks, I will estimate and validate neural network models using the 
same explanatory variables on the same estimation and holdout samples used for the logistic 
analysis in Chapter 5. Take the one year prior to failure neural network for instance. It will be 
trained on the estimation sample of 604,165 firms and validated on the holdout sample of 
260,073 firms. It is on the same samples that the one year prior to failure model using logistic 
regression is estimated and validated in Chapter 5. A portion of an estimation sample is 
reassigned to a testing sample to prevent a neural network from overfitting the data. As a result, 
the dataset of every period “t-1”, “t-2”, “t-3”, “t-4” or “t-5” is partitioned to an estimation 
sample (approximately 56% of data records), a testing sample (approximately 14% data 
records) and a holdout sample (approximately 30% of data records). While an estimation 
sample is used to train a neural network, a testing sample serves as an independent set of data 
records to track errors during training to prevent overfitting. A holdout sample is another 
independent set of data records used to assess a final neural network. Since a holdout sample 
is not used to train a neural network, the error in a holdout sample can give an estimate of the 
generalisability of a neural network.  
6.2.1 One year prior to failure model using neural networks  
 Table 6.4 Network information of one year prior to failure neural network model 
Name of layer Number of neurons* 
Input layer 27 neurons: the categorical variable of industry, the categorical 
variable of region, age, size, cash/total assets, creditors/total 
liabilities, EBIT/total assets, fixed assets/total assets, loans/total 
assets, total liabilities/total assets, working capital/total assets, 
international reserves per head (in USD thousand), trade balance 
(% of GDP), unemployment rates 
Hidden layer 6 neurons 
Output layer 2 neurons 
*excluding the bias unit  
 
As Table 6.4 indicates, the one year prior to failure neural network consists of three layers: 27 
neurons in the input layer, 6 hidden neurons in the hidden layer and 2 neurons in the output 
layer. While the hyperbolic function links the weighted sums of neurons in the input layer to 
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the hidden layer, the softmax function connects the weighted sums of hidden neurons to the 
output layer. I do not reproduce connection weights here because they are not interpretable as 
estimated coefficients in logistic analysis. Since the dependent variable is binary, the error 
function is cross-entropy which the network tries to minimise in the training process. A portion 
of the estimation sample is reassigned to a testing sample to prevent the overfitting of the 
network. The model is thus trained on the estimation sample including a testing sample before 
it is validated on the holdout sample. The cross entropy error is approximately 103,070 in the 
estimation sample and 26,055 in the testing sample.  
Table 6.5 Independent variable importance in one year prior to failure neural network 
Variable Normalized Importance 
International reserves per head (in USD thousand) 100.00% 
Total liabilities/total assets 81.40% 
Trade balance (% of GDP) 65.10% 
Unemployment rates 62.60% 
Age 54.30% 
Loans/total assets 34.40% 
Working capital/total assets 31.80% 
EBIT/total assets 28.70% 
Size (natural log of USD total assets) 28.60% 
Industry 23.20% 
Region 22.00% 
Cash/total assets 20.60% 
Fixed assets/total assets 15.00% 
Creditors/total liabilities 13.40% 
 
Table 6.5 reports the importance of an independent variable, suggesting how much the network 
model predicted value changes contingent upon different values of the independent variable. 
Normalized importance is the importance value divided by the largest value before it is 
expressed as a percentage.  As Table 6.5 indicates, the three macroeconomic variables turn out 
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to be more important than the firm-specific variables with the exception of total liabilities/total 
assets.  
To assess the predictive capability of the neural network model, Table 6.6 cross classifies the 
outcome variable with a dichotomous variable whose values are derived from comparing each 
estimated pseudo probability of failure to the optimal cut-off point of 0.042: the dichotomous 
variable is 1 (failure) if a firm’s predicted pseudo probability is greater than 0.042 or else 0 
(active).  
Table 6.6 One year prior to failure neural network model’s classification of firms in the 
estimation sample  
The estimation sample comprises 561,304 active firms and 42,861 failed firms. Using the optimal cut-
off point of 0.042, the model correctly predicts 417,548 active firms and 31,868 failed firms.  
 Predicted  
Observed Active Failed Total 
Active 417,548 143,756 561,304 
Failed 10,993 31,868 42,861 
Total 428,541 175,624 604,165 
 
Table 6.6 shows the practical results of using the neural network. Out of the 604,165 firms to 
train the model, 74.4% of the active firms are correctly classified, and 74.4% of the firms which 
failed one year later are correctly predicted. 23  Overall, 74.4% of the firms are correctly 
classified with the Type I and II errors being 25.6%. As the single cut-off point of 0.042 gives 
a very limited view of the predictive capacity of the network, the ROC curve in Figure 6.3 
provides a visual display of the sensitivity and specificity for all possible cut-off points in a 
single plot. The AUC is 0.818, representing the 0.818 probability that the predicted pseudo 
probability of failure is higher for a randomly selected failed firm than for a randomly chosen 
                                                            
23 When training the one year prior to failure model using neural networks, I reassigned a portion of the estimation sample to 
a testing sample to avoid overfitting of the neural network. To show the practical results of using the trained neural network, 
I reassigned the testing sample to the estimation sample. After all, I used both the estimation sample and the testing sample 
in the training of the neural network.  
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active firm. At a 95% confidence interval, the AUC is between 0.816 and 0.820, suggesting 
that the neural network provides excellent in-sample discrimination. The neural network 
achieves a similar one-year-ahead out-of-sample distress prediction: correct classification of 
74.2% of the firms in Table 6.7 using the single cut-off point of 0.042, and an AUC of 0.818, 
as large as 0.821 or small as 0.814 at a 95% confidence interval.24 
Figure 6.3 One year prior to failure neural network model’s ROC curve in the estimation sample 
 
Table 6.7 One year prior to failure neural network model’s classification of firms in the holdout 
sample  
The holdout sample comprises 241,475 active firms and 18,598 failed firms. Using the optimal cut-off 
point of 0.042, the model correctly predicts 179,294 active firms and 13,792 failed firms.  
 Predicted  
Observed Active Failed Total 
Active 179,294 62,181 241,475 
Failed 4,806 13,792 18,598 
Total 184,100 75,973 260,073 
                                                            
24 As the one to five years prior to failure neural networks achieve similar in-sample and out-of-sample predictive accuracy, I 
will not reproduce ROCs for the holdout samples. 
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6.2.2 Two years prior to failure model using neural networks 
The two years prior to failure neural network has the same architecture as the one year prior to 
failure neural network except that the former has only four hidden neurons in the hidden layer. 
The cross entropy error is approximately 85,206 in the estimation sample and 20,843 in the 
testing sample.  
Table 6.8 Independent variable importance in two years prior to failure neural network 
Variable  Normalized Importance 
Trade balance (% of GDP) 100.0% 
International reserves per head (in USD thousand) 68.2% 
Unemployment rates  56.6% 
Total liabilities/total assets 31.1% 
Size (natural log of USD total assets) 29.6% 
Region 27.8% 
Age 25.8% 
EBIT/total assets 19.4% 
Working capital/total assets 17.1% 
Industry 15.1% 
Fixed assets/total assets 12.2% 
Creditors/total liabilities 9.0% 
Loans/total assets 7.1% 
Cash/total assets 4.5% 
 
Table 6.8 presents the importance of the explanatory variables in a descending order. It appears 
that the three macroeconomic variables have the greatest effect on how the network classifies 
active and failed firms, followed by the firm-specific variables. Using the optimal cut-off point 
of 0.042, the two years prior to failure model correctly classifies 73.0% of the firms in the 
estimation sample in Table 6.9 with the Type I and II errors being 27.0%. The AUC in Figure 
6.4 is 0.794: that is to say, for a randomly selected failed firm and a randomly selected active 
firm, there is 0.794 probability that the model predicted pseudo probability of failure will be 
greater for the failed firm than for the active firm. At a 95% confidence interval, the AUC is 
between 0.791 and 0.796, suggesting that the model provides acceptable in-sample 
discrimination. The model achieves a similar two-year-ahead out-of-sample distress prediction: 
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correct classification of 73.3% of the firms in Table 6.10 based on the single cut-off point of 
0.042, and an AUC of 0.798, as large as 0.802 or small as 0.795 at a 95% confidence interval.  
Table 6.9 Two years prior to failure neural network model’s classification of firms in the 
estimation sample  
The estimation sample comprises 506,280 active firms and 37,686 failed firms. Using the optimal cut-
off point of 0.042, the model correctly predicts 369,327 active firms and 27,482 failed firms.  
 Predicted  
Observed Active Failed Total 
Active 369,327 136,953 506,280 
Failed 10,204 27,482 37,686 
Total 379,531 164,435 543,966 
 
Figure 6.4 Two years prior to failure neural network model’s ROC curve in the estimation 
sample 
 
 
 
176 
 
Table 6.10 Two years prior to failure neural network model’s classification of firms in the 
holdout sample  
The holdout sample comprises 318,107 active firms and 23,460 failed firms. Using the optimal cut-off 
point of 0.042, the model correctly predicts 233,336 active firms and 17,207 failed firms.  
 Predicted  
Observed Active Failed Total 
Active 233,336 84,771 318,107 
Failed 6,253 17,207 23,460 
Total 239,589 101,978 341,567 
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6.2.3 Three years prior to failure model using neural networks  
The three years prior to failure neural network has the same architecture as the previous two 
neural networks except that it has 9 neurons in the hidden layer. The cross entropy error is 
approximately 79,554 in the estimation sample and 19,738 in the testing sample. 
Table 6.11 Independent variable importance in three years prior to failure neural network 
Variable  Normalized Importance 
Trade balance (% of GDP) 100.00% 
International reserves per head (in USD thousand) 90.90% 
Size (natural log of USD total assets) 79.50% 
Age 47.90% 
EBIT/total assets 46.70% 
Unemployment rates  34.30% 
Region 32.40% 
Total liabilities/total assets 24.70% 
Fixed assets/total assets 23.00% 
Working capital/total assets 22.20% 
Industry 19.40% 
Loans/total assets 14.90% 
Creditors/total liabilities 13.00% 
Cash/total assets 11.10% 
 
Table 6.11 compares the importance of the explanatory variables in the three years prior to 
failure neural network. It appears that trade balance (% of GDP) has the greatest effect on how 
the network classifies firms, followed by international reserves per head (in USD thousand), 
size, age and other explanatory variables. As Table 6.12 indicates, the neural network in the 
three years prior to failure model correctly classifies 71.4% of the firms in the estimation 
sample with the Type I and II errors being approximately 28.6% based on the optimal cut-off 
point of 0.086. The AUC in Figure 6.5 is 0.782, suggesting that there is 0.782 probability that 
the model predicted pseudo probability of failure will be greater for a randomly selected failed 
firm than for a randomly selected active firm. The model provides acceptable in-sample 
discrimination for the AUC is between 0.779 and 0.785 at a 95% confidence interval. The 
neural network achieves a similar three-year-ahead out-of-sample distress prediction: correct 
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classification of 71.3% of the firms using the single cut-off point of 0.086 in Table 6.13, and 
an AUC of 0.779, as large as 0.784 or small as 0.774 at a 95% confidence interval.  
Table 6.12 Three years prior to failure neural network model’s classification of firms in the 
estimation sample  
The estimation sample comprises 460,620 active firms and 32,281 failed firms. Using the optimal cut-
off point of 0.086, the model correctly predicts 329,118 active firms and 23,033 failed firms.  
 Predicted  
Observed Active Failed Total 
Active 329,118 131,502 460,620 
Failed 9,248 23,033 32,281 
Total 338,366 154,535 492,901 
 
Figure 6.5 Three years prior to failure neural network model’s ROC curve in the estimation 
sample 
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Table 6.13 Three years prior to failure neural network model’s classification of firms in the 
holdout sample  
The holdout sample comprises 196,935 active firms and 13,774 failed firms. Using the optimal cut-off 
point of 0.086, the model correctly predicts 140,510 active firms and 9,821 failed firms.  
 Predicted  
Observed Active Failed Total 
Active 140,510 56,425 196,935 
Failed 3,953 9,821 13,774 
Total 144,463 66,246 210,709 
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6.2.4 Four years prior to failure model using neural networks 
The neural network in the four years prior to failure model consists of 27 neurons in the input 
layer, 7 neurons in the hidden layer and 2 neurons in the output layer. The cross entropy error 
is approximately 68,772 in the estimation sample and 17,607 in the holdout sample. Table 6.14 
reports the importance of the explanatory variables. As Table 6.14 indicates, the variable of 
international reserves per head (USD thousand) is the most important variable, followed by 
trade balance (% of GDP), size and other explanatory variables.  
Table 6.14 Independent variable importance in four years prior to failure neural network 
Variable  Normalized Importance 
International reserves per head (in USD thousand) 100.00% 
Trade balance (% of GDP) 78.70% 
Size (natural log of USD total assets) 56.00% 
Age 50.20% 
Total liabilities/total assets 46.10% 
Unemployment rates  30.50% 
Region 24.60% 
Industry 21.00% 
Fixed assets/total assets 15.00% 
Working capital/total assets 13.60% 
Cash/total assets 13.10% 
EBIT/total assets 11.00% 
Loans/total assets 8.00% 
Creditors/total liabilities 7.40% 
 
Table 6.15 shows the practical results of using the neural network. Out of 437,420 firms in the 
estimation sample, 69.2% of the firms are correctly classified with the Type I and II errors 
being 30.8%. As the single cut-off point of 0.072 gives a very limited view of the predictive 
capacity of the network, the ROC curve in Figure 6.6 provides a visual display of the sensitivity 
and specificity for all possible cut-off points. The AUC is 0.765: that is to say, there is 0.765 
probability that the predicted pseudo probability of failure is higher for a randomly selected 
failed firm than for a randomly chosen active firm. The neural network provides acceptable in-
sample discrimination for the AUC is between 0.762 and 0.768 at a 95% confidence interval. 
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In Table 6.16, the neural network achieves a similar four-year-ahead out-of-sample distress 
prediction: correct classification of 69.1% of the firms in Table 6.16 using the single cut-off 
point of 0.072, and an AUC of 0.764, as large as 0.769 or small as 0.759 at a 95% confidence 
interval.  
Table 6.15 Four years prior to failure neural network model’s classification of firms in the 
estimation sample  
The estimation sample comprises 411,115 active firms and 26,305 failed firms. Using the optimal cut-
off point of 0.072, the model correctly predicts 284,708 active firms and 18,210 failed firms.  
 Predicted  
Observed Active Failed Total 
Active 284,708 126,407 411,115 
Failed 8,095 18,210 26,305 
Total 292,803 144,617 437,420 
 
Figure 6.6 Four years prior to failure neural network model’s ROC curve in the estimation 
sample 
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Table 6.16 Four years prior to failure neural network model’s classification of firms in the 
holdout sample  
The holdout sample comprises 176,691 active firms and 11,410 failed firms. Using the optimal cut-off 
point of 0.072, the model correctly predicts 122,180 active firms and 7,890 failed firms.  
 Predicted  
Observed Active Failed Total 
Active 122,180 54,511 176,691 
Failed 3,520 7,890 11,410 
Total 125,700 62,401 188,101 
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6.2.5 Five years prior to failure model using neural networks 
The neural network in the five years prior to failure model consists of a 27-neuron input layer, 
a 5-neuron hidden layer and a 2-neuron output layer. The cross entropy error is approximately 
63,511 in the estimation sample and 15,999 in the testing sample. Table 6.17 compares the 
importance of the explanatory variables in the five years prior to failure neural network. It 
appears that the variable of international reserves per head (in USD thousand) has the greatest 
effect on how the network classifies firms, followed by trade balance (% of GDP), total 
liabilities/total assets and other explanatory variables.  
Table 6.17 Independent variable importance in five years prior to failure neural network 
Variable  Normalized Importance 
International reserves per head (in USD thousand) 100.00% 
Trade balance (% of GDP) 63.50% 
Total liabilities/total assets 42.30% 
Size (natural log of USD total assets) 41.80% 
EBIT/total assets 37.60% 
Unemployment rates  26.20% 
Region 22.00% 
Creditors/total liabilities 16.20% 
Age 14.30% 
Industry 12.60% 
Fixed assets/total assets 11.50% 
Cash/total assets 11.00% 
Loans/total assets 9.10% 
Working capital/total assets 5.60% 
 
The classification table in Table 6.18 shows that, using the cut-off point of 0.041, the network 
in the five years prior to failure model correctly classifies 67.8% of the firms in the estimation 
sample with the Type I and II errors being 32.2%. The AUC in Figure 6.7 is 0.725, suggesting 
that for a randomly selected failed firm and a randomly selected active firm, there is 0.725 
probability that the model predicted pseudo probability is greater for the failed firm than for 
the active firm. The neural network provides acceptable in-sample discrimination for the AUC 
is between 0.721 and 0.728 at a 95% confidence interval. The neural network achieves a 
184 
 
slightly better five-year-ahead out-of-sample distress prediction: correct classification of 
68.2% of the firms in Table 6.19 based on the single cut-off point of 0.041, and an AUC of 
0.729, as large as 0.735 or small as 0.723 at a 95% confidence interval.  
Table 6.18 Five years prior to failure neural network model’s classification of firms in the 
estimation sample  
The estimation sample comprises 350,544 active firms and 20,869 failed firms. Using the optimal cut-
off point of 0.041, the model correctly predicts 237,835 active firms and 14,154 failed firms.  
 Predicted  
Observed Active Failed Total 
Active 237,835 112,709 350,544 
Failed 6,715 14,154 20,869 
Total 244,550 126,863 371,413 
 
Figure 6.7 Five years prior to failure neural network model’s ROC curve in the estimation 
sample 
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Table 6.19 Five years prior to failure neural network model’s classification of firms in the 
holdout sample  
The holdout sample comprises 149,562 active firms and 8,931failed firms. Using the optimal cut-off 
point of 0.041, the model correctly predicts 102,055 active firms and 6,086 failed firms.  
 Predicted  
Observed Active Failed Total 
Active 102,055 47,507 149,562 
Failed 2,845 6,086 8,931 
Total 104,900 53,593 158,493 
 
6.3 Principal findings 
In this chapter, I have estimated up to five years prior to failure models using neural networks. 
Table 6.20 indicates that the neural network models deteriorate with reference to their in-
sample and out-of-sample distress prediction as I use accounting and non-accounting 
information in more distant years. Similar to the logistic analysis in Chapter 5, the addition of 
the macroeconomic variables has enabled me to predict financial distress for private firms as 
early as five years prior to failure with acceptable discrimination.  
Table 6.20 Neural networks estimation results 
 Estimation sample Holdout sample 
Year prior to failure AUC AUC 
1 0.818 0.818 
2 0.794 0.798 
3 0.782 0.779 
4 0.765 0.764 
5 0.725 0.729 
 
In the one year prior to failure model, the explanatory variable of international reserves per 
head is the most important predictor, followed by total liabilities/total assets, trade balance (% 
of GDP), unemployment rates, age, loans/total assets, working capital/total assets, EBIT/total 
assets, size, industry, region, cash/total assets, fixed assets/total assets and creditors/total 
liabilities. In the two years prior to failure model, trade balance (% of GDP) is the most 
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important predictor, followed by international reserves per head, unemployment rates, total 
liabilities/total assets, size, region, age, EBIT/total assets, working capital/total assets, industry, 
fixed assets/total assets, creditors/total liabilities, loans/total assets and cash/total assets. In the 
three years prior to failure model, trade balance (% of GDP) is the important explanatory 
variable, followed by international reserves per head, size, age, EBIT/total assets, 
unemployment rates, region, total liabilities/total assets, fixed assets/total assets, working 
capital/total assets, industry, loans/total assets, creditors/total liabilities, and cash/total assets. 
In the four years prior to failure model, the variable of international reserves per head is the 
most important predictor again, followed by trade balance (% of GDP), size, age, total 
liabilities/total assets, unemployment rates, region, industry, fixed assets/total assets, working 
capital/total assets, cash/total assets, EBIT/total assets, loans/total assets and creditors/total 
liabilities. In the five years prior to failure model, the variable of international reserves per head 
continues to be the most important predictor, followed by trade balance (% of GDP), total 
liabilities/total assets, size, EBIT/total assets, unemployment rates, region, creditors/total 
liabilities, age, industry, fixed assets/total assets, cash/total assets, loans/total assets and 
working capital/total assets. Overall, the three macroeconomic variables turn out to be the most 
important predictors and ratios related to structural soundness are not as important as they are 
in the logistic analysis in Chapter 5.  
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Chapter 7 Comparing logistic regression with neural networks 
Logistic regression and neural networks have been utilised to predict the financial distress of 
privately held firms in Chapters 5 and 6 respectively. To address the question of whether 
logistic regression remains a predictive alternative to neural networks, this chapter compares 
logistic regression and neural networks. Section 7.1 compares the predictive accuracy of 
logistic regression and neural networks in the models estimated in Chapters 5 and 6. To find 
out whether the finding in Section 7.1 holds against a change in sampling and independent 
variables, I will conduct two additional tests in Section 7.2. Section 7.3 discusses the 
advantages and disadvantages of both the approaches, thereby providing criteria for model 
selection.  
7.1 Predictive accuracy of logistic regression versus neural networks 
Since neural networks are more capable of modelling complex nonlinear relationships between 
outcome and independent variables and interactions among independent variables via hidden 
neurons, will neural networks outperform logistic regression in terms of predictive accuracy? 
To address the question of whether logistic regression remains a predictive alternative to neural 
networks, Table 7.1 compares the forecasting accuracy of the logistic regression models in 
Chapter 5 versus the neural network models in Chapter 6. Overall, logistic regression compares 
well with neural networks in terms of the in-sample and out-of-sample distress prediction, and 
so remains a predictive alternative to neural networks. Logistic regression and neural networks 
achieve very similar predictive accuracy over short time horizons. Over a one-year time 
horizon, logistic regression achieves an in-sample AUC of 0.818 and an out-of-sample AUC 
of 0.816. Neural networks achieve almost the same one-year-ahead prediction: an AUC of 
0.818 for both the estimation and holdout samples. Over a two-year time horizon, the 
techniques of logistic regression and neural networks achieve similar predictive accuracy 
again. The two-year-ahead in-sample distress prediction is an AUC of 0.787 for logistic 
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regression and an AUC of 0.794 for neural networks. The two-year-ahead out-of-sample 
distress prediction is an AUC of 0.790 for logistic regression. Neural networks achieve a 
slightly better two-year-ahead out-of-sample distress prediction: namely, an AUC of 0.798. 
Over long time horizons, logistic regression compares with neural networks because neural 
networks outperform logistic regression but not substantially. Over a three-year time horizon, 
the in-sample AUC and the out-of-sample AUC neural networks achieve are 3.44% and 3.18% 
respectively larger than the in-sample AUC and the out-of-sample AUC logistic regression 
achieves. Over a four-year time horizon, the in-sample AUC for neural networks is 2.41% 
larger than that for logistic regression, and the out-of-sample AUC for neural networks is 
2.14% larger than that for logistic regression. Over a five-year time horizon, neural networks 
achieve an in-sample AUC of 0.725, 3.57% larger than the in-sample AUC logistic regression 
achieves. For the holdout sample, the AUC neural networks achieve is 3.99% larger than the 
AUC logistic regression achieves.  
Table 7.1 Predictive accuracy of logistic regression versus neural networks over 1 to 5 year time 
horizons 
 Logistic regression Neural networks 
 Estimation sample Holdout sample Estimation sample Holdout sample 
Years prior 
to failure 
AUC AUC AUC AUC 
1 0.818 0.816 0.818 0.818 
2 0.787 0.790 0.794 0.798 
3 0.756 0.755 0.782 0.779 
4 0.737 0.746 0.765 0.764 
5 0.700 0.701 0.725 0.729 
 
Consistent with prior studies, the in-sample and out-of-sample predictive capacity of both the 
logistic regression models and the neural network models decays as the allowable time horizon 
for financial distress lengthens. The predictive accuracy declines more quickly for the logistic 
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regression models than for the neural network models, suggesting that neural networks are 
more robust and resilient against the choice of accounting data than logistic regression.    
7.2 Additional performance tests  
While Table 7.1 suggests that logistic regression compares well with neural networks in terms 
of the predictive accuracy over one to five year time horizons, the results may not be conclusive 
primarily because the variable selection in Chapters 5 and 6 is biased towards the success of 
logistic analysis. This study selects the explanatory variables based on the recommendations 
of prior empirical studies and their significant associations with the outcome variable. Most 
prior empirical studies on the financial distress of private firms have utilised traditional 
statistical techniques, among which logistic regression is the most popular classifier. All the 
selected explanatory variables are significantly associated with the outcome variable in the 
logistic analysis in Chapter 5. Variables excluded from the models are either insignificantly 
associated with the outcome variable or highly correlated with the selected variables in the 
logistic analysis in Chapter 5. It may be the biased selection of explanatory variables that 
reduces neural networks’ predictive accuracy compared with logistic regression.  
The results in Table 7.1 may not be conclusive secondarily because the models developed in 
Chapters 5 and 6 are single-period or static models. As Balcaen and Ooghe (2006) conclude, 
static failure prediction models have several problems and limitations. A static failure 
prediction model uses only one firm-year observation for each firm in an estimation sample 
assuming consecutive annual accounts are independent. There are several problems related to 
the use of only one firm-year observation for every firm. To begin with, when a firm has a 
number of consecutive firm-year observations, the choice of only one firm-year observation 
may induce a selection bias in the estimation of a model (Mensah 1984; Shumway 2001). 
Arguably, the selection bias may contribute to Type I and II errors: one may misclassify a 
financially healthy or distressed firm simply because the firm year arbitrarily selected has 
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temporary characteristics of a failed or active firm. Secondly, static failure prediction models 
neglect time-series behaviour although many researchers deem it necessary to use a number of 
observations for a firm and take account of a change in financial condition of a firm over time 
(e.g., Shumway 2001). Finally, the application of a static model to consecutive observations of 
a firm may lead to conflicting classification of a firm (e.g., Keasey, McGuinness & Short 1990). 
To investigate whether the finding in Table 7.1 holds against a change in explanatory variables 
and sampling, I will conduct additional tests in Sections 7.2.1 and 7.2.2. Section 7.2.1 expands 
the models estimated in Chapters 5 and 6 by the addition of new explanatory variables. Section 
7.2.2 estimates multiple-period models in which up to three observations ranging from “t-3” to 
“t-5” are selected for every firm.  
7.2.1 Expanded single-period models 
To investigate whether the finding that logistic regression compares well with neural networks 
holds against a change in explanatory variables, this section expands the logistic regression 
models in Chapter 5 and the neural network models in Chapter 6 by adding new explanatory 
variables to the selected explanatory variables. These newly added explanatory variables are 
28 financial ratios and 8 macroeconomic variables as shown in the input layer of the neural 
network in Table 7.2. 25 Most of these new variables are either insignificantly associated with 
the outcome variable or highly correlated with the selected explanatory variables in the logistic 
analysis in Chapter 5.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
25 Other ratios each have a very high percentage of missing values and so are not included in the expanded single-period 
models.  
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Table 7.2 Network information of one year prior to failure neural network model (expanded) 
Name of layer Number of neurons* 
Input layer 63 neurons: the categorical variable of region, the categorical variable of industry, 
age, size, return on total assets using profit and loss before tax, collection period (in 
days), credit period (in days), current ratio, solvency ratio, net assets turnover, current 
assets less stock/total assets, cash/total assets, creditors/total liabilities, debtor/total 
assets, EBIT/current liabilities, EBIT/total assets, EBIT/total liabilities, financial 
expense/operating revenue, fixed assets/total assets, loans/total assets, non-current 
liabilities/total assets, other shareholders’ funds/total assets, total liabilities/total 
assets, working capital/total assets, cash/current liabilities, current assets/total 
liabilities, current assets/shareholders’ funds, financial expense/current assets, long-
term debt/fixed assets, operating revenue/shareholders’ funds, operating revenue/total 
assets, operating revenue/total liabilities, shareholders’ funds/total liabilities, 
stock/working capital, total liabilities/current liabilities, working capital/current 
assets, working capital/current liabilities, working capital/operating revenue, 
stock/current assets, population (mil), GDP at constant $ rate (Jan 03) bil, GDP real 
growth rate %, GDP per head at constant $ rate (Jan 03), inflation rate (%), budget 
balance (% of GDP), public debt (% of GDP), unemployment rate, current account 
balance (% of GDP), trade balance (% of GDP), international reserves per head (USD 
thousand)  
Hidden layer 9 neurons 
Output layer 2 neurons 
*excluding the bias unit 
 
As Table 7.2 indicates, the expanded neural network in the one year prior to failure model 
consists of three layers: 63 neurons in the input layer, 9 neurons in the hidden layer and 2 
neurons in the output layer. The hyperbolic function links the weighted sums of neurons in the 
input layer to the hidden layer, and the softmax function connects the weighted sums of hidden 
neurons to the output layer. The neural network is trained on an estimation sample of 437,032 
“t-1” firm-year observations, a portion of which is reassigned to a testing sample to prevent the 
overfitting of the neural network. The cross entropy error is approximately 53,825 in the 
estimation sample, and 13,782 in the testing sample. The neural network is validated on an 
independent holdout sample of 188,389 “t-1” firm-year observations.26 The neural networks in 
the two to three years prior to failure models have the same architecture as the neural network 
in Table 7.2: a 63-neuron input layer, a 9-neuron hidden layer and a 2-neuron layer. The neural 
networks in the four to five years prior to failure models have the same architecture as the 
                                                            
26 The new explanatory variables have missing values and so the newly added variables reduce the estimation and holdout 
samples. 
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neural network in Table 7.2 except that the “t-4” neural network has 7 hidden neurons and the 
“t-5” neural network has 6 hidden neurons.  
Panel A of Table 7.3 summarises the predictive accuracy of neural networks over one to five 
year time horizons with the addition of the new explanatory variables. In terms of AUCs, neural 
networks achieve outstanding discrimination over short time (one to two years) horizons and 
excellent discrimination over long time (three to five years) horizons. To compare neural 
networks with logistic regression, I also estimate and validate logistic regression models using 
the same explanatory variables in the input layer in Table 7.2 on the same estimation and 
holdout samples. The inclusion of the new variables reduces every logistic regression model to 
a simple neural network whose output is not interpretable any more. Panel B of Table 7.3 
summarises the predictive accuracy of logistic regression over one to five year time horizons 
with the addition of the new explanatory variables. In terms of AUCs, logistic regression 
achieves excellent discrimination over one to four year time horizons and acceptable 
discrimination over a five-year time horizon. Panel C of Table 7.3 compares the in-sample and 
out-of-sample predictive accuracy of the logistic regression and neural network models over 
one to five year time horizons. Overall, neural networks outperform logistic regression 
substantially with the exception of the two-year time horizon. Over a one-year time horizon, 
the out-of-sample AUC achieved by neural networks is approximately 5% larger than that 
achieved by logistic regression. Over a two-year time horizon, neural networks continue to 
provide outstanding out-of-sample discrimination: an AUC of 0.908, approximately 2% larger 
than the AUC achieved by logistic regression. Over three to four year time horizons, the out-
of-sample AUCs for neural networks are approximately 5% larger than those for logistic 
regression. Over a five-year time horizon, neural networks achieve an AUC of 0.859 for the 
holdout sample, approximately 8% larger than the AUC logistic regression achieves.  
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Table 7.3 Predictive accuracy of logistic regression and neural networks over one to five year time horizons with the addition of new variables 
Panel A: Correctly classified firms and percentages (in parenthesis), AUC and its 95% confidence interval (in parenthesis) of neural networks  
 Estimation sample Holdout sample 
   
Years 
prior 
to 
failure 
Observed 
active 
firms 
Observed 
failed 
firms 
Cut-
off 
point 
Correctly 
classified 
active 
firms 
Correctly 
classified 
failed 
firms 
AUC  Observed 
active 
firms 
Observed 
failed 
firms 
Cut-
off 
point 
Correctly 
classified 
active 
firms 
Correctly 
classified 
failed 
firms 
AUC  
1 405,326 31,706 0.049 337,425  26,375 0.912 174,889 13,500 0.049 145,295 11,211 0.911 
    (83%) (83%) (0.910~0.914)    (83%) (83%) (0.908~0.913) 
2 368,942 27,714 0.051 306,138 22,988 0.910 157,816 11,879 0.050 130,436 9,817 0.908 
    (83%) (83%) (0.908~0.912)    (83%) (83%) (0.905~0.911) 
3 324,897 23,867 0.054 264,320 19,417 0.898 138,457 10,162 0.054 112,219 8,233 0.897 
    (81%) (81%) (0.896~0.900)    (81%) (81%) (0.894~0.900) 
4 301,488 19,711 0.055 240,503 15,720 0.885 129,907 8,471 0.055 103,467 6,748 0.883 
    (80%) (80%) (0.882~0.887)    (80%) (80%) (0.879~0.887) 
5 275,935 15,665 0.056 214,263 12,155 0.861 117,830 6,748 0.055 91,430 5,233 0.859 
    (78%) (78%) (0.858~0.864)    (78%) (78%) (0.854~0.864) 
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Table 7.3 (continued) 
Panel B: Correctly classified firms and percentages (in parenthesis), AUC and its 95% confidence interval (in parenthesis) of logistic regression 
 Estimation sample Holdout sample 
   
Years 
prior 
to 
failure 
Observed 
active 
firms 
Observed 
failed 
firms 
Cut-
off 
point 
Correctly 
classified 
active 
firms 
Correctly 
classified 
failed 
firms 
AUC  Observed 
active 
firms 
Observed 
failed 
firms 
Cut-
off 
point 
Correctly 
classified 
active 
firms 
Correctly 
classified 
failed 
firms 
AUC  
1 405,326 31,706 0.066 323,010 25,254 0.869 174,889 13,500 0.066 139,542 10,767 0.869 
    (80%) (80%) (0.866~0.871)    (80%) (80%) (0.865~0.873) 
2 368,942 27,714 0.066 298,289 22,385 0.888 157,816 11,879 0.065 127,752 9,615 0.890 
    (81%) (81%) (0.885~0.890)    (81%) (81%) (0.886~0.893) 
3 324,897 23,867 0.058 256,055 18,796 0.856 138,457 10,162 0.059 108,852 8,008 0.857 
    (79%) (79%) (0.853~0.859)    (79%) (79%) (0.853~0.862) 
4 301,488 19,711 0.059 233,502 15,253 0.842 129,907 8,471 0.060 100,871 6,577 0.841 
    (77%) (77%) (0.839~0.845)    (78%) (78%) (0.836~0.846) 
5 275,935 15,665 0.049 200,623 11,381 0.797 117,830 6,748 0.049 85,753 4,910 0.797 
    (73%) (73%) (0.794~0.801)    (73%) (73%) (0.791~0.803) 
 
Panel C: AUCs of logistic regression vs neural networks  
 Logistic regression Neural networks 
 Estimation sample Holdout sample Estimation sample Holdout sample 
Years prior to failure AUC AUC AUC AUC 
1 0.869 0.869 0.912 0.911 
2 0.888 0.890 0.910 0.908 
3 0.856 0.857 0.898 0.897 
4 0.842 0.841 0.885 0.883 
5 0.797 0.797 0.861 0.859 
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7.2.2 Multiple-period models 
To mitigate the problems associated with the single-period models estimated so far, I will 
estimate multiple-period models in which up to three firm-year observations ranging from “t-
3” to “t-5” are selected for every firm, and then validate these models in the “t-2” and “t-1” 
firm-year observations separately. I will describe these logistic regression and neural network 
models as current-level models. To extract additional information from the continuous 
variables, I decompose the end-of-year “p” level of every continuous variable into their end-
of-year “p-1” level and annual change “ ∆ݔ௣” (∆ݔ௣ ൌ ݔ௣ െ ݔ௣ିଵ). This decomposition reduces 
the sample size as the earliest firm-year observation for every firm has missing values for end-
of-year “p-1” level and annual change “∆ݔ௣” for every continuous variable. For the sake of 
simplicity, I will describe models using lagged levels and changes of the continuous variables 
as lagged level and change models. To find out whether the decomposition is effective, I will 
also compare the performance of each lagged level and change model to its aggregated current-
level model by estimating the two groups of models on a common reduced sample.  
Table 7.4 Network information of current-level model using neural networks 
Name of layer Number of neurons* 
Input layer 27 neurons: the categorical variable of industry, the categorical 
variable of region, age, size, cash/total assets, creditors/total 
liabilities, EBIT/total assets, fixed assets/total assets, loans/total 
assets, total liabilities/total assets, working capital/total assets, 
international reserves per head (in USD thousand), trade balance 
(% of GDP), unemployment rates, 
Hidden layer 8 neurons 
Output layer 2 neurons 
*excluding the bias unit  
 
 
As Table 7.4 indicates, the neural network used in the multiple-period current-level model 
consists of 27 neurons in the input layer, 8 neurons in the hidden layer and 2 neurons in the 
output layer. The activation functions used are the hyperbolic tangent function in the hidden 
layer and the softmax function in the output layer. The neural network is trained on an 
estimation sample including a testing sample before it is validated on two independent holdout 
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samples. The cross entropy error is approximately 228,783 in the estimation sample and 57,721 
in the testing sample.  
Table 7.5 Predictive accuracy of current-level neural network model 
Panel A: Correctly classified firms and percentages (in parenthesis), AUC and its 95% confidence 
interval (in parenthesis) in the estimation sample 
Observed 
active firms 
Observed 
failed firms 
Cut-off point Correctly 
classified 
active firms 
Correctly 
classified 
failed firms 
AUC 
1,420,435 78,741 0.057 952,487 52,795 0.732 
   (67.1%) (67.1%) (0.730~0.734) 
      
Panel B: Correctly classified firms and percentages (in parenthesis), AUC and its 95% confidence 
interval (in parenthesis) in the “t-2” holdout sample 
Observed 
active firms 
Observed 
failed firms 
Cut-off point Correctly 
classified 
active firms 
Correctly 
classified 
failed firms 
AUC 
611,324 39,983 0.031 432,515 28,274 0.778 
   (70.7%) (70.7%) (0.776~0.780) 
 
Panel C: Correctly classified firms and percentages (in parenthesis), AUC and its 95% confidence 
interval (in parenthesis) in the “t-1” holdout sample 
Observed 
active firms 
Observed 
failed firms 
Cut-off point Correctly 
classified 
active firms 
Correctly 
classified 
failed firms 
AUC 
674,640 46,197 0.025 454,365 31,110 0.715 
   (67.3%) (67.3%) (0.712~0.717) 
 
Table 7.5 shows the practical results of using the trained neural network. As Panel A indicates, 
the neural network correctly classifies 67.1% of the firms in the estimation sample using the 
single cut-off point of 0.057. The neural network achieves an AUC of 0.732, as large as 0.734 
or small as 0.730 at a 95% confidence interval. To check its generalisability, I test the neural 
network on two independent holdout samples. The neural network achieves a higher two-year-
ahead out-of-sample predictive accuracy rate in Panel B: it correctly classifies 70.7% of the 
firms with the Type I and II errors being 29.3% based on the optimal cut-off point of 0.031; 
the AUC the neural network achieves is 0.778, as large as 0.780 or small as 0.776 at a 95% 
confidence interval. The neural network, however, achieves a lower one-year-ahead out-of-
sample prediction accuracy rate: in Panel C, it correctly classifies 67.3% of the firms with the 
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Type I and II errors being 32.7% based on the optimal cut-off point of 0.025; it achieves an 
AUC of 0.715, as large as 0.717 or small as 0.712 at a 95% confidence interval.  
Table 7.6 Predictive accuracy of current-level logistic regression model 
Panel A: Correctly classified firms and percentages (in parenthesis), AUC and its 95% confidence 
interval (in parenthesis) in the estimation sample 
Observed 
active firms 
Observed 
failed firms 
Cut-off point Correctly 
classified 
active firms 
Correctly 
classified 
failed firms 
AUC 
1,420,435 78,741 0.056 946,717 52,405 0.718 
   (66.6%) (66.6%) (0.716~0.720) 
      
Panel B: Correctly classified firms and percentages (in parenthesis), AUC and its 95% confidence 
interval (in parenthesis) in the “t-2” holdout sample 
Observed 
active firms 
Observed 
failed firms 
Cut-off point Correctly 
classified 
active firms 
Correctly 
classified 
failed firms 
AUC 
611,324 39,983 0.046 429,038 28,049 0.759 
   (70.2%) (70.2%) (0.757~0.762) 
      
Panel C: Correctly classified firms and percentages (in parenthesis), AUC and its 95% confidence 
interval (in parenthesis) in the “t-1” holdout sample 
Observed 
active firms 
Observed 
failed firms 
Cut-off point Correctly 
classified 
active firms 
Correctly 
classified 
failed firms 
AUC 
674,640 46,197 0.039 480,681 32,913 0.775 
   (71.3%) (71.3%) (0.773~0.777) 
 
To compare logistic regression with neural networks, I also estimate a multiple-period current- 
level model using logistic regression (see Table 0.7 in the appendix). The model is estimated 
using the variables in the input layer of the neural network in Table 7.4 on the same estimation 
sample before it is validated on the same “t-2” and “t-1” holdout samples. As Panel A of Table 
7.6 indicates, the multiple-period current-level model using logistic regression correctly 
classifies 66.6% of the firms in the estimation sample based on the single optimal cut-off point 
of 0.056. The AUC the logistic regression model achieves is 0.718, as large as 0.720 or small 
as 0.716 at a 95% confidence interval. In external validation, the model achieves a better two-
year-ahead out-of-sample prediction in Panel B of Table 7.6: correct classification of 70.2% of 
the firms based on the optimal cut-off point of 0.046, and an AUC of 0.759, as large as 0.762 
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or small as 0.757 at a 95% confidence interval. The model achieves an even better one-year-
ahead out-of-sample prediction: it correctly classifies 71.3% of the firms using the optimal cut-
off point of 0.039 in Panel C of Table 7.6, and achieves an AUC of 0.775, as large as 0.777 or 
small as 0.773 at a 95% confidence interval.  
To extract additional information from the continuous variables, I decompose the end-of-year 
“p” level of every continuous variable into their end-of-year “p-1” level and annual change 
“∆ݔ௣” (∆ݔ௣ ൌ ݔ௣ െ ݔ௣ିଵ), and estimate lagged level and change models using both logistic 
regression and neural networks. Not only does this allow us to examine the effectiveness of the 
decomposition, but it also compares the predictive accuracy of logistic regression and neural 
networks again. 
Table 7.7 Network Information of lagged level and change model using neural networks 
Name of layer Number of neurons  
Input layer 38 neurons:  
 The categorical variable of industry  
 The categorical variable of region  
 age  
 Size୮ିଵ  ∆Size୮ 
 Cash	by	total	assets୮ିଵ ∆Cash by total	assets୮ 
 Creditors	by	total liabilities୮ିଵ ∆Creditors by	total	liabilities୮ 
 EBIT	by	total	assets୮ିଵ ∆EBIT by total	assets୮ 
 Fixed	assets	by total assets୮ିଵ  ∆Fixed assets by	total	assets୮ 
 Loans	by	total	assets୮ିଵ ∆Loans by total	assets୮ 
 Total	liabilities by total assets୮ିଵ  ∆Total liabilities	by	total	assets୮ 
 Working	capital by total assets୮ିଵ ∆Working capital	by	total	assets୮ 
 International	resevers per head୮ିଵ ∆Internatioanl	reserves	per	head୮
 Trade	balanace ሺ% of GDPሻ୮ିଵ ∆Trade balanceሺ%	of	GDPሻ୮ 
 Unemployment rates୮ିଵ  ∆Unemployment	rates୮ 
Hidden layer 8 neurons  
Output layer 2 neurons  
* excluding the bias unit  
 
The lagged level and change model using neural networks consists of 38 neurons in the input 
layer, 8 neurons in the hidden layer and 2 neurons in the output layer. The activation functions 
are the hyperbolic tangent function in the hidden layer and the softmax function in the output 
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layer. The cross entropy error is approximately 230,982 in the estimation sample and 57,999 
in the testing sample.  
Table 7.8 Predictive accuracy of lagged level and change neural network model 
Panel A: Correctly classified firms and percentages (in parenthesis), AUC and its 95% confidence 
interval (in parenthesis) in the estimation sample 
Observed 
active firms 
Observed 
failed firms 
Cut-off point Correctly 
classified 
active firms 
Correctly 
classified 
failed firms 
AUC 
1,420,435 78,741 0.052 959,540 53,122 0.732 
   (67.5%) (67.5%) (0.730~0.734) 
      
Panel B: Correctly classified firms and percentages (in parenthesis), AUC and its 95% confidence 
interval (in parenthesis) in the “t-2” holdout sample 
Observed 
active firms 
Observed 
failed firms 
Cut-off point Correctly 
classified 
active firms 
Correctly 
classified 
failed firms 
AUC 
611,324 39,983 0.048 371,993 24,312 0.650 
   (60.8%) (60.8%) (0.647~0.653) 
 
Panel C: Correctly classified firms and percentages (in parenthesis), AUC and its 95% confidence 
interval (in parenthesis) in the “t-1” holdout sample 
Observed 
active firms 
Observed 
failed firms 
Cut-off point Correctly 
classified 
active firms 
Correctly 
classified 
failed firms 
AUC 
674,640 46,197 0.044 413,205 28,268 0.652 
   (61.2%) (61.2%) (0.650~0.655) 
 
Panel A of Table 7.8 shows the practical results of using the neural network trained on the 
estimation sample. Using a single cut-off point of 0.052, the neural network model correctly 
classifies 67.5% of the firms with the Type I and II errors being 32.5%. The AUC it achieves 
is 0.732, as large as 0.734 or small as 0.730 at a 95% confidence interval. The model, however, 
achieves a much lower predictive accuracy rate in external validation. As far as the two-year-
ahead out-of-sample distress prediction is concerned, the model correctly classifies 60.8% of 
the firms based on the single cut-off point of 0.048, and achieves an AUC of 0.650, as large as 
0.653 or small as 0.647 at a 95% confidence interval in Panel B. In Panel C, the one-year-ahead 
out-of-sample distress prediction is correct classification of 61.2% of the firms based on the 
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cut-off point of 0.044, together with an AUC of 0.652, as large as 0.655 or small as 0.650 at a 
95% confidence interval.  
Table 7.9 Predictive accuracy of lagged level and change logistic regression model 
Panel A: Correctly classified firms and percentages (in parenthesis), AUC and its 95% confidence 
interval (in parenthesis) in the estimation sample 
Observed 
active firms 
Observed 
failed firms 
Cut-off point Correctly 
classified 
active firms 
Correctly 
classified 
failed firms 
AUC 
1,420,435 78,741 0.055 948,139 52,526 0.724 
   (66.7%) (66.7%) (0.722~0.726) 
      
Panel B: Correctly classified firms and percentages (in parenthesis), AUC and its 95% confidence 
interval (in parenthesis) in the “t-2” holdout sample 
Observed 
active firms 
Observed 
failed firms 
Cut-off point Correctly 
classified 
active firms 
Correctly 
classified 
failed firms 
AUC 
611,324 39,983 0.050 408,670 26,715 0.725 
   (66.8%) (66.8%) (0.722~0.728) 
      
Panel C: Correctly classified firms and percentages (in parenthesis), AUC and its 95% confidence 
interval (in parenthesis) in the “t-1” holdout sample 
Observed 
active firms 
Observed 
failed firms 
Cut-off point Correctly 
classified 
active firms 
Correctly 
classified 
failed firms 
AUC 
674,640 46,197 0.043 463,729 31,715 0.743 
   (68.7%) (68.7%) (0.740~0.745) 
 
To compare logistic regression and neural networks, I also estimate a logistic regression model 
using the variables in the input layer of the neural network in Table 7.7 on the same estimation 
sample before I validate it on the same “t-2” and “t-1” holdout samples (refer to Table 0.8 for 
the logistic regression model). As Panel A of Table 7.9 indicates, the lagged level and change 
model using logistic regression correctly classifies 66.7% of the firms in the estimation sample 
based on the single cut-off point of 0.055, together with an AUC of 0.724, as large as 0.726 or 
small as 0.722 at a 95% confidence interval. In external validation, the logistic regression 
model achieves similar two-year-ahead out-of-sample distress prediction accuracy in Panel B: 
it correctly classifies 66.8% of the firms based on the cut-off point of 0.050; the AUC it 
achieves is 0.725 and ranges between 0.722 and 0.728 at a 95% confidence interval. In Panel 
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C, the model achieves a slightly better one-year-ahead out-of-sample prediction: correct 
classification of 68.7% of the firms based on the cut-off point of 0.043, and an AUC of 0.743, 
as large as 0.745 or small as 0.740 at a 95% confidence interval.  
Table 7.10 compares logistic regression and neural networks to check whether the finding holds 
that logistic regression compares well with neural networks. As Table 7.10 suggests, neural 
networks outperform logistic regression in the aggregated current level models in terms of the 
in-sample and two-year-ahead out-of-sample distress prediction. In the one-year-ahead out-of-
sample distress prediction, logistic regression achieves a higher predictive accuracy rate than 
neural networks. In the lagged level and change models, neural networks achieve a slightly 
higher in-sample predictive accuracy rate than logistic regression. Logistic regression, 
however, substantially outperforms neural networks in the two-year-ahead and one-year-ahead 
out-of-sample distress prediction. When comparing each lagged level and change model with 
its aggregated current level counterpart, this study finds that the decomposition is not effective: 
it improves the in-sample prediction of both logistic regression and neural networks very 
trivially at the expense of their deteriorating out-of-sample prediction probably due to its 
overfitting of the lagged level and change models on the estimation data. To conclude, the 
second additional test of multiple-period models suggests that overall logistic regression 
compares favourably with neural networks in terms of generalisability.  
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Table 7.10 In-sample and out-of-sample distress prediction of multiple-period models using logistic regression versus neural networks 
 Logistic regression Neural networks 
 Estimation sample 2-year-prior-to-
failure holdout 
sample 
1-year-prior-to-
failure holdout 
sample 
Estimation sample 2-year-prior-to-
failure holdout 
sample 
1-year-prior-to-
failure holdout 
sample 
Model AUC  AUC  AUC  AUC AUC  AUC 
Current level  0.718 0.759 0.775 0.732 0.778 0.715 
Lagged level and change 0.724 0.725 0.743 0.732 0.650 0.652 
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7.3 Advantages and disadvantages of logistic regression versus neural networks 
Having predicted financial distress for private firms using logistic regression and neural 
networks and compared their predictive accuracy, this study will discuss the advantages and 
disadvantages of the two approaches in this section in order to provide criteria for model 
selection. The study will compare the two approaches in terms of ability to detect complex 
nonlinear relationships between outcome and explanatory variables, ability to detect 
interactions among explanatory variables, predictive accuracy, generalisability to external 
datasets, and ease of interpretation and sharing models with other researchers.  
What are the advantages and disadvantages of using neural networks versus logistic regression 
in the prediction of financial distress? Where an outcome is binary (e.g., 1 for failed and 0 for 
active in this study), logistic regression and neural networks share the goal of predicting the 
binary outcome based on the values of a series of independent variables. There are no 
predefined mathematical relationships between outcome and independent variables in a neural 
network. In a neural network, each neuron is an activation function of a weighted linear 
combination of neurons at the preceding layer. Rather than relying on predefined relationships, 
a neural network uses actual data to determine activation functions. To estimate the optimal 
values of connection weights, a neural network modifies connection weights in order to 
minimise the difference between actual outcome and predicted output using training 
algorithms, among which the traditional back-propagation adjusts weights to find a local 
minimum of a cross entropy function. As shown in Chapter 6, hidden neurons allow a neural 
network to model complex nonlinear relationships between outcome and independent 
variables: independent variables will undergo a nonlinear transformation at each hidden neuron 
and output neuron. If there is significant complex nonlinearity between outcome and 
independent variables in a dataset, neural networks will modify connection weights to better 
reflect complex nonlinearity. Since a hidden neuron is an activation function of input neurons, 
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the hidden layer of a neural network also enables a researcher to detect and model interactions 
among a series of independent variables. In contrast, there exists a predefined mathematical 
relationship between outcome and independent variables in a logistic regression model: the 
probability of the outcome is a logistic function of the values of the independent variables. 
Following a logit transformation, the independent variables are related in a linear manner to 
the log-odds of the outcome variable. By treating independent variables as linear in the log-
odds, logistic regression ends up with limited capacity to model complex nonlinear 
relationships between outcome and independent variables: it cannot automatically detect and 
model complex nonlinear relationships between outcome and explanatory variables; rather, it 
requires a researcher to explicitly search complex nonlinear relationships and model them 
explicitly as shown in Section 6.1. Logistic regression has limited capacity to detect and model 
interactions among explanatory variables as well as complex nonlinear relationships between 
outcome and explanatory variables. Logistic regression cannot automatically detect and model 
interactions among explanatory variables and requires a researcher’s specification of 
interactions terms. As shown in Section 6.1, it is, however, cumbersome for a researcher to test 
all possible two-way interactions, not to mention higher order interactions.  
The disadvantages of logistic regression, however, do not necessarily translate into a lower 
predictive accuracy rate of logistic regression compared with neural networks. With a small 
number of explanatory variables, logistic regression compares well with neural networks. This 
study finds that logistic regression and neural networks achieve similar predictive accuracy. As 
shown in our first additional test, neural networks do not outperform logistic regression 
substantially until one includes a very large number of variables as predictors. The second 
additional test indicates that logistic regression compares favourably with neural networks in 
terms of generalisability. When one estimates a logistic regression model on an estimation 
sample and validate it on a holdout sample which is very different from the estimation sample, 
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logistic regression is less prone to overfitting than neural networks and so outperforms neural 
networks. Equally important is that a logistic regression model yields highly interpretable and 
easy-to-share output. The method of maximum likelihood can be used to obtain estimated 
coefficients of a logistic regression model: the estimation process involves finding coefficients 
that maximise a likelihood function. With the conversion of a coefficient into an odds ratio as 
shown in Table 5.2, logistic regression has proved to be a very powerful tool in unmasking the 
relationships between outcome and independent variables. It is also easy to share an estimated 
logistic regression model with other researchers. One need only know the coefficients of a 
logistic regression model and perform simple calculations to predict an outcome. In contrast, a 
neural network yields a “black-box” output. The connection weights of a neural network are 
not as interpretable as the estimated coefficients of a logistic regression model, thereby failing 
to provide an insight into the relationship between outcome and independent variables. It is not 
easy to share a trained neural network: one need provide either a copy of the trained neural 
network or the very large connection weight matrices. To conclude, neither model can replace 
the other. With a small number of predictors, logistic regression remains a predictive alternative 
to neural networks given its comparable predictive accuracy, high generalisability and highly 
interpretable and easy-to-share output. Neural networks may be a better alternative only if a 
researcher is interested in the prediction of an outcome only and has a very large number of 
predictors.  
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Chapter 8 Conclusion 
While it is important to evaluate the financial health of private firms given their economic 
contributions and high failure rate, their financial health cannot be assessed by market equity, 
agency ratings or predictive models constructed for publicly traded firms. In the extensive 
literature on corporate financial distress prediction, private firms have been less frequently 
studied primarily due to limited access to data and the less informative nature of private firms’ 
accounting data. Over the past five years, there have been only a few studies on the financial 
distress of private firms, which include Bhimani, Gulamhussen and Lopes (2010, 2014) and 
Altman et al. (2014). Given this lack of recent studies on the financial distress of private firms, 
this study sets out to estimate financial distress prediction models for private firms in the EU 
using logistic regression and neural networks. In doing so, the study accomplishes the three 
objectives set out in Chapter 1 by addressing the three research questions: Can one use a set of 
risk factors as early indicators of the financial distress of private firms? How far ahead can one 
predict financial distress for private firms with acceptable discrimination? Does logistic 
regression remain a predictive alternative to neural networks in terms of predictive success? 
To address the three research questions, the study provides descriptive statistics in Chapter 4, 
estimates logistic regression and neural network models in Chapters 5 and 6 respectively, and 
compares the predictive accuracy of the two approaches in Chapter 7. This chapter is intended 
to make some concluding remarks and is structured as follows. Section 8.1 summarises the 
research journey and key findings before Section 8.2 discusses policy ramifications. Section 
8.3 considers the limitations of this study and proposes directions for future research.   
8.1 Research journey and findings 
Prior studies have typically modelled financial distress using a set of predictors, thereby 
providing insights into the symptoms of financial distress. Without detailed descriptive 
statistics, however, prior studies have failed to shed light on how the symptoms of financial 
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distress develop over time and vary by region and industry. While one can use a predictive 
model to evaluate the financial health of a private firm, it is also important to know the 
development of symptoms over time to provide an early diagnosis of financial distress. With 
this point in mind, this study raises the first research question of whether one can use a set of 
risk factors as early indicators of financial distress in private firms. The majority of prior studies 
on the financial distress of private firms have relied on accounting-based measures. These 
studies have typically predicted financial distress for private firms only one year ahead with 
acceptable discrimination because of limited access to data and the less informative nature of 
private firms’ accounting data. While the literature has well documented the ability of 
accounting ratios to predict financial distress, an initiative is introduced in this study to enhance 
the predictive accuracy of models and extend their forecasting horizon by using 
macroeconomic variables in addition to accounting ratios. The second research question then 
arises of how far ahead one can predict financial distress for private firms with acceptable 
discrimination. The construction of a predictive model involves the use of appropriate 
techniques. A range of techniques are available: at one extreme are simple linear statistical 
techniques and at the other extreme fully general and nonlinear techniques. Recent years have 
witnessed an increase of interest in the use of fully general and nonlinear techniques such as 
neural networks. There seems to be no consensus in the literature that neural networks 
outperform simple linear statistical techniques. Also, prior studies which have compared neural 
networks with simple linear techniques have several limitations: small sized samples of firms 
other than privately held firms and the use of similar estimation and holdout samples. This 
study addresses the third question of whether a simple linear technique remains a predictive 
alternative to neural networks in a very large private dataset in the EU. The statistical technique 
of logistic regression has been one of the most commonly used techniques since Ohlson (1980) 
and is thus chosen as a benchmark to assess a neural network’s predictive capacity.   
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With the three research questions in mind, this study provides a descriptive analysis in Chapter 
4 and estimates single-period models using logistic regression and neural networks in Chapters 
5 and 6 respectively. This is followed by a comparison of logistic regression and neural 
networks in Chapter 7. Chapter 4 does not simply identify a set of risk factors; it also examines 
the development of these risk factors over time, thereby providing an insight into the use of 
these risk factors as early warnings of financial distress. Chapter 4 examines nine firm-specific 
risk factors as early indicators of financial distress. Having found significant differences 
between active and failed firms in the nine firm-specific risk factors, this study provides a 
breakdown of these differences by industry, region and over a 5-year period leading up to 
failure. Overall, failed firms were younger, smaller, less liquid, less profitable, less solvent, 
held less cash and cash equivalents and made less investment in fixed assets than active firms 
across most industries and regions. Exceptions include larger failed firms in the industries of 
agriculture, forestry and fishing and retail trade and in the region of Southern Europe, lower 
levels of creditors to total liabilities among failed firms in the industries of mining and 
manufacturing and in the region of South Eastern Europe, and lower levels of loans to total 
assets among failed firms in the industries of public administration and mining and in the region 
of South Eastern Europe. Chapter 4 also provides the mean values of the firm-specific risk 
factors for failed firms over a 5-year period leading up to failure. The study finds that a failed 
firm began to show the symptoms of financial distress as early as five years prior to the 
occurrence of any failure event except that a failed firm did not become smaller and have a 
higher ratio of creditors to total liabilities than an active firm until 4 years prior to failure. The 
mean values of the firm-specific risk factors for failed firms over a 5-year period prior to failure 
provide valuable insights into the development of the symptoms of financial distress over time 
and so help one with an early diagnosis of a firm’s financial distress. The symptoms of a firm 
entering into financial distress include a relatively constant value of natural logarithm of total 
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assets and a stable increase in the ratio of creditors to total liabilities over a 4-year period 
leading up to failure, and a steady decline in the ratio of cash to total assets, a rapid decline in 
the ratio of EBIT to total assets, a gradual decrease in the ratio of fixed assets to total assets, a 
rapid increase in the ratio of loans to total assets, a stable rise in the ratio of total liabilities to 
total assets, and an overall decreasing trend in the ratio of working capital to total assets over 
a 5-year period leading up to failure.  
An early diagnosis of financial distress should also allow for the effects of industry, region and 
business cycles on failure risk. Chapter 4 finds that failure rates show considerable variation 
by industry and region, thereby showing the usefulness of the industry and region effects to the 
assessment of a firm’s financial distress. During the sample period of 2002 to 2011, firms in 
the public administration industry experienced the highest failure rate, followed by firms in 
construction, manufacturing, wholesale, finance, insurance and real estate, transportation, 
communication and public utilities, services, retail trade, mining and agriculture, forestry and 
fishing. Firms in Southern Europe had the highest failure rate, followed by firms in Western 
Europe, Eastern Europe, South Eastern Europe and Northern Europe. Chapter 4 also examines 
the impact of industry and region on financial distress over time by showing the variation of 
the annual failure rates across the ten industries and the five regions. The study finds that firms 
in all the industries except agriculture, forestry and fishing, and firms in the EU regions except 
South Eastern Europe experienced a higher failure rate at the onset of the global financial crisis, 
suggesting that the financial health of firms in most industries and regions is vulnerable to 
economic downturns. To further examine the impact of business cycles on financial distress, 
Chapter 4 investigates the association between failure rates and the three macroeconomic 
variables. The failure rates of private firms are found to be negatively associated with 
unemployment rates (% of labour force) and international reserves per head (USD thousand) 
and positively associated with trade balance (% of GDP), which suggests that one take into 
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account the use of macroeconomic variables as early warnings of financial distress in private 
firms.  
The examination of the early symptoms of financial distress provides a preliminary indication 
of the predictive power of the risk factors. How far ahead can one predict financial distress for 
private firms with acceptable discrimination? Chapters 5 and 6 estimate single-period models 
using logistic regression and neural networks respectively. A logistic regression model is 
ܲݎሺݕ௜ ൌ 1|ݔ௜ሻ ൌ Φሺߚᇱݔ௜ሻ, where ݕ௜ is a binary outcome variable, ߚᇱݔ௜ a vector of parameter 
estimates and explanatory variables, and Φ  the cumulative standard logistic distribution 
function. In a neural network, the target can be modelled as a function of linear combination 
of the ܼ௠, which are a function of linear combinations of the inputs:  
ܼ௠ ൌ ߪሺߙ଴௠ ൅ ߙ௠்ܺሻ,݉ ൌ 1,… ,ܯ, 
௞ܶ ൌ ߚ଴௞ ൅ ߚ௞் ܼ, ݇ ൌ 1,… , ܭ 
௞݂ሺܺሻ ൌ ݃௞ሺܶሻ, ݇ ൌ 1,… , ܭ, 
where ܼ ൌ ሺܼଵ, ܼଶ, … , ܼ௠ሻ, and ܶ ൌ ሺ ଵܶ, ଶܶ, … , ௞ܶሻ.  
The study finds that with the addition of the macroeconomic variables, both logistic regression 
and neural networks predict financial distress five years ahead with acceptable discrimination. 
In Chapter 5, up to five years prior to failure models using logistic regression are estimated on 
the estimation samples and validated on the holdout samples.  The one year prior to failure 
model provides excellent discrimination for the one-year-ahead out-of-sample distress 
prediction by the model is an AUC of 0.816. The two years prior to failure model provides 
acceptable discrimination for the two-year-ahead out-of-sample distress prediction is an AUC 
of 0.790. The remaining models continue to provide acceptable discrimination. The three-year-
ahead out-of-sample distress prediction is an AUC of 0.755 whereas the four-year-ahead out-
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of-sample distress prediction is an AUC of 0.746. The five years prior to failure model provides 
acceptable discrimination as well for the five-year-ahead out-of-sample distress prediction is 
an AUC of 0.701. The neural networks trained in Chapter 6 also extend the forecasting horizon 
to five years prior to failure with acceptable discrimination. The one year prior to failure neural 
network provides excellent discrimination for the one-year-ahead out-of-sample distress 
prediction is an AUC of 0.818. The remaining models provide acceptable discrimination: the 
out-of-sample distress prediction over two to five year time horizons is an AUC of 0.798, 0.779, 
0.764 and 0.729 respectively. Depending on accounting ratios as explanatory variables, most 
of the prior studies on the financial distress of private firms have typically predicted financial 
distress one year ahead. The addition of the macroeconomic variables enables both logistic 
regression and neural networks to forecast the financial distress of private firms over a five-
year time horizon with acceptable discrimination, thereby providing evidence of the 
incremental value of the macroeconomic variables over the accounting ratios used in this study.  
After predicting financial distress for private firms using both logistic regression and neural 
networks, this study offers an insight into the question of whether logistic regression remains 
a predictive alternative to neural networks. While there seems to be no consensus in the 
literature that neural networks outperform logistic regression, Chapter 7 finds that logistic 
regression remains a predictive alternative to neural networks for two reasons. Firstly, logistic 
regression has several advantages over neural networks. Logistic regression yields a highly 
interpretable and easy-to-use output whereas neural networks yield a “blackbox” and difficult-
to-interpret output. Secondly, logistic regression compares rather well with neural networks in 
terms of predictive accuracy. Chapters 5 and 6 estimate every single-period model using 
logistic regression and neural networks respectively on the same estimation samples before 
they are validated on the same holdout samples. Over one to two year time horizons, logistic 
regression and neural networks achieve a very similar rate of predictive accuracy: the one-year-
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ahead out-of-sample distress prediction is an AUC of 0.816 for logistic regression and an AUC 
of 0.818 for neural networks; the two-year-ahead out-of-sample distress prediction is an AUC 
of 0.790 for logistic regression and an AUC of 0.798 for neural networks. Over three to five 
year time horizons, neural networks do outperform logistic regression but not substantially: the 
three-to-five-year-ahead out-of-sample distress prediction is an AUC of 0.755, 0.746 and 0.701 
for logistic regression and an AUC of 0.779, 0.764 and 0.729 for neural networks.  
As the selection of the explanatory variables is biased towards logistic regression and the 
models estimated in Chapters 5 and 6 are single-period models, this study conducts two 
additional tests in Chapter 7 to determine whether the finding that logistic regression compares 
favourably with neural networks holds against a change in explanatory variables and sampling. 
The first additional test estimates single-period logistic regression and neural network models 
again over one to five year time horizons with the addition of new variables.  Overall, neural 
networks outperform logistic regression substantially. The one-to-five-year-ahead out-of-
sample distress prediction is an AUC of 0.869, 0.890, 0.857, 0.841 and 0.797 for logistic 
regression, and an AUC of 0.911, 0.908, 0.897, 0.883 and 0.859 for neural networks. The 
second test involves the estimation of multiple-period models based on three to five years prior 
to failure data in order to predict financial distress one to two years ahead (multiple-period 
current-level models). Neural networks outperform logistic regression in terms of the in-sample 
and two-year-ahead out-of-sample distress prediction but not the one-year-ahead out-of-sample 
distress prediction. The two-year-ahead out-of-sample distress prediction is an AUC of 0.759 
for logistic regression and an AUC of 0.778 for neural networks. Logistic regression, however, 
achieves a much better one-year-ahead out-of-sample distress prediction than neural networks: 
an AUC of 0.775, which is substantially larger than the AUC of 0.715 achieved by neural 
networks. Neural networks are more prone to overfitting, a phenomenon in which a model is 
highly adjusted specifically to an estimation sample and so performs poorly on an independent 
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sample, due to their complex structures and ability to model complex relationships between 
outcome and explanatory variables and among explanatory variables. In this study, an early 
stopping rule and testing samples are used to prevent the overfitting of neural networks. Despite 
these efforts, the resultant neural network seems to have overfit the data given its unexpected 
poor one-year-ahead out-of-sample distress prediction. This is confirmed when the study 
estimates multiple-period models again on the same estimation sample in which every 
continuous variable is decomposed into their lagged level and annual change (multiple-period 
lagged level and change models). Neural networks continue to outperform logistic regression 
in terms of the in-sample distress prediction although the difference is not substantial. When 
validated on the holdout samples, logistic regression, however, achieves a much higher 
predictive accuracy rate than neural networks: the two-year-ahead out-of-sample distress 
prediction is an AUC of 0.725 for logistic regression and an AUC of 0.650 for neural networks; 
the one-year-ahead out-of-sample distress prediction is an AUC of 0.743 for logistic regression 
and an AUC of 0.652 for neural networks. It should also be noted that the multiple-period 
current-level models using both the techniques achieve a better out-of-sample distress 
prediction than the multiple-period lagged level and change models, suggesting that one should 
strive for parsimony in model building.  
8.2 Policy ramifications 
While accounting conventions assume that a firm is going to operate in the foreseeable future, 
this concept of going concern does not match the actual behaviour of a firm in the real world. 
Constant changes in the environment including public policy and in the expectations of a firm 
oblige the firm to respond by changing its corporate private policies (Chambers 1970). The 
survival of a firm is thus both endogenous and exogenous. While this study explores the 
exogenous effect of public policy and the endogenous effect of corporate policies on corporate 
survival by incorporating both the firm-specific and macroeconomic variables in the estimated 
214 
 
models, what are the implications of the predictive models for both public and private corporate 
policies? The managers of a firm make decisions about the firm’s operating, investing and 
financial activities, whose resultant effects are partially represented by financial ratios. The 
effect of the ratio of fixed assets to total assets on a private firm’s survival indicates that to 
survive in the foreseeable future, a private firm should have adequate investment in fixed assets 
by developing appropriate policies with regards to the acquisition and disposal of fixed assets: 
investment in fixed assets affects both the operating capacity of a firm and its ability to respond 
to a liquidity crisis by selling fixed assets. The association of the ratios of creditors to total 
liabilities, loans to total assets, total liabilities to total assets and working capital to total assets 
with the survival of a firm suggests that a private firm finance its operations with debts it is 
liquid and will be liquid enough to repay. The impact of the ratio of cash to total assets on a 
private firm’s survival indicates that having more cash and cash equivalents is more useful than 
wasteful for a private firm due to its limited access to capital markets. To assess a firm’s 
operating efficiency and performance, one typically examines profitability ratios. The effect of 
the ratio of EBIT to total assets on a firm’s survival indicates that managers should increase or 
at least stabilize its profitability or else a firm may ultimately fail. A firm’s corporate policy 
should also respond to business cycles. In times of economic turmoil, a firm should borrow 
less, increase its liquidity and have more cash and cash equivalents although profitability may 
decline.  
The effect of the three macroeconomic variables on a private firm’s survival has important 
implications for public policy. During an economic downturn, a government should increase 
its international reserves per head and reduce the reliance of GDP on trade balance in order to 
reduce the financial distress of private firms. Unemployment rates, however, have a more 
ambiguous effect on the financial distress of private firms, thereby generating more 
complicated implications for public policy with regards to unemployment. Unemployment is 
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counter-cyclical in the sense that it falls during an economic upturn but rises during an 
economic downturn: in times of economic turmoil, a firm often reduces its workforce to avoid 
financial distress, thereby contributing to a higher unemployment rate. Conversely, a rise in 
unemployment rates worsens an economic downturn by denting consumers’ confidence; 
therefore, it may increase the probability of a private firm’s entering into financial distress.  
8.3 Limitations of the study and future research 
This study contributes to the literature by yielding results that may change the consensus in 
prior studies which have found that 1) models typically only predict financial distress for 
private firms over a one-year time horizon with acceptable discrimination and 2) neural 
networks achieve a higher predictive accuracy rate than logistic regression. Nevertheless, there 
are some limitations in this study.  
In the financial distress prediction literature, there have been two strands of research with one 
being empirical research and the other theoretical research. The former involves the 
construction of empirically derived models that can be used to discriminate between active 
firms and firms that fail over a certain time horizon. The latter is more concerned with the 
construction of a theoretically derived model from an explicit and well developed theory. In 
this study, the descriptive statistics and the logistic regression results cast some light on the 
effect of the selected predictors on financial distress. The study, however, selects these 
predictors based on the findings of prior empirical studies and their significant associations 
with the outcome variable rather than an explicit and well developed theory. In the literature 
on financial distress prediction for publicly traded firms, there have been several studies based 
on a theoretically derived model from a well-developed theory: cash flow models in Beaver 
(1966), Casey and Bartczak (1984, 1985), and Gentry, Newbold and Whitford (1985a, 1985b), 
the gambler’s ruin models in Wilcox (1971), Santomero and Vinso (1977) and Vinso (1979), 
and a catastrophe theory model in Gregory-Allen and Henderson (1991). There has been a 
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dearth of theoretically derived models for private firms. One future direction is thus the 
development of a theoretically derived model in light of a corporate failure theory for privately 
held firms given their considerable differences from publicly traded firms.  
This study falls into the empirical research side of the financial distress prediction literature. 
Several limitations are apparent in the building of the empirically derived models in this study. 
First is the representativeness of the sample used in this study. To obtain a very large dataset, 
I collected data from the ORBIS database for as many as 28 countries in the EU; however, the 
ORBIS database has not collected data evenly across the countries, thereby reducing the 
representativeness of the derived sample. Second is lack of available behavioural predictors for 
private firm analysis. While early studies depended only on financial ratios to predict financial 
distress, recent studies have used a wide range of predictors, financial, macroeconomic, and 
behavioural. Examples of behavioural predictors include managerial structure and audit lags in 
Keasey and Watson (1987), and reasons for starting a business, strategy, financial management, 
cash flow management, relationships with banks, pricing, marketing, quality of workforce and 
characteristics of owners in Perry (2001). A possible extension of this study is to explore the 
incremental value of behavioural predictors over financial and macroeconomic predictors. 
Third are missing values in the dataset. In this study, I collected and calculated 50 accounting 
ratios, many of which have some missing values. Some ratios such as net cash provided by 
operating activities/total debts have more missing values. The complete-case analysis reduced 
the sample size in this study; it may also have biased our inferences as failed firms are more 
likely to have incomplete data than active firms. To handle the problem of missing values 
arising in most statistical analyses, one needs to find out whether values are missing completely 
at random, at random, depending on unobserved predictors or missing values themselves. In 
practice, however, it is generally very difficult to know why values are missing. Future studies 
on private firms can try to impute missing values using a number of approaches (e.g., singular 
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value decomposition, weighted K-nearest neighbours). Fourth is the use of the traditional back-
propagation algorithm in the neural networks models trained in this study. There are several 
algorithms to train a neural network such as back-propagation and resilient back-propagation. 
Both back-propagation and resilient back-propagation aim to minimise the error function by 
adding a learning rate to the weights going into the opposite direction of the gradient. Resilient 
back-propagation, however, has a separate learning rate that is used for each weight and can be 
changed during the training process. Future research could use alternative algorithms including 
resilient back-propagation to train a neural network model before it is compared with logistic 
regression in terms of predictive accuracy. Finally, this study employs logistic regression and 
neural networks in order to answer the third research question. Future studies on the financial 
distress of private firms could use more advanced techniques which have been more frequently 
used in predictive models for publicly traded firms. In the literature on financial distress 
prediction for publicly traded firms, there have been three generations of empirical models. 
Corporate failure prediction modelling begins with Beaver (1966, 1968) and Altman (1968). 
The second generation of modelling is represented by models such as Ohlson (1980)’s logit 
model and Zmijewski (1984)’s probit model. The third generation of modelling is dominated 
by artificial intelligence and duration analysis such as Tam and Kiang (1992)’s artificial neural 
networks and Shumway (2001)’s discrete duration model. In the literature on failure prediction 
for privately held firms, however, the third generation of modelling has been less frequently 
used. It would be worthwhile to predict financial distress for private firms using the third 
generation of modelling.    
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Appendix 
Table 0.1 Financial ratios 
 Financial ratios 
1 Return on total assets (profit before tax/total assets) 
2 Collection period (in days) 
3 Creditor period (in days) 
4 Current ratio (current assets/current liabilities) 
5 Solvency ratio (shareholders’ funds/total assets) 
6 Net asset turnover [operating revenue/(shareholders’ funds + non-current 
liabilities)] 
7 Current assets less stock/total assets 
8 Cash/total assets 
9 Creditors/total liabilities 
10 Debtor/total assets 
11 EBIT/current liabilities 
12 EBIT/total assets 
13 EBIT/total liabilities 
14 Financial expense/operating revenue 
15 Fixed assets/total assets 
16 Loans/total assets 
17 Non-current liabilities/total assets 
18 Other shareholders’ funds/total assets 
19 Total liabilities/total assets 
20 Working capital/total assets 
21 Cash/current liabilities 
22 Current assets/total liabilities 
23 Current assets/shareholders’ funds 
24 Financial expense/current assets 
25 Long-term debt/fixed assets 
26 Operating revenue/shareholders’ funds 
27 Operating revenue/total assets 
28 Operating revenue/total liabilities 
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29 Shareholders’ funds/total liabilities 
30 Stock/working capital 
31 Total liabilities/current liabilities 
32 Working capital/current assets 
33 Working capital/current liabilities 
34 Working capital/operating revenue 
35 Stock/current assets 
36 Cash flow/current liabilities 
37 Cash flow/total assets 
38 Cash flow/total liabilities 
39 Cash flows/shareholders’ funds  
40 Net operating cash/current liabilities 
41 Net operating cash/shareholders’ funds 
42 Net operating cash/total assets 
43 Net operating cash/total liabilities 
44 Export revenue/operating revenue 
45 R&D expense/operating revenue 
46 Profit per employee (th) 
47 Operating revenue per Employee (th) 
48 Costs of employees / Operating revenue (%) 
49 Average cost of employee (th) 
50 Shareholders’ funds per employee (th) 
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Table 0.2 Accounts 
BvD 
Code Label Formula Definition 
FIAS Fixed Assets IFAS+TFAS+OFAS Total amount (after depreciation) of non 
current assets (Intangible 
assets+Tangible assets+Other fixed 
assets). 
IFAS Intangible 
Fixed Assets 
  All intangible assets such as formation 
expenses, research expenses, goodwill, 
development expenses and all other 
expenses with a long term effect 
TFAS Tangible 
Fixed Assets 
  All tangible assets such as buildings, 
machinery, etc. 
OFAS Other Fixed 
Assets 
  All other fixed assets such as long term 
investments, shares and participations, 
pension funds etc. 
CUAS Current 
Assets 
STOK+DEBT+OCAS Total amount of current assets 
(Stocks+Debtors+Other current assets). 
STOK Stocks   Total inventories (raw materials+in 
progress+finished goods) 
DEBT Debtors   Trade receivables (from clients and 
customers only) 
OCAS Other 
Current 
Assets 
  All other current assets such as 
receivables from other sources (taxes, 
group companies ), short term 
investment of money and Cash at bank 
and in hand. 
CASH Cash and 
Cash 
Equivalent 
  Detail of the Other current assets =Only 
the amount of cash at bank and in hand 
of the company. 
TOAS Total Assets FIAS+CUAS Total assets (Fixed assets+ Current 
assets) 
SHFD Shareholders’ 
Funds 
CAPI+OSFD Total equity (Capital + Other 
shareholders funds) 
CAPI Capital   Issued Share capital (Authorized 
capital). 
OSFD Other 
Shareholders’ 
Funds 
  All Shareholders’ funds not linked with 
the Issued capital such as Reserve 
capital, Undistributed profit, include 
also Minority interests if any. 
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NCLI Non-Current 
Liabilities 
LTDB+ONCL Long term liabilities of the company 
(Long term financial debts + other long 
term liabilities and provisions) 
LTDB Long Term 
Debt 
  Long term financial debts (e.g. to credit 
institutions (loans and credits), bonds) 
ONCL Other non 
Current 
Liabilities 
  Other long term liabilities (trade debts, 
group companies , pension loans, etc.)+ 
provisions + deferred taxes 
PROV Provisions   Provisions (social security, taxes, etc.) 
CULI Current 
Liabilities 
LOAN+CRED+OCLI Current liabilities of the company 
(Loans + Creditors + Other current 
liabilities) 
LOAN Loans   Short term financial debts (e.g. to credit 
institutions + part of Long term 
financial debts payable within the year, 
bonds, etc.) 
CRED Creditors   Debts to suppliers and contractors (trade 
creditors) 
OCLI Other 
Current 
Liabilities 
  Other current liabilities such as pension, 
personnel costs, taxes, intragroup debts, 
accounts received in advance, etc. 
TSHF Total shareh. 
funds & liab. 
SHFD+NCLI+CULI Total Shareholders’ funds and liabilities 
(Shareholders’ funds + Non current 
liabilities + Current liabilities) 
WKCA Working 
Capital 
STOK+DEBT-CRED Indicates how much capital is used by 
day to day activities=Stocks + Debtors-
Creditors 
NCAS Net current 
assets 
CUAS-CULI Similar to Working capital (allowing to 
indicate how much capital is used by 
day to day activities) but using a 
different formula: Current assets - 
Current liabilities 
OPRE Operating 
revenue 
(Turnover) 
  Total operating revenues (Net sales + 
Other operating revenues+ Stock 
variations). The figures do not include 
VAT. Local differences may occur 
regarding excises taxes and similar 
obligatory payments for specific market 
of tobacco and alcoholic beverage 
industries. 
TURN Sales   Net sales 
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COST Cost of 
Goods Sold 
  Cost of sold goods, production, services. 
Costs direcly related to the production 
of the goods sold + depreciation of those 
costs 
GROS Gross Profit OPRE-COST Operating revenue - Cost of goods sold 
OOPE Other 
Operating 
Expenses 
  All costs not directly related to the 
production of goods sold such as 
commercial costs, administrative 
expenses, etc. + depreciation of those 
costs 
OPPL Operating 
P/L [=EBIT] 
GROS-OOPE EBIT. All operating revenues - all 
operating expenses (Gross profit-Other 
operating expenses) 
FIRE Financial 
Revenue 
  All financial revenues such as interest, 
incomes from shares, etc. 
FIEX Financial 
Expenses 
  All financial expenses such as interest 
charges, write-off financial assets. 
FIPL Financial P/L FIRE-FIEX Result from financial activities of the 
company (Financial revenue-Financial 
expenses) 
PLBT P/L before 
Tax 
OPPL+FIPL Operating profit + financial profit 
TAXA Taxation   All taxes related to the accounting 
period (paid, accrued or deferred) 
PLAT P/L after Tax PLBT-TAXA Profit before taxation - Taxation 
EXRE Extraordinary 
and other 
Revenue 
  All extraordinary revenues and other 
revenues not belonging to the 'ordinary' 
activities of the company. 
EXEX Extraordinary 
and other 
Expenses 
  All extraordinary expenses and other 
expenses not belonging to the 'ordinary' 
activities of the company. 
EXTR Extraordinary 
and other P/L 
EXRE-EXEX All extraordinary and other result not 
belonging to the 'ordinary' activities of 
the company. 
PL P/L for 
Period [=Net 
income] 
PLAT+EXTR Net income for the Year. Before 
deduction of Minority interests if any 
(Profit after taxation+Extraordinary and 
other profit). 
EXPT Export 
revenue 
  Part of the turnover made abroad 
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MATE Material 
Costs 
  Detail of the purchases of goods (raw 
materials+ finished goods). No services. 
STAF Cost of 
Employees 
  Detail of all the employees costs of the 
company (including pension costs) 
DEPR Depreciation 
& 
Amortization 
  Total amount of depreciation and 
amortization of the assets 
INTE Interest Paid   Total amount of interest charges paid 
for shares or loans 
RD Research & 
Development 
expenses 
  Total amount of expenses on research 
and development activities 
CF   Cash Flow PL+DEPR Profit for period + Depreciation 
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Table 0.3 Macroeconomic variables 
 Macroeconomic variable 
1 Population mil 
2 GDP at constant $ rate (Jan 03) bil 
3 GDP real growth rate % 
4 GDP per head at constant $ rate (Jan 03) 
5 Inflation rate % 
6 Budget balance (% of GDP) % 
7 Public debt (% of GDP) % 
8 Unemployment rates (% of labour force) % 
9 Current account balance (% of GDP) % 
10 Trade balance (% of GDP) % 
11 International reserves per head ($thousand) 
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Table 0.4 Mapping of NAICS 2007 to GICS 
GICS NAICS 2007 
10. Energy Mining (21), Machinery (333) 
15. Materials Primary and fabricated metal products (331-
332), Chemical (325), Wholesale trade (42) 
20. Industrials Primary and fabricated metal products (331-
332), Machinery (333), Computers and 
electronic products (334), Electrical 
equipment, appliances and components 
(335), Transportation equipment (336).  
25. C. Discretionary Transportation equipment (336), 
Miscellaneous (339), Information (51), 
Professional, scientific, and technical 
services (54) 
30. C. Staples Food (311), Chemical (325), Wholesale 
trade (42) 
35. Health Care Chemicals (325), Computers and electronic 
products (334), Miscellaneous (339), 
Wholesale trade (42) 
40. Financials Finance and insurance (52), Depository 
institutions (60) 
45. IT Computers and electronic products (334), 
Information (51), Professional, scientific, 
and technical services (54) 
50. Telecom Information (51) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
235 
 
Table 0.5 Classification of EU countries 
EU Member states Standard Australian classification of countries 
United Kingdom Western Europe 
Ireland 
Austria 
Belgium 
France 
Germany 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Denmark Northern Europe 
Finland 
Sweden 
Italy Southern Europe 
Malta 
Portugal 
Spain 
Bulgaria South Eastern Europe 
Croatia 
Cyprus 
Greece 
Romania 
Slovenia 
Czech Republic Eastern Europe 
Estonia 
Hungary 
Latvia 
Lithuania 
Poland 
Slovakia 
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Table 0.6 ORBIS global information providers and data sources 
1 CIBI Information, Inc. (Philippines) 
2 CreditReform (China) 
3 Creditreform (Bulgaria, Ukraine & Rep. of Macedonia) 
4 Chamber of Commerce & Industry of Romania (Romania) 
5 CMIE (India) 
6 CFI Online (Ireland) 
7 Creditreform-Interinfo (Hungary) 
8 Infocredit Group Ltd (Cyprus & Middle East) 
9 CreditInform (Norway) 
10 Creditreform Latvia (Latvia) 
11 Creditreform (Rep. of Macedonia) 
12 Informa Colombia SA (Colombia) 
13 Contact database 
14 Credinform (Russia & Kazakstan) 
15 Creditreform Austria (Austria) 
16 Coface Slovenia (Slovenia) 
17 Dun & Bradstreet (USA, Canada, Latin America, Israel & Africa) 
18 DGIL Consult (Nigeria) 
19 MarketLine (previously Datamonitor) 
20 PT. Dataindo Inti Swakarsa (Indonesia) 
21 DP Information Group (Singapore) 
22 Finar Enformasyon derecelendirme ve danismanlik hizmetleri A.S (Turkey) 
23 Suomen Asiakastieto (Finland) 
24 Factset 
25 Worldbox (Switzerland) 
26 Honyvem (Italy) 
27 Creditreform Croatia (Croatia) 
28 Huaxia (China) 
29 Inforcredit Group (Cyprus) 
30 Informa (Portugal) 
31 ICAP (Greece) 
32 Informa (Spain) 
33 InfoCredit (Poland) 
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34 Ibisworld (Australia) 
35 Jordans (UK, Ireland) 
36 Patikimo Verslo Sistema (Lithuania) 
37 Krediidiinfo (Estonia) 
38 Købmandstandens Oplysningsbureau (Denmark) 
39 KIS (Korea) 
40 LexisNexis (Netherlands) 
41 Bureau van Dijk (Luxemburg) 
42 Creditreform Belgrade (Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia & Montenegro) 
43 Coface MOPE (Portugal) 
44 National Bank of Belgium (Belgium) 
45 Novcredit (Italy) 
46 CRIF Teledata AG (Switzerland) 
47 Ompic (Morocco) 
48 Private Equity 
49 Qatar Chamber of Commerce and Industry (Qatar) 
50 Cedar Rose (Middle East) 
51 Annual return (UK) 
52 Coface SCRL (France) 
53 Creditinfo Schufa GmbH (Czech Republic, Slovakia, Iceland, Malta). 
54 SeeNews (Moldova, Albania, Georgia & Uzbekistan) 
55 Chinese source 
56 Statistics Canada (Canada) 
57 China Credit Information Service Ltd (Taiwan) 
58 Taiwan Economic Journal (Taiwan) 
59 Teikoku Databank (Japan) 
60 Dun & Bradstreet TSR Ltd 
61 Transunion (South Africa) 
62 UC (Sweden) 
63 Verband der Vereine Creditreform (Germany) 
64 Veda (Australia) 
65 Worldbox (New Zealand, Hong Kong, Switzerland, Monaco, 
66 Liechtenstein, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, India & Cuba) 
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Table 0.7 Estimation results for the current-level logistic regression model 
Variable ઺ SE z Pr(>|z|) ۳ܠܘሺ઺ሻ 
Age (in years) -.010 .000 -30.345 .000 .990 
Size (natural log of total assets) -.017 .003 -6.015 .000 .983 
Cash/total assets -1.484 .031 -48.362 .000 .227 
Creditors/total liabilities .130 .016 8.230 .000 1.139 
EBIT/total assets -1.057 .029 -36.916 .000 .347 
Fixed assets/total assets -1.455 .022 -65.501 .000 .233 
Loans/total assets -.404 .023 -17.344 .000 .667 
Total liabilities/total assets .306 .020 15.596 .000 1.358 
Working capital/total assets -.903 .020 -45.246 .000 .406 
Agriculture, forestry & fishing      
Mining .495 .078 6.361 .000 1.640 
Construction .656 .045 14.424 .000 1.926 
Manufacturing .694 .045 15.355 .000 2.002 
Transportation & communications .542 .048 11.398 .000 1.719 
Wholesale trade .286 .046 6.262 .000 1.331 
Retail trade .481 .046 10.461 .000 1.618 
Finance, insurance &real estate .623 .046 13.560 .000 1.865 
Services .478 .046 10.500 .000 1.613 
Public administration .214 .176   1.211 .226 1.238 
Western Europe      
Northern Europe -1.186 .036 -33.280 .000 .306 
Southern Europe -.083 .009 -9.458 .000 .921 
South Eastern Europe -.577 .036 -15.838 .000 .562 
Eastern Europe .555 .024 23.459 .000 1.742 
International reserve per head -.973 .012 -84.056 .000 .378 
Trade balance % of GDP .138 .001 113.645 .000 1.148 
Unemployment rate .003 .002 1.358 .175 1.003 
Constant -.991 .074 -13.365 .000  
Null deviance: 617,294      
Residual deviance: 575,479      
Pseudo R square: .081      
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Table 0.8 Estimation results for the lagged level and change logistic regression model 
Variable ઺ SE z Pr(>|z|) ۳ܠܘሺ઺ሻ 
Age  -.009 .000 -28.390 .000 .991 
Size୮ିଵ -.007 .003 -2.356 .018 .993 
∆Size୮ .052 .008 6.673 .000 1.054 
Cash	by	total	assets୮ିଵ  -1.655 .033 -50.289 .000 .191 
∆Cash	by	total	assets୮ -.978 .041 -23.909 .000 .376 
Creditors	by	total	liabilities୮ିଵ .076 .017 4.418 .000 1.079 
∆Creditors	by	total	liabilities୮ .320 .022 14.339 .000 1.376 
EBIT	by	total	assets୮ିଵ -1.175 .034 -34.893 .000 .309 
∆EBIT	by	total	assets୮ -1.131 .035 -32.223 .000 .323 
Fixed	assets	by	total	assets୮ିଵ -1.579 .023 -67.824 .000 .206 
∆Fixed	assets	by	total	assets୮ -1.031 .043 -24.030 .000 .357 
Loans	by	total	assets୮ିଵ -.554 .026 -21.254 .000 .575 
∆Loans	by	total	assets୮ -.143 .033   -4.376 .000 .867 
Total	liabilities	by	total	assets୮ିଵ .251 .021 11.945 .000 1.285 
∆Total	liabilities	by	total	assets୮ .332 .033 9.938 .000 1.394 
Working	capital	by	total	assets୮ିଵ -1.032 .021 -48.194 .000 .356 
∆Working	capital	by	total assets୮ -.501 .029 -17.470 .000 .606 
Agriculture, forestry & fishing      
Mining .493 .078   6.332 .000 1.638 
Construction .657 .046   14.433 .000 1.929 
Manufacturing .706 .045 15.604 .000 2.027 
Transportation & communications .549 .048 11.534 .000 1.731 
Wholesale trade .291 .046   6.374 .000 1.338 
Retail trade .490 .046 10.654 .000 1.633 
Finance, insurance &real estate .621 .046   13.501 .000 1.862 
Services .489 .046 10.727 .000 1.631 
Public administration .265 .177 1.498 .134 1.303 
Western Europe      
Northern Europe -1.434 .038 -38.149 .000 .238 
Southern Europe .028 .009 3.004 .003 1.028 
South Eastern Europe -.407 .037 -10.919 .000 .665 
Eastern Europe .938 .026   35.550 .000 2.555 
International	resevers	per head୮ିଵ -.812 .013 -63.226 .000 .444 
∆Internatioanl	reserves	per head୮ -1.600 .027 -58.635 .000 .202 
Trade	balanace	ሺ%	of	GDPሻ୮ିଵ .149 .001 115.080 .000 1.161 
∆Trade	balanceሺ%	of	GDPሻ୮ -.047 .006 -7.467 .000 .954 
Unemployment	rate୮ିଵ -.016 .002 -7.102 .000 .984 
∆Unemployment	rate୮ .209 .005   39.651 .000 1.232 
Constant -1.053 .076 -13.924 .000  
Null deviance: 617,294      
Residual deviance: 570,868      
Pseudo R square: .090      
 
 
 
 
